What with the nominations of Bolton and Wolfowitz and the release of the National Defense Strategy and the new "blueprint" for UN reform, I've been thoroughly depressed the past couple of weeks about the possibility of an overall philosophical turn-for-the-worse of US foreign policy under the new Bush Administration. With a host of loosely connected ideas churning around in the brain, I've deliberately avoided a lot of the day-to-day debate and have returned to reading some of my old favorites, trying to get a better sense of balance and perspective.

To further divert myself from gnashing of teeth and rending of garments in extreme frustration, I've decided to take up two closely-related topics, recently raised by Matt Yglesias, that I think the Bush Administration has been handling a good deal better than in the past.

Matt is advocating the "declare victory and come home" approach to getting out of Iraq. Although presented as a rhetorical innovation, I'd argue that the Bush Administration is ahead of him on this one. Robert Novak was correct last fall -- this is the strategy the Bush Administration hoped to be able to execute, and with the relatively successful elections at the end of January, they've shifted all their weight to that approach. The triumphalist celebrations over the elections themselves were the equivalent, psychologically, of declaring the war "won."

For those who have generally opposed the overall thrust of the Bush Administration's foreign policies, I believe that framing the outcomes in Iraq in terms of the US "winning" or "losing" is counterproductive. Rather, we should put the question of "winning" or "losing" in Iraq aside rhetorically, and instead focus on measures for "success" for the Iraqis going forward. To that extent, I'm a supporter of the Bush Administration's current rhetoric on the subject, because I think it's far healthier for the body politic. As an aside, and meriting another discussion entirely, I find the Bush Administration's current focus on "success" in terms of political outcomes for the Iraqis, rather than in terms of US military "victory" over a constantly shifting motley crew of terrorists, insurgents, thugs and other ill-defined enemy, to be a belated and refreshing reintroduction of some Clausewitizian strategic wisdom to the whole Iraq adventure.

For those who opposed the original invasion, it's tempting to say "We can't let the Bush Administration declare victory. We have to get everyone to understand how terribly bad the invasion policies were so we won't make the same mistakes again." But a "looking forward" strategy doesn't mean that the bleak lessons of the Iraq adventure would be lost in the future on US intervention policies. The Bush Administration is not claiming a "victory" in the sense of a clean win, with the troops marching home in triumph, spoils of war in hand, bad guys finished off. The definition of "success" has been defined downward steadily, and will almost certainly continue to be so as it takes months and years to extract the US military presence from Iraq (and for that matter, Afghanistan), accompanied by the inevitable steady drip of casualty figures and the inevitable climb of defense budget estimates.

A modest majority of Americans already believe the price of going to war in Iraq was too high. Of those not willing to say it was too high, a significant number must, however, be well aware of the high costs and the now extremely modest definition of victory. There's a considerable difference between a psychological defensiveness about past action -- an unwillingness to admit the US might have been "wrong" with respect to Iraq -- and an affirmative conviction that a past action was so unambiguously "right" that it should be repeated in other circumstances. And of those who argue that the Iraq conflict has been unambiguously good, in its profound geopolitical implications, few other than hardcore ideologues would argue that there are similar situations where less costly US military intervention would be certain to produce such large-scale shifts. Those perceptions, along with the continued commitment of a significant portion of US military capacity to Iraq operations, will be a major part of the context for any decision to deploy US troops in the future. To a certain extent, an Iraq Syndrome is unavoidable.

The cautionary benefits of these perceptions are likely to be diluted, however, if those who are ambivalent supporters of the Iraq intervention are put further on the defensive. If internal political forces continue to push polarization, the group of "I was right about Iraq but that was the exception" is all too likely to be pushed into the "I'm not with the anti-Iraq guys" camp. Polarization is not, however, solely the result of those who opposed the war continuing to insist on the merits of their opposition with each new bit of bad news. It also comes from those who continue to insist on the merits of their support for the invasion. This is in many ways the crux of my repeated irritation with the self-proclaimed "idealist" or "liberal" "hawks" who want to make support for Iraq invasion policies (or some hypothetical Iraq that meets some of the most pointed objections) a touchstone for future foreign and national security policy. By continually focusing on refighting the Iraq policy wars, they aren't changing any opinions, they certainly aren't winning any "hearts and minds" of their fellow citizens, they're merely exacerbating polarization. The irony is of course that they are the ultimate losers because the ground they claim as their own -- along with the grounds on which other centrists of more "realist" traditions stand -- is destroyed in the polarization process.

A cautious and realistic assessment by a majority of Americans of the limits to what force can achieve, and of the costs both to the US and to local civilians of using force, is a far cry, however, from a majority believing the US has "lost a war." If a significant portion of the US public came to believe that the US "lost" Iraq, the psychological damage to our political system of decades of future debate over "who lost Iraq" is frightening to contemplate. The polarization would inflame the "enemy within" camp and push into that camp many who may be willing to justify their support for the Iraq war merely because they refuse to admit the US was "wrong" or who cling to idealistic rationalizations. For those on the left who want to think in purely partisan terms, it would simply be catastrophic for Democrats. In purely electoral terms, Democrats should have as great an interest in the US "succeeding" in Iraq as do the members of the current administration.

In the current rhetorical strategy of the Bush Administration, "success" is now defined not by defeating the terrorists or insurgents but by handing off as much responsibility as quickly as possible to the Iraqis themselves. There can be little doubt that the US military is clearly working as hard as it can to accelerate the reduction of troop levels. That strategy, which is generally shared by all but those who want an immediate full withdrawal, entails giving support to policies that make that transition more likely, and opposing those policies that are likely to be counterproductive.

Whether this rhetorical strategy of "success" is viable in the long run -- that is, whether the American public psyche will continue to feel the Iraq intervention was relatively successful even if in retrospect they wouldn't approve of it again -- clearly depends now as much on the Iraqis as on the US. In judging the current policies of the Bush Administration against a "looking forward" strategy of "success," our focus should be on how US policies affect the Iraqis themselves -- their capacity to create functioning institutions, their ability to stand up military and security forces capable of dealing with internal and external threats, the degree of tensions or instability arising from Iraqi or American relations with other countries in the neighborhood, and overall, the likelihood that the US military can "work itself out of a job" while trapped between a rock and a hard place of knowing its presence and force is needed to control the violence and insecurity but also helps produce some of the violence and insecurity.

In the long run, I'm arguing, it's best for the American political system if there is a general perception within the US itself that the US is choosing the nature of its continued presence in Iraq based on the needs and interests of the Iraqis as expressed by the Iraqis' own government. But that the Iraqis should understand there is a consensus within the US on certain principles: that the Iraqis must be able to stand on their own as soon as possible; that there are limits to what the US is willing to spend in terms of blood and treasure to support their transition to a stable political system; and that the US is going to do its utmost to avoid being sucked into becoming a player in a perpetual internal tug-of-war among contending sectarian or ethnic groups.

This brings me to the second Yglesias post-of-the-day on Iraq: the elephant no one mentions, or the permanent US bases. Permanent US military bases are not necessarily incompatible with the principles just outlined. The attractiveness of permanent bases to either the US or the Iraqis, as well as their type and extent, depends on a host of imponderables that we are in no position to define at this moment.

As Matt indicates, there is a broad consensus among those outside the Bush Administration (other than the hard-core neocon geostrategists and military nationalists), that it is crucial to send credible signals to the Iraqi people that the US has no desire or intent to turn their country into a US aircraft carrier from which it intends to manage the region. There is also a fairly widely shared appreciation that no such signals are likely to carry much weight with the Iraqi public as long as the US is merrily constructing a sizable number of large, expensive "enduring" facilities around the country.

Yet the Bush Administration is in someways trapped, because even if its strategy of Iraqization is successful, it's going to take time. In the meantime, the current burdens on US forces and equipment demonstrate the need for better and more routinized support systems. In the process of transitioning security responsibilities, the Iraqis themselves will, we assume, need and use a portion of the facilities being constructed. Furthermore, it's not evident that even as the Iraqis take on more of the responsibility for internal security, they are going to be in a position anytime soon to be able to handle all their external security needs on their own, or are going to be all that eager to have US forces disappear over the horizon, given the neighborhood they live in. And let's be realistic about the current situation -- statements by US officials regarding the intention to build or not build permanent facilities aren't likely to have much credibility with Iraqis as long as the US military's physical presence remains so visible to Iraqis in their everyday lives.

If, as I've argued, the measure of US policy should be how well it helps the Iraqis succeed, it seems to me that statements from US officials or debates within the US about permanent bases right now are a bit premature. We are in a tense and uncertain period of waiting. The US is waiting for the appointment of its official Iraqi interlocuteurs and for their organization into a government capable of taking major decisions. The Iraqis themselves are in the midst of defining the trajectory their system will take in the coming months and years, which will in turn partly dictate nature of the security issues they will face, the overall prospects for the Bush Administration's Iraqization strategy, and the desires of the Iraqis themselves for various forms of American security support. What specific positions should we push US policymakers to adopt today, given these imponderables, beyond the basic principles of an Iraqization strategy?

The long-term US military posture is similar to many other big issues the Iraqis will have to face, once they have a government capable of making major decisions, such as the future structure of the oil industry. Sometimes patience is a virtue. The Iraqis are currently trying to square several huge circles: the nature of Sunni participation, Kurdistan and Kirkuk, the role of the central government more broadly, and the religious character of the future political system. So far, the US has pretty much left them to their own devices, refusing either to mediate or take sides, while indicating a few broad and sensible parameters of outcomes "acceptable" to both the US and to the international community, such as "Sunnis need to be a meaningful part of the equation," and "no independent Kurdistan."

The current hands-off US approach may not comport with the preferences of those American agencies, experts, pundits or think tank denizens whose sympathies lie with one group or another, or who focus their attention on one source or another of US tensions with Iraq's various neighbors. But from this distance, at least, it seems to me that a hands-off policy that respects the Iraqis' own timetable and decision-making process is a wise approach, and one that is supported by a broad range of political groups in Congress as well as most of the countries' whose future support we will need in helping Iraq "succeed." .

Does this mean that we should continue to ignore the entire subject of permanent bases in Iraq? Absolutely not. I agree completely with Matt that it's a major failure of the US media -- and I would add our political system -- that our presence and activities in Iraq have not been framed, in part, by the shifting assumptions about the nature of the long-term US military presence there. I'd suggest, however, that this is a matter that goes far beyond the bases themselves, to the entire strategy of Iraqization. For example, the decisions being made (and budgets proposed) for training and equipping the security forces carry, at the least implicitly, some fundamental assumptions about the size, structure and functions of the future Iraqi security forces, both for internal and external security. And those assumptions, in turn, at least implicitly, carry some fundamental assumptions about what the US expects to be doing in Iraq over the coming years if not decades.

We have no real picture of the force structures that the US and the Iraqis are trying to build. We hear outlandishly conflicting official claims that so many "security forces" or "police" have been "trained," but as is clear from following Senate hearings or perusing Stephen Aftergood's Secrecy News, there are few clues available about the purposes or level of training or the command structures into which they are supposed to fit.

The impressions from the past two years of media coverage are that the Iraqi military's armored vehicles, munitions, artillery and air forces seem to have been put out of commission during the invasion, wandered off as the army disbanded, were looted, or were pretty grotty to start with. What are the assumptions underlying plans to replace them in terms of the types of forces that will use this equipment, where it's going to come from, and who's going to pay for it? How much, if any, of the costs of standing up Iraqi security forces, or keeping them in the field, is part of "reconstruction" funding or programmed for future spending in US defense budgets? Is all of this being bought by the Iraqis themselves? Are they going to have a choice about what they buy and where they buy it?

About the only time we catch even a whiff of any of these matters is when there's a scandale about procurement of tanks or armored vehicles. Or some comment in passing about airplanes and helicopters that seems to suggest the US doesn't contemplate Iraq getting much airborne capacity anytime soon. Does that mean that the US is going to be Iraq's "airforce" for ensuring security vis a vis Iraq's neighbors?

And then there are the broader strategic questions that involve the US posture. Just to deal with the Iraq's most notable neighbor -- we hear fragmented concerns that the Iranians are trying to influence or infiltrate various levels of government, political parties, militias etc. And of course continuous US saber-rattling over nuclear weapons development. But no real discussion about how US-Iranian tensions may effect the US' own strategic imperative of ensuring "success" in Iraq. Tom Barnett claims the Bush Administration is going to have to choose between letting Iran develop nuclear weapons and a sufficiently stable region to enable Iraqi political success and some of the other political transformations the Administration is seeking. I think he's probably right, but few are framing the debate at that strategic level -- just keeping score on how many sabers were rattled or put back in their sheathes this week with the Europeans.

It's understandable that attention has focused on the immediate problems of training forces to address terrorists, insurgencies, and growing criminal activities that threaten the day-to-day safety of Iraqi citizens. But the rest of the story is missing in action. There are lots of bits and pieces out there, but the reporting tends to be either at the super-micro level or, when it's at the macro, it's basically score-keeping among ideological warriors. The only reason macro stories appear is that somebody's pushing an inter-agency agenda, or there's another titillating spat on the horizon with a US ally. A few of the think tanks are trying to fill in the missing pictures, but their efforts are only rarely brought into the stories being told in the media. Yet many of these are topics that can be covered without being exposed to the very real physical dangers to reporters of being snatched off the streets in Iraq.

Permanent bases may be the elephant, but to my way of thinking there's a whole menagerie that the press needs to start covering in the coming months as the Iraqis consider key decisions about their future and begin to discuss with the US the long-term US position in the country. It's at that point that the American political discussions should come into play. We should hold the Bush Administration to the criteria for judging policy that they themselves have established -- what's good for the "success" of Iraq in the long run. That's the time when we should oppose the inevitable arguments for a US force posture in Iraq that's based on what's in geostrategic fashion among the Washington cognoscenti at the time.

{cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism}