Friday, April 29

Defining the UN reform agenda
by
nadezhda
on Fri 29 Apr 2005 02:05 AM EDT
With all the ink split and airwaves filled about John Bolton and UN reform, very little in the way of "what exactly do we mean by reform" has been discussed by either proponents or opponents of Bolton's nomination. I admit to a certain sympathy for Tom Friedman's recent takedown of the GOP cries for "UN reform."
"Reforming the U.N." is without question one of the most tired, vacuous conservative mantras ever invented. It is right up there with squeezing "waste, fraud and abuse" out of the Pentagon's budget.
Still, I think Suzanne Nossel does us all a terrific service at Democracy Arsenal in explaining where UN reform really does matter. She outlines a number of key issues, as well as the stands being taken by different players.
Suzanne presents her piece as "on the margin of the Bolton debate." If, however, as has been speculated, the White House is considering pushing Bolton to the Senate floor even if the Committee sends his nomination with a negative recommendation, the sole reason -- other than an assertion of presidential power -- will be to tar the Democrats as "UN-huggers" who don't want an "effective UN." Such a circus will do neither the Democrats nor US foreign policy any good.
For that reason, I think it's extremely healthy for the policy blogs like Democracy Arsenal to expand beyond Bolton himself to the specifics of UN reform. The point is not that the Bush position on reform (at least as it's likely to be pursued by Rice) is either necessarily disingenuous or bad per se. Nor is it that the Bolton opponents are opposing Bolton as a way of undermining Bush's position on the UN. Rather, it's that Bolton is the wrong guy to pursue a reform agenda that is broadly shared on both sides of the aisle.
To make that case effectively requires Bolton's opponents to do more than simply saying "me too." It's not enough to say vaguely that the UN needs reform. That isn't very persuasive, and it has the added negative effect of being just general UN-bashing, rather than focusing on expanding on what the UN does well and changing it where it needs to change.
Suzanne also makes the point that it's important to identify where specific reform priorities overlap with Kofi Annan's proposals, and where the sticking points are. As she illustrates, a lot of those sticking points will be found in disagreements between the US and either Annan or other groups of countries, NOT between a majority of Republicans and Democrats.
Suzanne points us to a recent speech at the UN by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, the person Condi Rice has put in charge of the reform effort and the response to Annan's proposals. There are lots of tricky issues that are finessed in the speech. But I think most of us will find there's much to like in the Rice agenda so far. Which just makes the Bolton appointment all the more maddening and inexplicable!
{ cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism}
Thursday, April 28

A stroll down memory lane
by
nadezhda
on Thu 28 Apr 2005 10:53 PM EDT
As he's graphically displayed on a "where you've been" map, Matt Yglesias is not embarrassed to admit he's led a sheltered life when it comes to exploring the geography of America beyond narrow strips of the blue coasts. He's mightily well-read and certainly keeps up with the national media cultures of music, entertainment, sports and the internets. But sometimes a limited exposure to the highways and byways of American culture reaches out to bite him. There's more continuity in both high politics and l'Amerique profonde than perhaps Matt realizes.
 In a post commending the bracing honesty of the old-fashioned, god-fearing, anti-papists of Northern Ireland's Ian Paisley troops, Matt seems to suggest that either anti-Catholicism is waning among US Protestants or that their leaders have recently allowed political ambitions to overcome moral and theological clarity. Yes, it's easy to see why the Paisley-types would find the well-trained telegenic smiles of America's fundamentalist leaders more than a little off-putting. But no one should think that the combination of sectarian hatred and political correctness is a recent invention of the American religious right. It has a long tradition, as I am often reminded when I catch myself humming one of my favorite Tom Lehr tunes. From "That Was the Year That Was" (release 1965) comes "National Brotherhood Week." It's put to a catchy, upbeat, clap-along sort of jingle. Here's how it closes -- tap your feet in time to get the sense of how it goes:
Oh, the Protestants hate the Catholics,
And the Catholics hate the Protestants,
And the Hindus hate the Moslems,
And everybody hates the Jews.
But during National Brotherhood Week, National Brotherhood Week,
It's National Everyone-smile-at-one-another-hood Week.
Be nice to people who
Are inferior to you.
It's only for a week, so have no fear.
Be grateful that it doesn't last all year!
Now I was pretty sure of the lyrics, but I Goggled to be on the safe side. While I was searching, I naturally skimmed over the other titles on the album. I was not only reminded of the number of "greats" on that particular Lehr performance but also of the timelessness of his topical oeuvre.
Lehr gives us "The Vatican Rag" to commemorate the brouhaha over the liberal Vatican II and the decision to introduce the vernacular into the liturgy. Then there's "Smut," still fresh as a daisy in its current incarnation as porn. You want raging curriculum debates -- he's got "New Math." Or there's "Pollution," one of my all-time favorites, set to a catchy Latin beat a la "America" from West Side Story, that gives a mild flavor of suspicion of things and people urban.
If you visit American city,
You will find it very pretty.
Just two things of which you must beware:
Don't drink the water and don't breathe the air.
[snip]
Just go out for a breath of air,
And you'll be ready for Medicare.
The city streets are really quite a thrill.
If the hoods don't get you, the monoxide will.
[snip]
So go to the city, see the crazy people there.
Like lambs to the slaughter,
They're drinking the water
And breathing the air.
We were already promoting democracy in "Send the Marines." The Dominican Republic had another crisis that year, and we had a bit of an attitude where the UN-must-be-reformed-to-be-effective was concerned -- but hey, the French Soviets had a veto remember. When someone makes a move
Of which we don't approve,
Who is it that always intervenes?
U.N. and O.A.S.,
They have their place, I guess,
But first send the Marines!
There was a sense that liberal intellectuals might be slightly, shall we say, out of touch -- captured in "The Folk Song Army."
And forty years ago, we had a few concerns about nuclear proliferation. How time flies, plus ca change, and all of that. But at least today we've got a pretty good idea "Who's Next."
First we got the bomb, and that was good,
'Cause we love peace and motherhood.
Then Russia got the bomb, but that's okay,
'Cause the balance of power's maintained that way.
Who's next?
France got the bomb, but don't you grieve,
'Cause they're on our side (I believe).
China got the bomb, but have no fears,
They can't wipe us out for at least five years.
Who's next?
Then Indonesia claimed that they
Were gonna get one any day.
South Africa wants two, that's right:
One for the black and one for the white.
Who's next?
Egypt's gonna get one too,
Just to use on you know who.
So Israel's getting tense.
Wants one in self defense.
"The Lord's our shepherd," says the psalm,
But just in case, we better get a bomb.
Who's next?
Luxembourg is next to go,
And (who knows?) maybe Monaco.
We'll try to stay serene and calm
When Alabama gets the bomb.
Who's next?
Who's next?
Who's next?
Who's next?
Wednesday, April 27

Qualifications for Majority Leader
by
nadezhda
on Wed 27 Apr 2005 02:54 PM EDT
I am an enormous fan of The Decembrist's commentary on the intersection of policy and process. He has few competitors -- in or out of the blogosphere -- when it comes to insights on political strategy. But those of us who are political junkies love tactics as well. And Mark Schmitt's most recent contribution is a delicious item on how Harry Reid is, at least so far, running tactical rings around Senator Frist.
Much of Frist's problems may stem from a single personal weakness -- or perhaps more accurately, the lack of a strength shared by those Senate leaders who have been most formidable, such as LBJ. Frist isn't a one-on-one "listener," with the result that he is guilty of the cardinal sin for a Senate leader -- he doesn't know where his votes are or where they may be a week from now if the scene shifts slightly.
When combined with the fact that Frist is being pulled every which way by the various constituencies he needs to mount a presidential campaign, the picture is not a pretty one.
Ezra Klein proposes that Senate leadership positions should be reserved for those who forswear any immediate presidential ambitions.
So if future Senates want themselves to function, they should pass a new rule: no majority leader or minority leader is allowed to run for president in the next presidential election. If you hold the position in 2005 and resign in 2006, no go until 2012. If you become majority leader in 2009, you got to bracket your hopes until 2016. You've got to be out of the leadership for four whole years before you can run for president. Hopefully, that'd keep the opportunists from running and help install those who care about, and like, the Senate as an institution.
Someone who lives and breathes legislating, and loves nothing better than to talk with his colleagues about it. Sounds old-fashioned, but it just might work. Harry Reid, anyone?
Tuesday, April 26

Kofi's nominee for new head of UNDP
by
nadezhda
on Tue 26 Apr 2005 09:08 PM EDT
This is one of those inside-baseball posts, but it's very good news for the development community.
The nominee for the new head of the United Nations Development Program -- replacing Mark Malloch Brown who has moved to Kofi Annan's chief of staff -- is Kemal Dervis from Turkey. For those of you who have read Sebastian Mallaby's book on Jim Wolfensohn's stint at the World Bank, you'll remember Kemal as one of the most colorful characters in one of Mallaby's most riveting tales. Kemal was the World Bank manager under whom the extraordinarily difficult and innovative Bosnia emergency assistance package was put together in 1994 -- which was crucial to the success of bringing Dayton to a conclusion. And as Mallaby notes [p. 121]:
a few years later, when he returned to Turkey to take up an appointment as his country's finance minister, the stock market jumped as his plane landed in Ankara and he was greeted as a savior.
I'm not going so far as to hail Kemal Dervis as UNDP's "savior," although given UNDP's leading role regarding the Millennium Development Goals and an uncertain mandate with respect to crisis prevention and recovery, this is one challenging job. It's great to see someone who is both a fine mind and a risk-taker in a major leadership role in the international civil service. Kudos to Kofi for selecting him from among 100 candidates.
Here's a snip from the UN press release today:
UNDP is the largest of the independently funded UN agencies and, under its special General Assembly mandate, leads the UN's work on eradicating extreme poverty and promoting good governance in the developing world. Its staff is active in 166 countries.
Mr. Dervis' current activities, such as participation in the Global Progressive Forum and the Progressive Governance Network, have been aimed at "finding ways to make globalization into a more stable and inclusive process and to further international cooperation," UNDP said.
He is the author of a book published last month called "For Better Globalization," speaks fluent English, French and German, besides Turkish, and holds a doctorate in economics from Princeton University and Master's and Bachelor's degrees from the London School of Economics (LSE).
{ cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism}
Friday, April 22

What do Digby & Bill Buckley have in common?
by
nadezhda
on Fri 22 Apr 2005 11:34 PM EDT
Not a combo you see every day of the week, I'll grant you. Yet this unlikely duo is in hearty accord that the top executives at Viacom are sleaze-oids. In fact, Digby is far more charitable -- he just thinks Sumner Redstone's a cheapskate who's delusional about his "genius." For Buckley, Viacom is a particularly egregious example of "capitalism's boil."
WFB is hopping mad, and it's fun to see him get well and truly steamed. The National Review built its success on the amusement value of Buckley in high dudgeon, even if you didn't agree with him. He's especially tasty when the targets of his wrath are so well-deserving.
Buckley's entertaining message is also a serious one, and, unfortunately for us and him, he doesn't have a ready solution to propose to the chronic problem he highlights.
Every ten years I quote the same adage from the late Austrian analyst Willi Schlamm, and I hope that ten years from now someone will remember to quote it in my memory. It goes, "The trouble with socialism is socialism. The trouble with capitalism is capitalists."
Buckley proceeds to detail the "executive plunder" of salaries. bonuses and stock options that are jaw-dropping in their chutzpah -- especially when we consider the compensation was "earned" during a year Viacom's share price dropped 18 percent and losses were in the billions. But wait, there's more!
Consider excruciating, but apparently tolerable, incidentals. Mr. Freston [Viacom co-president] is based in New York. But from time to time, business requires him to be in Los Angeles — where, as it happens, he also has a home. On those nights does he take hotel rooms? Ample hotel rooms, understand. No. He just charges the company what he thinks is appropriate to pay him for using his own home. In 2004, this amounted to $43,000. He is evidently a man with simpler habits than the Los Angeles-based Mr. Moonves's [Viacom's other co-president]. He does the same kind of thing, he has his own home in New York, but what he charged the company for the nights he spent in New York was $105,000.
Viacom is not an outlier in today's world of big-time celebrity executive compensation, as Buckley emphasizes. And as his opening adage reminds us, he's certainly not claiming that in the annals of greed today's captains of industry are somehow unique. Nor is he complaining of a lack of "equity" or "fairness" when the boss takes home so much more than either the employees who work for him or the shareholders for whom he, at least in theory, works.
The sin of which Buckley accuses these executives is, quite simply, that they have no shame. This loss of an ability to see their conduct as shameful is an assault on the very system from which they derive such outsized benefits, a market that appears to have lost its moorings and has no self-corrective mechanisms.
What dismays is the utter lack of class in such businesses and businessmen here parading their skills in distortion. Michael Eisner appears twice in the table of the 25 largest compensation packages paid in a single year. In 1993 he took home $203 million. In 1998, $575.6 million.
That money was taken, directly, from company shareholders. But the loss, viewed on a larger scale, is a loss to the community of people who believe in the capitalist free-market system. Because extortions of that size tell us, really, that the market system is not working — in respect of executive remuneration. What is going on is phony. It is shoddy, it is contemptible, and it is philosophically blasphemous [em added].
Unlike some of the youngsters who now appear under WFB's old masthead, Bill Buckley is willing to acknowledge that the system which he believes is humanity's best hope isn't a utopian self-equilibrating machine. Like all institutions humans have ever invented, the free market is still subject to the broader moral vision and self-discipline of those with power. Buckley's tone may be more acerbic than John Danforth's mournful critique [$ archive] of today's Republican party leadership, but both share a dismay with what is essentially a lack of moral bearings that threatens the healthy functioning of both our economic and political systems. This is a danger implicit in our political economy, and both gentlemen believe its best corrective is a regular dose of sunshine that brings the abusers of power to the court of public opinion. Hear, hear!

Regulatory protection racket?
by
nadezhda
on Fri 22 Apr 2005 06:11 PM EDT
Billmon has sussed it out. And unfortunately, I don't think there's a bit of tinfoil in his narrative -- just the natural logic of power and and an example of the dynamics of competition when interest groups obtain political controls over markets. A cautionary reminder for Democrats as well, I should add, even when they rationalize their own interventions as being on the side of angels.
Thursday, April 21

Turning up the volume?
by
nadezhda
on Thu 21 Apr 2005 08:21 PM EDT
[ Cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism]
Praktike points us to some China-related comments from Chairman Greenspan today. The China remarks appear in a column by Greg Ip (WSJ) -- see prak's post -- who reported on comments that weren't in the Greenspan statement (which was all budget process), Ip characterizes Greenspan as "the latest U.S. official to turn up the volume on China."
Ip is far more experienced at Greenspan-ology that I, but I have a decidedly different take on today's comments. Seems to me Greenspan's telling folks to cool their jets. That a revaluation of the yuan is going to happen when it's in China's interest and they're not going to be pressured into it. Pressure is, if anything, counter-productive because it produces cross-the-board tensions that are really quite unncessary.
Greenspan indicated, and I agree, that the Chinese know full well that it's -- sooner or later (and increasingly sooner) -- going to be necessary to revalue. They've been openly trying to prepare for it for some time -- especially in their financial system (which as we all know isn't the strongest, to put it politely). In fact, as Greenspan seems to have noted according to Ip, one of the main pressures for revaluing is increasingly the strains on their financial system from the hot money they can't sterilize and the asset bubbles and over-investment in some regions and sectors. All that is undermining many of the benefits they're trying to extract from the current exchange rate as well as their ability to manage macro policy.
I'd expect that Greenspan's real audience for the comment about the revaluation sooner rather than later is the markets -- there are a lot of concerns about too rapid a readjustment, the impact on global growth, and a hard landing. For the masochists among us, Brad DeLong has been keeping a running inventory of "hard landing" fretting and commentary over the past few days (from David Altig, Bruce Barlett, and Krugman & Setser).
I read Greenspan's China remark as similar to his comment about oil prices a couple of weeks ago -- that they'll work their way through the global economy in a fairly orderly adjustment of supply and demand. So Greenspan's trying to keep everybody calm.
I think he's also signaling to Congress that their impatience is both unnecessary and not doing the markets any good. American business is concerned about all the trade war noises. A big tariff increase may make "good politics" domestically, and it may seem to some not materially different from an exchange rate adjustment in macroeconomic theory. But in practical terms, it sure doesn't make American businesses who actually have to produce and sell stuff happy to hear about big unilateral tariffs against a key trading partner, and it shouldn't make their employees happy either.
As The Economist notes today in a piece on Congress' new-found love-affair with protectionist noisemaking, even the National Association of Manufacturers isn't keen on the tariff games.
Nobody in Congress, alas, seems to care about breaking WTO rules. The aim is to be seen to be bashing China loudly. Mr Bayh is holding up the confirmation of Rob Portman, the new trade representative, until his bill is voted on. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, Duncan Hunter, a conservative Republican, and Tim Ryan, a Democrat, have cooked up a law that allows American companies to use “exchange-rate manipulation” as a reason for demanding protection under America's trade laws. And the Congressional China Currency Action Coalition has filed a Section 301 petition asking the Bush administration to file a formal case to the WTO complaining about the yuan.
In the 1980s, a rising trade deficit—at that time with Japan—fueled protectionist pressure in Congress. Ronald Reagan introduced the notorious “voluntary export restraints” on Japanese steel and cars. The Reagan team also abandoned its laisser-faire attitude to currency markets and, through the Plaza Agreement, engineered a sharp drop in the dollar.
The current bout of China-bashing is not a replay of the 1980s. Back then, large American firms, particularly the Detroit car giants, led the clamour for protection. Now big business, which relies heavily on Chinese inputs, is quieter. The shouting comes from smaller American suppliers. And even the noisier business groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers, are relatively nuanced. Though the NAM wants Beijing to revalue the yuan, it does not support the Schumer bill.
I just love how every time the chickens start coming home to roost from the pursuit of bad (or non-existent) US policy, the US politicians (of both parties I might add) all run to blame somebody else. Doesn't strike me that Greenspan is falling into that old bad habit. But it's pretty disgusting when it comes from the profligates who have been at least titularly in charge of conducting US economic policy like Snow, and I don't have much more patience for grandstanding from folks who should know better like Schumer and Bayh.
If Democrats want to turn up the volume, let's start with making noise about the ridiculous energy bill that's actually being voted on in the House but that could, if enough Senators got behind some of the more sensible proposals out there, be changed in the Senate with, I might add, some White House support. (The House bill's so bad even Bush bashed it this week.) Hey, and where was the volume on the estate tax or bankruptcy bills that really mean something directly to people? Nah, it's easier to blame somebody else for the consequences of the consumer-spending and debt binge we've enjoyed for years. Sheesh!
BTW -- Just to respond to Roubini's remark that prak quotes in his post on Greenspan. I disagree with the emphasis by Roubini and many others on the loss of value of foreign reserves as one of the major pressures on the Chinese to revalue early. Hey, it's only money. The Chinese have humongous problems they're trying to grow their way out of -- e.g. SOEs, banking system, labor mobility, development in inland regions. 16% of one year's GDP doesn't look like all that outrageous a price tag when you look at things from their perspective.
UPDATE re the reserves losses discussion: For more on the impact of losses on reserves held by the PBoC (Peoples Bank of China), see this post from Brad Setser yesterday. He concludes:
The PBoC may still have a positive cash flow, but it is sitting on a large expected valuation loss on both its dollar and its euro reserves. Diversifying out of dollars does not help much; the best way for the PBoC to reduce its prospective loss is to stop adding to their reserves. And in any case, it might want to start provisioning against that future loss now ...
The real debate here is not whether the losses are "just paper" losses or not -- the losses from a revaluation would be very real, though they could be partially offset by the PBoC's ongoing profits from issuing renminbi cash. The real question is whether these mounting losses are a worthwhile price to pay to sustain China's rapid export growth for a while longer.
And as I suggested, at least until recently when some of the downside of an overvalued currency started undermining the gains, the answer from the Chinese has clearly been "It's worth it." I see them in quite a different position from other Asian central banks who are being forced to digest a lot more dollars than they'd like.
In the comment thread Brad also helps sort out some of the confusions that are common in discussions of the risks of revaluation to China's banking system. Worth a read.

The peace Pope?
by
nadezhda
on Thu 21 Apr 2005 09:47 AM EDT
Jack Balkin provides a bit of entertaining history on papal names and "the prophesies of St. Malachy, an Irish Bishop who lived in the twelfth century, and who is supposed to have prophesied all of the future popes."
Malachy's list offers prophetic mottos for 112 remaining popes. Each is supposed to describe some aspect of the pope's life, or, in the case of the earlier popes, a feature of his heraldic coat of arms.
[...]
The motto for the next pope, Ratzinger, now Benedict XVI, is de gloriae olivae, "[He] of the glory of the olive"...
One of several possible meanings for the "olive" reference is the olive branch as a sign of peace. Was the new Pope considering the prophecy when he chose "Benedict"? Was this a reference to the most recent Benedict, the fifteenth, who pushed for peace throughout World War I?
As Balkin notes, "Perhaps fittingly, Pope Benedict XVI has chosen pax or "peace" as his papal motto."
Wednesday, April 6

A southern point of view
by
nadezhda
on Wed 06 Apr 2005 11:46 PM EDT
About the death of Pope John Paul II, I have no personal thoughts to share, other than to extend sympathy to the millions around the world who are experiencing his death as a source of considerable sorrow. The wall-to-wall media coverage about the significance of John Paul II or the religious reactions of members of the Catholic faith are mostly over-the-top hagiography, good TV visuals, or simply remote to those of us who don't share that faith. Most of the non-religious commentary on the life of the Pope or the future of the Church has been just another excuse for the commentariat and puditocracy to trot out their favorite over-exercised hobby-horse.
Enlightenment of either the spiritual or intellectual variety has been equally rare in the blogosphere. I've come across two notable exceptions, that weren't simply stale rehashes of ancient debates seen through one predictable worldview or another. Taken together I found they implicitly challenge most of the narratives being imposed on the story of the Pope's death, and thereby challenge a number of assumptions, casually shared by many American and European commentators, about the political valence of religion in the culture of the "West" and in the rest of the world.
The first is a highly personal and entertaining tale by Kieran Healy of Crooked Timber on his family's excursion to see the Pope when he came to Ireland in 1979, and an extraordinary portion of the entire population of the country went to see him. Kieran follows with the unhappy story of what has happened to the Catholic Church in Ireland since the Pope's famous visit.
The Irish story contrasts sharply with Ed Kilgore's thoughtful assessment of John Paul II's significance for the Church in the Southern hemisphere, where the tensions perceived in the Northern hemisphere -- between the "liberal" and "conservative" Pope -- have certainly played out differently.
Yet nearly everything about the powerful and perhaps irreversible trajectory he set for the Church points South, to the Third World, and away from Europe and the United States. Many obituarists of this Pope have struggled to categorize him ideologically as "conservative" on faith and morals yet "liberal" or even "radical" on issues of globalization, poverty and war, even as they acknowledge the unity of his own thinking.
But these are Eurocentric ways of looking at his teachings, which may confuse and distress American Catholics and what's left of the faith in Europe, but make perfect sense to most Catholics in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
A deeply illiberal approach to issues involving sexuality and gender; a rejection of capitalism as a necessary counterpart to democracy; and an abiding hostility to U.S.-European political, military, economic and cultural hegemony: this is a consistent point of view with strong support in the global South, among Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Indeed, in many respects what John Paul II represented was a living link between the pre-modern traditions of European Catholicism and the post-modern realities of much of the rest of the world.
[...]
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and irreligious, who are outdoing each other this week in viewing this pope's legacy through the lens of their own cultural and political obsessions. This pope's opposition to "American exceptionalism" invariably embraced opposition to the death penalty, to capitalist triumphalism, and to George W. Bush's unilateralist foreign policies, as well as to abortion or birth control or the removal of feeding tubes from the hopelessly dying.
Many conservatives accuse John Paul II's American flock of practicing a "Cafeteria Catholicism" of selective obedience to Rome. But the American Right, I would argue, is practicing "Cafeteria Conservatism"--an equally selective interpretation of this pope's teachings and legacy, which lead not Right or Left but South. [em. added]
To relate these observations to my most recent blog entry -- when those of us from developed liberal democracies embrace the prospect of promoting greater political freedoms and development across continents where genuine freedom is scarce and poverty is endemic, Kilgore's observations should remind us that that large portions of people in those worlds share the "mentality" of a Pope whose attitudes and core beliefs are often hard for us to integrate, reconcile or fully understand. That recognition should be reflected both in the actions we choose and in our expectations about the probable results of our actions.

Freedom and the "mental" aspects of development
by
nadezhda
on Wed 06 Apr 2005 03:01 AM EDT
Recently I've been feeling bombarded by a strange and perhaps unholy alliance of George Bush and Condi Rice, Kofi Annan, Jacques Chirac and Lula, Tony Blair, Jeffrey Sachs, Bono and assorted denizens of the op-ed pages. Although each speaker or author has a preferred emphasis and a few code words for his or her target audience, they share a remarkably consistent vocabulary and program. "Freedom" is extolled as humanity's universal goal, and we are reminded of the urgent need to promote human dignity and protect the rights of the vulnerable (especially women). The march of freedom is then -- to one degree or another depending on the political agenda of the speaker or author -- combined with exhortations to make hunger and disease a thing of the past. And all claim that we must seize a unique moment of opportunity to change the globe in the 21st century.
Development -- economic and social as well as political -- is back in the spotlight, and not only in the Middle East. Although the international community is still reverberating from the Iraq invasion and its aftermath and continues to grapple with "what is terrorism" and Iranian nukes, for the moment security issues are not crowding out the rest of the international agenda. Significant discussions have already begun and are scheduled in the coming months on specific UN programs and reforms and G-8 initiatives. And as Paul Wolfowitz indicated when the World Bank's Board approved his nomination last week, the annual meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions this year are going to have a hefty set of issues of their own.
In self defense, I've started to try to make sense of the various viewpoints and proposals -- where they overlap, where they conflict -- and the political positions being taken by major donor and developing countries as well as the broader development community. I've begun plowing through a whole host of background papers, assessments, reports and so forth. I've still got a long ways to go -- just locating the organizations and websites that have relevant documentation, to say nothing of inventorying all of Sachs' productions, is an undertaking in itself. From my initial forays into the piles of e-docs, however, I already have some common reactions and concerns.
These concerns coalesced for me when I came across an article in the CS Monitor on the surprisingly large advances being made in reducing the incidence of female circumcision in Senegal. The specific progress is itself noteworthy and encouraging. But more compelling for me personally, the brief description of how this program has been able to make major headway, dealing with what has been an intractable issue, reminded me of some of the lessons I've learned from experience about what development is.
The "secret" of informed choice -- changing mentalities in Senegal
Tostan is a human rights agency in Senegal that seems to have found a magic formula for eradicating the practice of female circumscion or female genetal mutilation (FGM). Their secret: encouraging people to choose within a context of extensive education and support on human rights, womens' health, and economic development.
Mike Crawley of the CS Monitor describes the scope of the problem and the changes being seen in Senegal: Excision of all or part of the female sexual organs before puberty has long been considered a prerequisite for marriage among many of the pastoral cultures immediately south of the Sahara and in the Horn of Africa. Despite growing awareness of the health risks, which can affect childbirth, parents continue carrying out the practice because they fear their daughters won't otherwise be able to find a husband.
[...]
Back in 1997, 13 Senegalese villages publicly declared that they would no longer permit female circumcision, or female genital mutilation (FGM) as it's called by critics. In the eight years since, the number has grown to 1,527, representing 30 percent of Senegalese communities where FGM has been practiced. Dozens more villages are preparing to make similar declarations in the coming months.
Campaigners have tried for decades to bring an end to FGM. But their tactics of providing alternative employment to the circumcisers, introducing alternative rites of passage for girls, or demanding legislation to outlaw the practice have all failed to make a dent: an estimated 2 million girls in about 26 African countries are circumcised every year.
Tostan, by contrast, doesn't focus on FGM but rather on the broader place of women and children within the promotion of health and economic development of the community. according to Molly Melching, the Texas-born director of Tostan who has lived in Senegal for more than two decades.
Once Tostan commences its program of health, human rights education, and economic development in a village, it typically takes two to three years before citizens decide that they want to abandon FGM, says Ms. Melching. The public declarations the villages make, amid vibrant celebrations with music, dancing, and speeches from elders and prominent citizens, generally contain other statements about respect for women's rights and children's education.
The declarations are also coming from places where Tostan staff have never set foot. Enthusiastic villagers are taking it upon themselves to talk to neighboring villages, causing the movement to spread even more quickly.
[...]
As more villages publicly announce that they are abandoning the practice, Tostan says others begin realizing it may no longer be a marriage requirement, momentum builds, and the number of villages following suit snowballs.
Change is accelerating, and spreading beyond the original areas of Senegal to other countries in the region, as the pressures of social conformity shift. Gerry Mackie, a professor at Notre Dame, sees the process as eventually reaching a "tipping point," after which change becomes the new norm. He sees an analogy to foot-binding in China, where the practice was virtually eliminated within a generation.
Change doesn't come easily or automatically, however. These changes are not perceived universally as positive, especially at the beginning. They represent real threats to social structures, to idenity, to livelihoods, to the very ability to survive to the extent that girls depends on marriagability in a near-subsistence economy. The changes must confront and overcome very strong fears. A great deal of patient work is required. Even concrete positive experiences don't bring rapid acceptance. Mike Crawley explains that Tostan has become, in some sense, a victim of its own success as its reputation becomes more widespread.
Particularly in northern Senegal where resistance to ending the practice remains strong, some villages have protested and rioted to dissuade the organization from doing any sort of work.
Here in Ker Simbara there was similar - albeit less heated - initial refusal to listen to visiting women from nearby Malicounda Bambara, the village where the first anti-FGM declaration was made, says Imam Demba Diawara. But the public declarations soon made the issue of excision "the talk of the town," he says.
The debate that ensued was a big shift from the previously secretive approach to the practice, says Ramata Sow, who staffs the local clinic and nursery. "No one talked about the health troubles before - it's a difficult subject," she says.
Ker Simbara eventually declared in 1999 that its citizens would no longer practice female circumcision. Ms. Sow's family illustrates the transformation. She circumcised her eldest daughter, but her two youngest, Sadio, 13, and Nabou, 7, and her granddaughter Duma, 2, are not circumcised.
"I will never do it again," she declares. "Things have changed."
The United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF) is looking to Tostan as a model. "The Tostan approach is working because it's a holistic approach, and it works with communities," says Lalla Toure, UNICEF's regional adviser for women's health. "The starting point is not female genital mutilation; it's about rights, it's about health, it's about development. We think that's the best approach."
Development at the "retail" level -- local ownership
Reading about the Tostan approach brought into focus what was bothering me about so much of what I'd been hearing from the promoters of freedom, human rights, the end of poverty, and global development. The implicit mental model behind so many of these strategies, challenges, initiatives and campaigns is that the world of the developed liberal democracies holds the keys to success. That postive development would result if "we" just got rid of the tyrants, or pushed harder for reforms, or gave more money, or were more "efficient" at planning and coordinating so that the money gets to the "right" people, (etc., etc., etc., as a certain King of Siam would say to his development adviser).
I don't want to suggest that the various "calls to action" are in themselves inappropriate or harmful. I believe strongly that development assistance is essential -- that indeed many countries or societies need an external push or a helping hand to break out of a host of circumstances in which they find themselves locked -- not just due to their history, culture or policies of their own devising but external condtitions beyond their control such as the "givens" of geography or the neighborhood they live in. The high-profile political initiatives are clearly the only way to draw media attention to critical global issues, and they are undoubtedly needed to mobilize attention, resources and action.
But I do think we risk doing considerable mischief, as well as failing to meet the high expectations being set by the politicians, if our mental model stays fixed at the "grand initiatives" level and doesn't start at the bottom with the individuals we are trying to help. We must be able to separate the "wholesale" function -- the critical role that central leadership must play in bringing issues to the fore and, during the brief moment the world is paying attention, mobiliizng political will and resource commitments for the future -- from the "retail" function -- the medium and long-term, patient support of emergent transformative processes that can't be sequenced or planned and that require decentralized, responsive, adaptable, highly flexible forms of assistance.
Focusing where "the rubber meets the road" has led development agencies to perhaps the most important lesson learned over the past decade or so -- the importance of "local ownership" of programs or initiatives to liberalize or create new political, economic and social structures. By "local" I don't t simply mean the head of the local government ministry. "Local" means truly engaging people who are actually going to be active in or affected by the initiatives or policies or projects. Because ultimately that's where meaningful, sustainable change occurs.
The developed liberal democracies can encourage positive change through providing resources -- ideas, know-how, experience, money, and sometimes security -- and cheerleading, the importance of which should not be underestimated. The developed countries and the international community more broadly can signal displeasure by withholding resources, expressingly loud disapproval, or putting assorted pressures on uncooperative regimes.
The development mantra must, however, be "it's their country, their society." That is certainly an important lesson from Tostan in Senegal. Similarly, the current political process in Iraq is reminding us daily that only the Iraqis can, in the final analysis, solve their own problems. We can make their job harder or easier; we can expand or limit the choices they have available. But only they can decide which of a multitude of competing objectives are their top priorities, and how to manage, for good or ill, the inevitable tradeoffs. Top-down, externally imposed development -- whether political, economic or social -- rarely works as well as expected, is only the first step of a long process, and is replete with unintended (often negative, sometimes positive) consequences. The same is often true within countries that attempt to impose top-down change.
Development at the "retail" level -- changing complex systems versus delivering projects
In addition to the need for "local ownership," the Tostan story highlights another important insight about the development process. First and foremost, political, economic and social development are changes of "mentality" -- shifts in attitudes, expectations and incentives that affect behavior. [see ftnt] Some of the most valuable outside interventions don't implement change directly. Their most powerful impact emerges from the ways they encourage a gradual erosion of mental prisons and give individuals a sense that they have more choices and more control over their own lives. To steal a phrase from Amartya Sen, it's "development as freedom."
Mental prisons constrain both imagination and action. They are constructed from a host of fears, anxieties, rigidities, and limits -- from fear of a dictator or of another ethnic group, from social conventions, from simple ignorance of alternatives, or from a sense of powerlessness that a society never rewards initiative or that opportunity is the privilege of a few. Each time we try to encourage positive change, we need to understand the nature of and connection among the constraints on both imagination and action -- and take them into account when we try to help. We also need to see something as seemingly simple as the political, economic and social development of a village as a complex system that is always changing, and our development interventions need to be continually adjusted and adapted to respond to those changes. That basic principle -- "mentality" is the primary means by which ongoing change of complex systems occurs -- is at play whether we're dealing with demands for fair elections, freedom of the press, the status of women, expanding economic activity, reforming the judiciary, AIDS, or access to clean drinking water. And that is the case whether changes in mentality occur at a glacial pace or are accelerated in response to some sort of exogenous shock.
This indirect, gradual, complex, "mentality"-based nature of the development process presents some real dilemmas for furnishing development assistance at the retail level. Clearly, "project design" is a major challenge if what we are dealing with are processes that depend on the interconnected effects of the unpredictable shifting of attitudes and behavior, which may not really be felt until "tipping points" are reached. Management "metrics," predictive models and accountability mechanisms are hard to apply to processes that lack a clear sequential logic or fail to demonstrate, at least at a project level, a close "causality" connection between specific inputs and outputs. Attempts to produce projects that can demonstrate to financial contributors (or members of Congress) "what I got for my money" may actually serve only to waste that money. Insistence on eliminating overlap or competing approaches may be faux efficiencies. Project selection is frequently more an art than a science -- the closest analogy I've found is to venture capital, where success is often as much a matter of betting on the right horse as on choosing the best business plan, and the number of "losers" far exceeds the number of "superperforming winners". Replicability and scalability are also, like VC, often a major challenge.
Yet simply because the transformation of "mentality" is too hard to control, measure or predict, and just because "results" may be only indirect and come years after a project completion report is filed, doesn't mean we can ignore it. Without putting mentality, incentives and behavior at the center of our understanding of development -- whether political, economic or social -- we risk wasting resources or, worse, violating the cardinal principle of development assistance, "first, do no harm."
Back to "wholesale"
The messy reality of the development process makes it difficult to communicate about development to the general public. I don't envy the "wholesalers" who have to imply that we have answers when the only thing we know for sure is that there are no easily duplicated recipes for success.
The "retail" issues are also hard to capture in stirring speeches that call the developed world to the glorious mission of making our inreasingly interconnected and interdependent globe a better place. And in a PowerPoint world, I won't hold George Bush or Kofi Annan to the details. I am encouraged that many recent speeches, even by US officials such as Condi Rice and Karen Hughes, are peppered with the code words that the development community uses when they talk about sustained, multifaceted engagement and complex systems, such as "partnership," "listening," "learning," "long-term," even "generations."
I'll just have to keep my "retail" principles in mind, with the switch on my hubris-detector in the "on" position, as I read the voluminous quantities of fine print.
Note: I've chosen "mentality" because that is in fact the short-hand term most frequently used by clients with whom I've worked in developing financial and legal systems in a number of countries. It is truly striking how reformers, regardless of country, share the frustration that the true impact of changes they are tryiing to implement today will not be realized until a new generation emerges which isn't trapped in old ways of thinking. As I am using "mentality," it is shorthand intended to capture most of the elements development economists consider when they use the terms "incentives" and "institutions."
In The Elusive Quest for Growth, William Easterly's study of what development economists do and don't know about promoting growth, Easterly focuses on the importance of "incentives" to effective development, with which I wholeheartedly concur. I find, however, that "mentality" is more descriptive than "incentives" when going beyond the "growth conundrum" or the operations of specific economic institutions. When discussing development writ large, including political and social change, "mentality" more easily captures the importance of cultural worldviews and social and political expectations and conventions. The term "institutions" has become another important concept closely related to "incentives" in development economists' lingo, with the focus primarily on the creation or reform of formal political, legal and economic structures. Within the notion of "mentality," I am rather casually including "institutions" in their broader sense, including socially-shared "identity" factors such as religion, ethnicity and gender and informal social structures and conventions. That's not to suggest, however, that most aspects of social structures, attitudes and behavior that I'm including in "mentality" could not be expressed and analyzed in terms of incentives and instituitons. More on Easterly at a later date.
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Blake Hounshell (aka praktike), our co-founder and main man, is now web editor of Foreign Policy.
blakehounshell [at] gmail
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