{Comment clarifying and expanding on post -- from thread on LAT} First to clarify -- if I had to take a position today, based on US strategic interests alone and not considering the Iraqis themselves, I'd almost certainly come down on the side of "no bases." I also agree with Eric and the AG that it's a bad idea to take a lot of decisions today that assume a major continuing presence. In that regard, I share the AG's concerns about a number of the assumptions implicit in the new National Defense Strategy. I'm also concerned about an approach to Iran that is based on an assumption we're going to indefinitely grumble and growl across the border at the mullahs whom we've successfully isolated -- lots of stuff wrong with that picture IMHO. I'm less bothered by the physical constuction of facilities underway. Hey, it's only money. There may be a whole lot of concrete being poured right now, but we and a number of other countries are going to have a military presence there for some time to come, and the Iraqis themselves will eventually be able to use some of that concrete (and communications systems, etc.) If we were building a major naval facility, we'd be talking about an investment on a scale -- and a series of major inter-connected strategic commitments -- that might be hard to walk away from. But we've been able to walk away from other basing investments before when it suited us strategically. I also believe, however, that many decisions regarding the type and timing of US and multinational military presence in Iraq are going to be subject to how the situation on the ground evolves, what the Iraqis themselves decide they need from the US, and, assuming the security situation improves, the eventual participation of other countries. I know that basing is usually viewed from Washington, on both sides of the aisle, as if it's all a matter of what the US decides it wants. But there are lots of reasons why various countries find a US military presence, in one form or another, attractive to them. And I can certainly imagine more than one scenario under which the Iraqis would like to have some formal ongoing setup with the US military. That being said, looking at the dynamics today, the odds are great that for both the US and the Iraqis it will be preferable to bring the occupation to a "clean" conclusion by a complete withdrawal of US forces. I'd bet if you took a poll of senior officers who have had field command in Iraq, they'd be quite happy to pull out entirely tomorrow if that would end the insurgencies. That sentiment isn't necessarily reflected in the long-term plans that are implicitly embedded in the year-to-year budget proposals being sent by DoD to Congress. And I agree strongly with the AG that those plans that assume a continuing US presence in Iraq need to start being discussed more openly, not just buried in line items that can't be interpreted by even the most microscopic budget analysis. I'm also suggesting that the discussion of DoD's plans needs to go beyond why the US might want permanent basing rights, or what it might cost the US to secure them. We also need to look at the entire question of the types and structure of Iraqi military and security forces that are being planned and built, not just to deal with internal insurgencies and assorted violence, but the broader long-term security picture for Iraq in the region. In my original post, I mentioned how abysmally inadequate the information is about Iraqi training. Brad Plumer has a good post on this very point today. And I'm suggesting, that the inaequacies he points to are just the tip of the iceberg. So I'm advocating a lot more discussion of these topics -- and I think we should be making a great deal more noise about getting better information from both the government and the media. My personal bias in those discussions is that we'll probably want/have to get out entirely without retaining permanent basing privileges. That brings me back to the first point -- that I believe the guiding principle for US policy should be what's effective for Iraq's "success." That is the most important outcome for both America's domestic tranquility and its geostrategic position, as well as for the world's general well-being. An America that is defensive, polarized, and generally unhappy about its position in the world is not likely to contribute to making either America or the world a better place. I see questions about matters like permanent bases as diversionary sideshows except as they relate to the overriding policy imperative of a "successful" Iraq. It is in that light that I would avoid insisting on a "no bases" agreement today -- that's to be worked out with the Iraqi themselves in light of what the Iraqis ultimately believe they need.