Speaking of Asia Times, one of their occasional contributors had a decidedly different take in September on the motives and merits of unhorsing Kahn in Herat. [M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian career diplomat who has served in Islamabad, Kabul, Tashkent and Moscow.]

[Herat governor Ismail Khan] consistently opposed the stationing of American forces in Herat. He felt there was simply no need for that. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Herat in 2002 and personally tried to persuade Ismail Khan to change his mind. Not that Khan did not know why the Herat region was so important for US strategic interests - Shindand air base (built by the Soviets) was one of the biggest such facilities in the Central Asian region. Access to Shindand, which dominated Iranian air space, could drastically reduce US dependence on the "lily pads" in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan or Azerbaijan in a potential conflict situation with Iran. But Khan said "no" to Rumsfeld, politely but firmly. [...] During the turbulent 1992-95 period of mujahideen rule in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, Khan insulated Herat from anarchy. The Taliban had to overthrow him through guile and treachery. Thereafter, he led the anti-Taliban resistance. For the natives of Herat, he is a living memory. Those who label him as a "warlord" must explore why his people respect him so much. [...] Yet an elaborate charade has been played out through the past two years to wear out Khan. His "rival", Amanullah, a small-time renegade, had links with US special forces. The strategy was transparent - when a tall leader got nettled with a lumpen element, his stature would inevitably suffer. The ethnic angle was also thrown in as Amanullah is a Pashtun, Khan of Tajik origin; a blood feud arose when Amanullah murdered Ismail Khan's son; dissensions were created within Khan's camp. Incrementally, Khan was weakened. Amanullah has since merged into the shadows. We may never hear of him again. [...] Into the void created by Khan's fall, US troops have appeared in Herat. They first took control of Shindand. The timing of the putsch is immaculate - at a juncture when Iran (which has been backing Khan) is "distracted" elsewhere, mobilizing resources to address the ominous US-Israeli threats in the Gulf.

And folks wonder why Iran gets antsy about being able to defend itself. Until the matter of Iran's own perceptions of its legitimate rights to self-defense can be addressed by American analysts in public without it being a serious career-limiting gesture, we're not all that likely to get very far with a nuclear proliferation policy vis a vis Iran. Yet if regime change, either soft or hard, is the flavor of the decade, we are condemning ourselves to being constantly on a hair trigger away from confrontation. With our troops exposed to a much larger potential group of "terrorists" or "insurgents" pouring across the border from Iran than Saudi Arabia is likely to provide.