Other analysts and historians would undoubtedly come up with a somewhat different list, but it's a useful starting point for refining both goals and methods to achieve them. [For those who can't get enough of counterinsurgency more generally, the article is also a useful companion piece to Kingdaddy's ongoing series on insurgency strategies pursued by different types of revolutionaries.]
SuccessfulWith all the recent noise about the timing of US withdrawal from Iraq and the growing disconnect between White House rhetoric and what the US military is actually planning to do, the pundits are losing sight of changes that have been going on for some months that don't involve aggregate force levels or the simple metric of number of Iraqis trained. These changes are affecting both the work being done to build Iraqi security forces and the current counterinsurgency operational priorities of the US forces.
- Emphasis on intelligence.
- Focus on population, their needs, and security.
- Secure areas established, expanded.
- Insurgents isolated from population (population
control).
- Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader).
- Effective, pervasive psychological operations
(PSYOP) campaigns.
- Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents.
- Police in lead; military supporting.
- Police force expanded, diversified.
- Conventional military forces reoriented for
counterinsurgency.
- Special Forces, advisers embedded with
indigenous forces.
- Insurgent sanctuaries denied.
Unsuccessful
- Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency.
- Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging
population.
- Battalion-size operations as the norm.
- Military units concentrated on large bases for
protection.
- Special Forces focused on raiding.
- Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment.
- Building, training indigenous army in image of
U.S. Army.
- Peacetime government processes.
- Open borders, airspace, coastlines.
This checklist seems to me to capture a lot of the adjustments the US military has been making that have been emerging over the past nine months or so. From a broader policy standpoint of what the US should be trying to accomplish in Iraq and what resources are required, the list is also a handy guide for major vulnerabilities that may need addressing promptly or, unfortunately, may no longer be reparable.
Personally, I think we should applaud the adjustments the generals are continuing to make in Iraq -- and vocally encourage more of them. By now we already know about the disastrous consequences of trying to run an occupation on the cheap, refusing to plan for "winning the peace," and failing to remember lessons from other occupations and counter-insurgencies. Surely we don't need to point to every change in goals or methods as evidence of incompetence or worse. That just creates incentives for an overabundance of caution, not making changes when needed, and other CYA behavior.
The Iraq debacle will fuel debates for decades to come about when/whether/how to engage US forces in the future. But in the meantime, for what to do in Iraq now and in the coming years, we should be trying to get out of the current political dynamic, where both Bush supporters and opponents treat any deviation from plan as evidence of failure. The debate between "stay the course" and "withdraw" may be real at the political level but as a practical matter it's a phony one. As I've noted on a number of occasions, the Administration has been rapidly shifting goal posts (yes, adopting a lot of what Kerry was saying), but it's trapped in its own political rhetoric. We may relish watching the Bushies deservedly squirm, but just as hope is not a plan, neither is schadenfraude.
True, simply reacting to rapidly changing circumstances by devising a different "plan" every few months can deteriorate into chickens running around without heads. But adjustment to changing circumstances -- at both the strategic and operational levels -- is a good thing. Failure to adjust -- or failure to communicate adjustments to both the public and the troops who have to execute -- is unhealthy.
The dynamic nature of both policy and military strategy, and their interconnections, demands flexibility and adaptation. Pierre Lessard, in "Campaign Design for Winning the War... and Peace" (Parameters, Summer 2005) gives some historical perspective.
But even steady policy is no guarantee of a correspondingly unalterable military strategy. [...] Indeed, in World War II, Allied military strategy experienced no less than eight major decisions involving significant repercussions for theater- or operational-level commanders between 1942 and 1945, or about once every five months. Thus, military strategic objectives are rarely enduring, and campaign design must be sufficiently agile to adjust to their fluctuations.
A competent leadership (both civilian and military) should be clarifying its objectives and showing how it can learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circumstances. A responsible opposition should demand no less.
cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism
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