This new found pragmatism seems to be producing some progress in isolating both Syria and Iran. The formula in both cases combines a multilateral approach with a focus on issues around which a consensus can be built rather than insisting on maximalist positions.
I'd add to that list another area where there has been a shift in approach -- bilateral relations with major countries. In the cases of China, India and Russia, the BushAdmin2 seems to be repositioning the US agenda away from a bunch of disconnected (and sometimes inconsistent) issues toward more multi-dimensional relationships.
- The central theme of Singh's visit to the US was the broadening and deepening of inter-connected economic and security aspects of the US-India relationship.
- There have been a flurry of notable China initiatives in preparation for the (Katrina postponed) Hu trip -- Zoellick going to Beijing in August explicitly to launch a multi-dimensional relationship-building exercise; Rumsfeld's recent trip focusing on increasing the range of military contacts and improving communications on a number of levels; and Snow's attempt to expand the agenda beyond exchange rate regimes to the financial sector more broadly.
- Russia has received less attention, but one could argue a similar shift is underway toward relationship-building and a greater focus on economic and political integration of Russia in Western structures. There is certainly a greater emphasis on finding ways to collaborate, or at least not create competitive frictions, in post-Soviet space where Russia will continue to be a major presence. (See the interesting remarks (pdf) on enriching the US-Russia relationship by Thomas Graham, the NSC's Senior Director for Russian Affairs, at an AEI forum on Russia in October. Without giving Putin a "free ride," Graham displayed considerable appreciation of the political and economic challenges the Russians face. The Russophobes and democromanes in the audience must have been disappointed.)
One of the most frequent critiques of the BushAdmin1's approach to diplomacy has been its embrace of "unilateralism." And certainly prak's examples of the more pragmatic diplomacy of the BushAdmin2 include a new acceptance of the potential usefulness of multilateralism. But it seems to me, if we also look at the adjustments being made by the BushAdmin2 in bilateral relations, we are seeing something beyond pragmatism or multilateralism. There seems to be at least a hint of a structural shift in the way the US is defining the sources of its political power and how it is deploying that power in the diplomatic arena. Some of this shift may be simply tactical -- forced on the BushAdmin2 by circumstance. But hopefully some of the shift also reflects a greater appreciation by Bush himself of the merits of a less polarizing approach to the politics of diplomacy.
In The Politics of Diplomacy, James Baker's memoirs as Secretary of State, Baker tells the story of how he was able to translate the rather formidable skills he had developed in the domestic arena to the international stage. For Baker, and for his close partners Scowcroft and Bush41, diplomacy was anything but a zero-sum game.
By contrast, the approach to the politics of diplomacy adopted by the hardliners in the BushAdmin1 was a Rove/DeLay winner-take-all style, based on assumptions about how a polarized structure can be used to augment power. What are some of the factors I'd point to as polarization politics?
- They regularly turned differences of opinion about means into irreconcilable disputes by choosing to emphasize maximalist positions and preferring no solution to compromise -- with John Bolton starring as Dr No, the poster boy of polarization. They converted disagreements into ideological battles ("we don't do business with evil dictators," environment), and they turned differences of degree into stark opposition ("you're either with us or against us.")
- They used campaign-style techniques to personalize and demonize foreign public figures, both political leaders and international civil servants, who dared to raise questions.
- They preferred constructing smaller coalitions over building broader consensus. And then they publicly displayed carrots and sticks -- bilateral deals to gleefully reward supporters and openly punish those countries who failed to support them.
- The issues they focused on were a set of pet peeves or hot-button issues for various parts of their domestic political constituencies that didn't add up to a coherent agenda -- anything-but-Clinton dissatisfactions, long-standing grievances, hostility to Lilliputians and munchkins, moral/religious battles, debates over the use of "scientific" evidence in policymaking.
- They ignored the stuff that Baker was so adept at managing -- cross-issue linkages that contribute to the general political atmosphere in the society of nations, both within multilateral institutions and in bilateral relations.
- They sacrificed long-term credibility for short-term tactical gains.
- And they seem to have relied on the Rove theory of bandwagonning -- look like you're unstoppable, and those vacillating on the sidelines will jump on board.
These patterns are reminiscent of the BushAdmin behavior especially in the House of Reps, where the GOP has become infamous for gratuitously sticking nonessential bits into legislation that reduce the size of the majority voting for a bill. They focus on red-meat issues to keep the base mobilized. They don't go looking for accommodations that could pull Democrats into supporting an initiative. Those who are on their team get well rewarded through assignments, pork, campaign funding and the support of the RNC machinery. Those who cross them are punished -- and sufficiently openly as an example for others who might be tempted to act independently. At the presidential level, who needs wide but shallow public support when narrow but deep support produces 51% and the power to dictate the agenda. And their agenda is incoherent -- a wishlist of pet peeves and rewards for various parts of their base. And as for demonizing those who challenge the Administration and sacrificing credibility for short-term gain...
I certainly don't see the moderation of approach in BushAdmin2 as evidence of repentant hardliners, although one could argue that grappling with the complexities of the future structure of the US military has forced Rumsfeld to adopt a more pragmatic set of priorities. Certainly, Iraq has left them little leverage to continue with a polarization approach. Bandwagonning has also demonstrably ceased to be a plausible theory. They can no longer credibly threaten a small-coalition approach to issues like Iran and NKorea -- the "coalition of the willing" would be the US and who else? And the US by itself is now tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The management of key relationships rather than red-meat issues is coming back into vogue, whether China, India, Russia or France. Making nice to international leaders who don't agree 100% with White House talking points is coming into fashion. And "spin" is no longer much of an option because they've repeatedly shredded their credibility.
All told, it looks like the Baker-type approach to diplomatic politics has finally managed to win some breathing space. If the Latin America trip is any indication, however, this isn't a diplomatic style that comes naturally to Bush. The limited game plan the US displayed for the Latin America Summit suggests that in areas where Condi or Zoellick aren't personally heavily involved, the WH/NSC/State apparatus isn't yet geared to play the Baker political-style game.
[cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism]
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