basically concludes that the US has failed to achieve its political, military, and economic goals in Iraq and are now revising those goals towards more "realistic" expectations.
Dan's reaction is a lengthy cri de coeur that boils down to "Say it ain't so!" My response is, "Yes, at long last!" Although I sympathize with Dan's sentiments, I'm afraid his remarks illustrate just what a box the White House has created for itself as reality and election rhetoric have steadily diverged. Dan complains, with good reason:
No offense, but if the end-result (goal?) of this whole adventure is that Iraq is left in the hands of yet another dictator, even a benevolent one, I'm going to have to join the chorus of people asking why we've bothered to remain as long as we have. If we were planning to install yet another Iraqi dictator, couldn't we have at least stuck with Allawi, who if nothing else has been a steadfastly reliable CIA asset?
Now maybe all of this is a trial balloon that's being put out by somebody for reasons that are as yet unknown and maybe it's not. If it isn't, then this needs to be disavowed in reasonably short order (which it won't be even if it isn't for reasons I'll explain further down) and if it is then those of us, myself included, who have repeatedly argued in favor of remaining in Iraq in order to accomplish just that based on what we assumed was the administration's goals have every reason to feel betrayed.
Dan makes an impassioned case for why a "cut and run" strategy is dangerous for US interests. Given his personal focus on terrorist groups, he is particularly distressed by the notion that Al Qaeda would benefit from being able to claim to have defeated the US in Iraq. Without saying it in so many words, he also fears a sort of "Iraq syndrome" that would inhibit the US from intervening with force where necessary to deal with terrorist threats. In addition, he worries:
Another likely outcome of this process will be that the Arab reform and democratization project will be dead. The "Muslim democracy = Islamists" script has already been written for Iraq and will be held up as proof of the futility of democracy in the Middle East if not in the Muslim world as a whole.For me, Dan's strongest argument, which he doesn't flesh out, is that leaving Iraq as a "failed state" would present a considerable threat not only to Iraq's neighbors but to the rest of the world.
The balance of Dan's remarks, and the bulk of his concern, address domestic politics and his fear that the Bush Administration and the GOP have concluded that politics trumps US interests in Iraq. He cites a series of posts that our co-blogger, Eric Martin, has published on this site [Liberals Against Terrorism], which offer plausible evidence that the US electoral calendar is influencing Iraq exit strategies.
Undoubtedly, some in the GOP hierarchy are political cynics who would like to time a reduction in troop levels with the 2006 elections. However, too much can be made of electoral politics. It would be a mistake to see the Post article as a trial balloon or the maneuvering of dissident bureaucrats within one part of the Administration or another. The recent rumblings in the media are, in fact, reflecting shifts to a more realistic and sober set of objectives -- shifts we've been tracking for a number of months. It may be news to the Post and the NYT, but not to close observers of the Bush's second term Administration.
As I argued earlier regarding the GWOT/GSAVE ruckus, the White House is "out on a limb" with its continued attachment to the politics of "war" all the while developing a far broader, longer-term and, shall we say, more nuanced strategy for combating the threats from Islamist extremism.
To mobilize a considerable part of the American public, Bush and his team oversold an idea that was questionable at the outset but has by now certainly outlived its usefulness. The Administration now has to engage in a sleight-of-hand -- it must shift goalposts and policies to ones that are far more realistic, promising and sustainable internationally, while maintaining the unquestioning loyalty of a critical domestic constituency whose support is premised on that core idea.
The President is facing an even more acute version of the same problem in Iraq. The original justifications for the invasion have gone by the boards, and the "feel-good" moments of being treated as liberators were long-gone by the time the Bremer/Sanchez duo departed Baghdad. The rationales used for the November elections were to transform the Middle East through a successful democracy in Iraq and to fight terrorists to keep them from attacking us at home. Neither rationale remains terribly satisfactory to a growing portion of the American public, as Dan outlines in his post.
A recognition of the need for clearer and more realistic objectives in Iraq, and of the urgent imperative to realign military, reconstruction and diplomatic operations with those objectives, appears to be shared across major parts of the Bush Administration's policy apparatus -- OSD, CENTCOM and State. One assumes NSC is at least participating in the rethinking and reorientation. But either the President is truly disengaged from what his key Cabinet officers and generals are doing, or the disconnect between rhetoric and reality has rendered their communication strategies brittle and increasingly vulnerable to any bit of bad news.
Pace Bill Kristol, it's not just that "Rummy doesn't want to fight to win." The generals know they've got all they can handle just to hold the finger in the dike until they can stand up an Iraqi security structure that won't disintegrate. It's not simply a matter of training. As General Barry McCaffery reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a month ago:
[M]uch remains to be done [with the Iraqi Security Forces]. There is no maintenance or logistics system. There is no national command and control. Corruption is a threat factor of greater long-range danger than the armed insurgency. The Insurgents have widely infiltrated the ISF. The ISF desperately needs more effective, long-term NCO and Officer training.The generals are acutely aware that time isn't on their side -- the clock is ticking because the military can't sustain the presence it currently has in Iraq. The Number One threat or vulnerability McCaffery identified was:
Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling U.S. domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of Army and Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected melt-down of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months) [emph supplied]
Nor is State abandoning democratic values in preference for an arbitrary and artificial political timetable, pace Larry Diamond's sorrowful complaints. In the Post article cited by Dan, Diamond mourns: "We... don't have the time to go through the process we envisioned when we wrote the interim constitution -- to build a democratic culture and consensus through debate over a permanent constitution." Yes, as Eric, Swopa and others have pointed out, democracy can't be rushed and it's easy to be cynical -- it would be mighty embarrassing for the White House and mighty inconvenient for military deployment plans if the referendum and elections are postponed. But time truly is of the essence for the Iraqis as well. As Zalmay Khalizad said today on one of the Sunday newsfests:
"One of the big problems in the current situation in Iraq is that there is a lack of agreement about the future among the important Iraqi communities," he said. "And I look at the constitution as a national compact, an agreement among the various communities about the future."Diamond's dashed hopes -- to "build a democratic culture" -- were predicated on the major groups committing to the broad outlines of the sort of basic compact Khalizad is talking about.
Further, until some core agreement can be reached, there's no hope in bringing critical portions of the Sunni insurgencies into the fold. Until a compact is reached -- which is sufficiently sustainable to survive the referendum process -- both the Iraqi government and the US military are pretty much engaged in day-to-day management of a low-intensity civil war. Delay is the enemy -- it benefits both insurgents and the political and economic groups using unsavory methods to vie for power within the new system. The constitutional drafting process is forcing the issues from the realm of political rhetoric -- demands and threats by leaders speaking to their respective communities -- to the difficult world of hard bargaining. They will likely not get everything thrashed out by Monday, and a postponement of the draft wouldn't be surprising. But they'll be a lot closer than they were and will have a better idea of where the ultimate dealbreakers are. Maybe they'll never get there and civil war is their only future. But before we worry about developing a democratic culture, the basic bargain has to be struck.
To return to the various sources of Dan's angst about realism intruding into Administration policy. First, isn't it time we face up to the fact that the Iraq war was never part of a "war on terror" nor was it about fighting terrorists in Iraq to avert another 9/11. This confusion, shared by an unfortunately large number of US troops, has probably been responsible for a number of the difficulties the US has faced as an occupying authority in treatment of civilians and detainees. The idea that we'd "rather fight 'em there than here" is both nonsense and morally repugnant, to put it politely. True, we are now forced to fight terrorists in Iraq. But that's not because we're preventing them from attacking the US, but rather because they're trying to prevent a functioning country from emerging. Of course, in the sense that the US has a strong interest in the future of Iraq, fighting the terrorists is protecting the US. And I share some of Dan's concerns about the manner in which the US withdraws from Iraq producing a psychological victory for jihadists. But those are not the ways that President Bush employs the claim that the war in Iraq is central to the war on terror.
Second, except for the Jacobins and dreamers, the war has never been about "the march of freedom" in the sense of creating a liberal democracy in the Middle East as a beacon to the region. I'm not one of folks who think that Muslims or Arabs can't be democrats. I for one wanted to see elections for an interim government as early as possible instead of the CPA taking total charge. I also welcomed the January elections as a critical but small step toward a better future for Iraq and Iraqis (although not, I might add, as a vindication of the decision to go to war in Iraq).
But I also recognize that reconciling the tensions among democratic institutions, freedoms, rule of law and cultural norms is a massive undertaking for any society -- the US itself is engaged in perpetual adjustments to manage those tensions. When you add to the mix the number of circles that the Iraqis have to square -- most notably regarding federalism and the role of Islam as a source of civil law -- we shouldn't be surprised at the way things are turning out. For me, the source of never-ending surprise is that so many Americans still think that they can dictate the results of what has to be a sustainable bargain among the Iraqis themselves.
Although not yet articulated by the President, the US now has far more focused objectives, which are starting to be reflected in policy on both the military and civilian sides. This isn't about the US "winning the war." It's about creating the basic conditions for Iraqis to make a decent life for themselves and not present a threat to others. The way I would define the strategic objective of the US presence in Iraq was well summed up by Gen McCaffery in his Foreign Relations Committee testimony:
The point of the US war effort is to create legitimate and competent Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance.
That may not sound like a glorious reason to fight. It doesn't sound like a "noble cause" that would satisfy Cindy Sheehan -- although maybe it would, if it were stated clearly. But it's actually an extremely ambitious goal, which to achieve will take enormous ongoing expenditure of blood and treasure as well as political and military resolve. As I discussed earlier regarding adjustments in counterinsurgency strategies, it will also require constant flexibility and adaptation of American strategic ends and operational means. And that's assuming the Iraqis themselves can come to a consensus on what sort of governance they want, or at least will accept.
In a great comment posted by jonnybutter, he warns me of the dangers of political naivete. But I'd nonetheless like to see Bush make the case I've outlined rather than remain trapped in his obsolete political rhetoric. It's what Joe Biden means when he says Bush needs to "level with the American people" before they lose patience. Unlike Biden, I wouldn't have gone into Iraq in the first place. But now we're there, US interests are indeed at stake. We've got a long, difficult road ahead that will necessarily require adjustments. Thank goodness, US policies have been shifting to reflect reality on the ground.
My political concerns are the opposite of Dan's -- that Bush will "stay on message." Is America really going to be better off if the President and the antiwar folks manage between them to further polarize the Iraq war even though there's a significant common ground that could be built around the very policies his Administration is beginning to pursue? Bush is doing a disservice to the rest of his Administration, the troops and the country by clinging to meaningless sloganeering to maintain the loyalty of his base. There are centrist Republicans and large numbers of Democrats in Congress who don't buy the Bush rhetoric but are pleading to work with his Administration on realistic policies. My fear is that they will become increasingly isolated in the center -- treated as defeatists by Bush partisans and as out-of-touch hawkish elites who have betrayed liberal ideals by those who want out of Iraq yesterday. As a wartime President, Bush should be pulling people together by defining the true challenges and real limitations we face, explaining how and why our policies are adapting to circumstance, and specifying what we're really there to achieve. Unfortunately, I don't think we're going to see that sort of leadership out of this President.
cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism
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