A follow-up to praktike's prior post. Prak points to why I found the recent profile on a group of Sunni insurgents so interesting. You wouldn't know it from listening to our President or Secretary of State, but political participation and violence aren't an "either/or" proposition. In the run-up to the December elections, we shouldn't anticipate that violence will be limited to those insurgents who oppose any Sunni participation in the electoral process. Nor should we expect that a high turnout in Sunni areas would foretell a major reduction in post-election violence.

One reason to expect continued violence is highlighted in the article prak cites: even if Sunnis were more satisfied with their representation in the emerging political system, that would not remove one of the major motives for violence -- the US presence. But even if the US military were to withdraw tomorrow and the December elections produced a more "inclusive" political system, we should not be surprised if violence remains a significant feature of the political landscape.

Just an impression -- sorry, no links -- but it seems to me commentators are starting to use the three-plus decades of Northern Ireland's Troubles to point out a simple fact: political participation and violence are often complementary tactics within a broader opposition/resistance strategy. The "military wing" can be used to enhance credibility or political power for the "political wing."

Some of the patterns we should expect during the run-up to and after the December elections among Sunni groups that aren't total rejectionists of any political participation:

• The "hard men" try to get the government and other political groups to take their "political wing" seriously by, at the very least, holding out the threat of continued violence.
  
• They use high-profile attacks to attract the support (including the votes) of constituencies that agree with their aims and admire their willingness to fight and take personal risks.
  
• They try to radicalize the political process by muscling out of the political space (through intimidation, assassination etc) other politicians who are competing for the same base but who renounce violence.
  
• They use violent criminal activities (robbery, smuggling, kidnapping, protection rackets and other extortion) to obtain important resources for their movement (funding, weapons) or enhance their personal power via personal enrichment.

A number of these observations would also apply in some regions to Shi'a and Kurd militias that are closely linked with formal political groupings.

I'm not suggesting that elections are bad. In fact, one of the reasons I had hoped for elections in Iraq much earlier was to reduce the period of time during which "vested interests" in continued violence, especially criminal connections, were created and became valuable for members of fighting groups. The fact that a large number of individuals have "vested interests" in continued violence means that, at least for many Sunni groups, the "military wing" is likely to outweigh the political side for some time to come. The importance of the "military wing" for the Kurds and some of the Shi'a groups will actually increase in some locations, such as Kirkuk, where key political solutions are yet to be defined.

The continued importance of the "military wings" reduces the likelihood that Khalizad's "national reconciliation strategy" (see Fareed Zakaria) will produce quick, large-scale reduction in the level of violence. We should also expect that any attempts by the US to negotiate with insurgent groups will be an immensely complex and drawnout process.

That's not to suggest that a primary focus on political solutions to address violence by insurgent or militia groups is unwarranted. On this score, the Bush Administration is right -- insurgencies are ultimately defeated politically, not militarily. Indeed, pursuing policies that establish reconciliation processes, such as amnesties, are critical and, in fact, probably long overdue. In my opinion, the significance of Saddam's trial is ultimately how it contributes to or erodes the prospects of Iraqis becoming reconciled with their future political system, if not with each other and with their pasts.

In the long run, the fighters have to be either brought "in from the cold" or, if they refuse to renounce violence, marginalized from mainstream political, social and economic life. As is illustrated by the gradual process by which Sein Fein distanced itself from the military IRA, if the political system begins to work, there seems to come a "tipping point" where violence starts working against the political agenda rather than supporting it. But Northern Ireland also illustrates that it's a long, complicated process that demands both the internal development of political institutions and continuing engagement by the international community.

[cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism]