One obvious difference stands out between the success and failure -- central, ideologically informed plans versus on-the-ground, practical improvisation. The difference isn't quite as stark as it first appears, since we should note that 1st Division's tactics in Tikrit, though they may be improvisational in the particulars, are grounded in theory that has emerged from US military experiences in handling low intensity conflicts elsewhere. By contrast, if the reports of former advisers to the CPA such as Larry Diamond are any guide, such theoretical assumptions that underpinned CPA's priorities or how they designed and executed programs were not drawn from prior successful experiences in institution-building by either US government agencies or multilateral institutions.
There's a second, somewhat more less obvious element that I discern. which may simply be due to it being a major "hobby horse" mine. Whether we call it nation-building or democratization or in the "post-conflict" or "failed-state" situations, stabilization, a major transformation of a society is involved. Any such transformation is ultimately the product of the locals. If you want to influence the direction of the transformation, you work initially through the locals and, as soon as possible, switch roles, so it is they who are making the main directional decisions and you who is providing the support.
I have two principal corrollaries to the principle of "it belongs to the locals." First, a major transformation requires at least a generation before its broad institutional outlines are in place; and second, a critical factor for success is education.
Several observations, though the topic deserves not only a post but a site of its own:
Re change belongs to the locals, we can only assist. The changes must be achieved across a large number of dynamically inter-related fronts: political, economic, legal, social (shifts in the basis for elite status and the rules for who are winners/losers), and cultural. Transformation entails a radical upheaval in attitudes and behaviors. Any change that's not "owned" by locals won't take hold (unless it's the result of long-term colonialization, and even then it will be "localized.") Furthermore, there's no single "recipe" since the change process is dynamic and iterative, with lots of feedback loops, not linear or "sequential."
Re it takes an awfully long time and we must remain engaged. Because the change of attitudes and behaviors is at the heart of a major transformation, the generation of leaders when the transformation begins is usually not able to transform itself fast enough to lead the entire process, or even necessarily to benefit personally in the long-run from the transformation. Gorbachev is the classic example, with his ex-foreign minister the most recent in Georgia. The exception that proves the rule is Nelson Mandela. Quite astonishing how adaptable he has been to changing circumstances, even into his 80s. The number of reformers-turned-tyrants in Africa illustrates all too painfully why any attempt to accelerate political change must plan for a lengthy process during which competitive mechanisms for regular and orderly succession of accountable leadership are paramount. (Peaceful alternation of parties in power and in opposition is to be welcomed but is less of an absolute imperative.)
Re education is a critical factor. The transformation also requires new forms of knowledge for individuals to be able to (1) understand the options they have for new activities or institutional structures, whether political, economic, etc. and (2) function effectively in the new evolving environment. Accordingly, improving the quality and access to education must be a centerpiece of the transformation process. Education in this sense means acquisition of knowledge through all types of mechanisms, not only formal learning but practical experience, access to knowledge materials (translations, internet), and sharing ideas and experience through communication more broadly.
Education is not only a key facilitator of successful transformation, it can also be an important stimulus to transformation. I am convinced that the exposure of a generation of children of Latin America's government and business elites to US engineering, business, economics and law schools is an important part of the explanation for the last two decades of moves away from military-led or one-party governments and towards economic liberalization. Experience in higher education in the US has also been an important part of the transformation process in many parts of Asia.
[Somewhat tangential, but on the US policies that affect education as a transformative force: One of the main reasons I'm allergic to framing the threats from Islamist extremism as the "war on terror" is the narrow focus on physical security. While "soft" power is no substitute for using "hard" power to protect our security, the reverse is equally true when it comes to shaping a more secure world. It's a travesty that we've reduced the access of foreign students, scholars, media and business people at the very time we should be increasingly open to them. And of course the rapidly growing physical threats to Americans abroad, especially in countries with considerable Islamic populations, are already having a chilling effect on the amount of interchange we have with potential friends in those societies. I have been extremely perturbed by the insensitivity of the Bush Admin to the dangers posed by this erosion of global openness in the long-term. It's not just the INA's application of rules or the procedures in the consular offices; it's the quasi-xenophobia of Ashcroft or it's Wolfowitz' cavallier attitude toward risks of doing business in Iraq (from accusing journalists of cowardice to not knowing how many soldiers are being killed or wounded). The negative impact of these attitudes won't change without a deliberate policy shift -- until leadership at the top makes openness a high priority, bureaucrats will always be "Dr No" because "Yes" might be a mistake. Maybe the recent screams from the business community re visas for partners and scientists will start having some effect.]The challenge for US foreign policy is to obtain a broadly-shared understanding of what those three "keys to success" mean for US action and commitments. Without such an understanding, our policies will be erratic and under-resourced, both in the attention paid by policymakers and in funding (although what else is new?). I despair of having it discussed sensibly in a presidential election campaign. If Kerry was trying to start such a conversation, he failed miserably. Yet it should be an explicit component of our strategy over the next several decades of conflict with Islamist extremism as it was during the Cold War.
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