Reality in Iraq is so incredibly multi-dimensional, and it seems that we have rather routinely operated in dimensions that matter to us, without much regard for the dimensions that matter to Iraqis. But maybe I'm too harsh. It's all very complicated. A couple of questions. First, is there any reason to think that our intelligence going in was much conscious of these intra-Shiite layers of significance, or that if we were, that we made any conscious effort to exploit them to our advantage? Second, given the relocation (or reestablishment) of real Shiite power in Najaf, and the apparent disdain that Iraqis like Sistani feel for the Iranians and Khamenei (if memory serves, Sistani very bluntly told the Iranians a few months to back the hell off), doesn't this represent an opportunity for us to conduct a sort of theological proxy war against the Iranian regime (as contrasted with a military confrontation)? Who knows if Sistani and his crowd would ever play ball, but facing down the Khameneis and the rest of the theologically inferior Iranian crowd would seemingly be good for the Najafis, and couldn't be bad for us. Finally, is the Pollack book any good?