And now, moving back from politics to policy again. One of the interesting points about Juan Cole's "plan" that I linked to previously is the distinction he makes between withdrawing US ground forces based in Iraq and total disengagement. He sees an ongoing need for American military support for the Iraqi government and to deter an all-out "set-piece" civil war.
Rob Farley at Lawyers, Guns and Money, in reviewing Cole's proposals, raises a good caveat on the limits to the efficacy of US air power as a guarantee.
Some similar thoughts on a "withdrawal-lite" that provides for continued engagement has been offered by Daniel Byman of Georgetown/Brookings. Brad Plumer discusses in a series of posts here, here and here.
And Kevin Drum chimes in that we have to take the risk of a failed state or civil war seriously. The debate should therefore be over how best to achieve what I've called "mission damage control." He argues for his preferred approach -- an announced timetable.
UPDATE: Fafblog has the definitive cunning plan. Check out those permanent bases!
cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism
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Comments
Re: If ya gotta have a plan
by
Dave Schuler
on Tue 23 Aug 2005 04:52 PM EDT | Profile | Permanent Link
Professor Cole's plan is not completely unreasonable but, as I've commented elsewhere, it does have a flaw or two. The cornerstone of his plan is U. S. withdrawal from the cities presumably in an attempt to lower the profile of U. S. presence in Iraq. Just as a hypothetical, imagine that the governor came out and announced that the highway patrol was going to enforce the speeding laws everywhere except on a 50 mile stretch of I70. I don't think that would deter speeding on that stretch of I70. I don't even think it would keep the level of speeding the same. I think that drivers would take advantage of the reduced vigilance and speed like crazy.
Similarly, I think the only way we can get the benefits of U. S. withdrawal from Iraq (presumably by demotivating a genuine insurgency in Iraq) is by withdrawing our forces from Iraq. This does bring up an interesting point, though. IMO the insurgency (a totally inadequate word) in Iraq has several distinct components which may or may not have common command and control: Ba'athists, genuine insurgents (people who just oppose the U. S. presence), foreign jihadis, and plain street criminals. If the overwhelming preponderance of the insurgency is either genuine insurgents and/or street criminals, Cole's plan has a slim chance of success. Otherwise it's absurd. Do we have any real notion of what the actual composition is? Trackbacks
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