Good for E.J. Dionne for taking the time to read and respond to emails, both nasty and nice. But did he really print them all out? How quaint.

When the first news of the tsunami crossed the wires, reports were of deaths in the 20s and 50s. But the wires also reported the magnitude of the earthquake and geographic reach -- to southeastern India and beyond -- as well as walls of water two stories high. This clearly meant we would be looking at deaths in the tens of thousands at best. And indeed, each hour the toll keeps marching upwards, and we are still in the midst of the initial chaos, when the numbers of missing and presumed dead cannot be accounted for with any accuracy.

Yet the score-keeping of numbers of victims only tells part of the tale. The scale of the geophysical event is mind-boggling, and will be the stuff of both science and legends for decades to come. So far, Wikipedia is proving to be a remarkable, dynamic resource for understanding what has happened.

Wikipedia also provides an extremely useful compendium of constantly updated information on the current struggles to deal with the most urgent threats as well as the broader tasks of addressing the longer-term consequences of the catastrophe in each country affected. In addition, a truly international collection of sites and programs soliciting assistance -- in kind and cash -- can be found there. A special section is devoted to indepth coverage of the disaster as it has affected India. Reuters' AlertNet, its humanitarian crisis and disaster service, is a good place to track news on UN, aid agency and NGO responses going forward.

The blogosphere has of course not disappointed. Folks have ramped up a variety of resposnes in short order. Via The Acorn, here's a just-launched site devoted to both information and organizing assistance: SEA-EAT blog (The South-East Asia Earthquake and Tsunami). Here's their RSS feed as well.

SEA-EAT blog has just set up a very useful donation page that directs you to organizations accepting donations online as well as those taking other forms of donations. Check out if there are comments on the SEA-EAT blog regarding some of the organizations soliciting assistance -- and you can also post questions about an organization if you want to know more about them.

In the blog's list of "how you can help," they add:

If you're a blogger, and would like to help us out by taking up posting duties, the same post has email addresses of the current contributors who can send you a blogger invitation. It would be nice having people around the world taking this up in shifts.

The SEA-EAT blog has a number of links to info, satellite photos, etc. on the topographical impact of the earthquake and tsunami that's beyond my ability to imagine.

The press item that perhaps caught my overall disbelief best was this bit of black humor, from a Korean site, titled "Sumatra, We Have a Problem":

The devastating earthquake that sent tidal waves flooding across land masses in the Indian Ocean has wrought significant changes in the topography of the region - even dislocating Sumatra by 36 meters. This caused aeronautical problems as the instruments of aircraft delivering relief supplies from all over the world failed to detect the new location of Sumatra Airport.

[UPDATE] The shifting Sumatra and neighboring islands is raising additional concerns about getting aid to affected people in those areas. According to Reuters:

The [US Geological Survey] team in Pasadena, California, also was studying more detailed satellite images on Tuesday to determine if the scraping of one plate over another plowed up enough debris on the ocean floor to block the port of Banda Aceh in Sumatra where international aid was headed.

Large earthquakes in the last decade in Kobe, Japan, and Golcuk, Turkey, deformed the coastlines and rendered their ports inoperable after the crises, Hudnut said.

The scientists have asked for cooperation from operators of commercial satellites that can provide high-resolution images to show the extent of damage to coastlines, he said.

---

We'll continue to post additional sources of information or organizations that might be of interest as we learn about them.

Network for Good is an online network that links people who want to donate funds or volunteer with projects of interest. They also help people find ways to give in response to disasters, such as the Caribbean and Florida hurricaines earlier this year. Their page on assistance for victims of the Asian tsunami can be found here.

Right now we're up to 50,000 dead, and the toll is inevitably going to go up as disease kicks in. While I strongly agree with Colin Powell that it's unfair to characterize the United States as "stingy," we do need to show that the world still needs us in a pinch, badly. Talking blandly about "assessments" and "surveys" won't do the trick. Bill Clinton gets it--he dropped a none-too-subtle hint on the Beeb that the Bush administration needs to ramp up its efforts to help victims of the recent devastating Sumatran Tsunami: "It is really important that somebody takes the lead in this." The UN can't do it; only the United States and, to be more specific, Pacific Command has the logistical acumen to pull off a major relief effort (in cooperation with the Indians and others in the region). This is not a major relief effort.

UPDATE: USAID throws in another $20 million. Good.

UPDATE2: John F. Harris and Robin Wright report on the criticism President Bush is getting for not demonstrating adequate sympathy for the tsunami victims. While the charge of "stinginess" is certainly unfair, I do believe that Bush should have gotten off his ass immediately and headed back to Washington to show not only his empathy for the victims but also to demonstrate leadership. I'd say the same thing about PM Singh if he were chilling out at a resort somewhere in northern India. Meanwhile, Nitin Pai, as well as many American bloggers on the right, are crying foul. As I hope I conveyed over at Nitin's place, this isn't about scoring political points or trying to cynically use a tragedy for nationalistic gain. It's just that America needs to lead, because only America has the capacity to do so. And, pace Mr. Pai, symbolism does matter. At the same time, it's an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that America is, fundamentally, a force for good in the world. There's nothing cynical, hypocritical, or inconsistent about that. And a note to Glenn: the extra $20 million that you're crowing about was thrown in precisely because the U.S. was getting slammed. Unfairly so? Perhaps. But if you want to claim the mantle of world leadership, it's tough times like this when you have to show why you deserve it.

[UPDATE 12-24-04] The best reformers turn crises into opportunities. That's what the Orange revolution has been attempting in Ukraine, and that's what Rami Khouri, executive editor of Beirut's Daily Star is calling for, although on a far less dramatic scale.

As has become official, with the release Wednesday of a statement by UNDP (see below), the third annual Arab Human Development Report will not be issued by the UNDP itself but rather by a to-be-created organization located in the region. Khouri is calling on regional business and intellectual leaders to see this as a great opportunity to put their money where their mouths have been all these years: take the initiative and establish a truly independent regional think-tank and civic action center to promote reforms in the region.

If the timing of press initiatives is indicative, such an institution is already in the works and is to be discussed seriously this weekend in Beirut. We'll now have to see whether those Arabs who hold themselves out as dedicated to true reform are ready to take what would be an important symbolic step.

But first, let's review the bidding. It seems that the third Arab Human Development Report, to be published under the auspices of UNDP and which is devoted to freedoms and good governance, has stirred a number of hornets nests. The first is with the US, which was reported, initially by Tom Friedman (see initial story below), to have objected to a portion of the report critical of US policies in Iraq and Israel, and was forcing a publication delay. Various denials and confirmations of Friedman's story (official and unofficial) have appeared in the press. The story has over time expanded to include reported opposition by Egypt and other countries.

As of three days ago, it seemed there is general consensus that UNDP will not be the official publisher of the new AHDR, and if it is published it will be issued by a to-be-established organization. According to AFP, the criticisms of the draft report come from a fairly wide group of governments, not only Egypt but especially countries in the Gulf.

The draft "includes serious elements and others that need correcting," Arab League Secretary General Amr Mussa told reporters Tuesday.

"There are problems preventing its release by the UNDP. We expect it to be issued by a third party," said Mussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister.

The Arabist Network has the transcript of an interview he conducted earlier this week with one of the principal authors of the report, Nader Fergany, as well as further perspective on the politics surrounding the issue of the first and second AHDRs.

And now Transitions Trends has the text of a press statement released by UNDP in which it denies that it is being threatened by the US government with withholding of funding if it issues the new AHDR. The text of the press statement needs to be read carefully, since it was clearly written with great care.

UNDP statement on Arab Human Development Report

New York, 22 December 2004—There have been numerous press reports in recent days concerning the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The AHDRs are the product of an independent editorial team of Arab scholars, policymakers and practitioners. As such they are not statements of UN or UNDP policy, although UNDP, according to its mandate, has been and remains involved in programmatic follow up to many of the recommendations contained in the report.

One of the strengths of the AHDRs has been their status as frank, independent analyses of the state of human development in the Arab world. Different countries, both within and outside the region, have warmly welcomed some of the recommendations and views in previous reports while raising objections to others. That has been part of the aim of the reports: to catalyse constructive debate about how best to promote human development in the region. While at different times concerns have been raised by some Governments about the content of the forthcoming report, no formal discussions on editorial content have taken place, no Government has asked for their suppression, and press reports that the US has threatened to cut future contributions to UNDP in relation to the upcoming report are inaccurate.

Nevertheless, any report coming out under UNDP’s name must meet the high standards of impartiality expected of a UN agency. Further, the difficult political climate in the region makes our principal motive – finding common ground around reform – difficult. UNDP has for some time been exploring the possibility of helping to create a new, independent centre, situated in the region, that could become the institutional home of an editorially independent AHDR going forward. This would provide full freedom for the authors to promote their views while institutionalizing the series of reports as a representative voice of Arab civil society. This has always been our end goal and is fully consistent with the central message of the AHDRs that successful reform needs to be driven from within the region. UNDP, along with other partners, would directly support such a centre and remain actively involved in following up on key recommendations in current and future reports. Consultations are currently being held in the region to agree on the best way forward. Following these discussions, UNDP will be able to provide further details on the publication of the forthcoming AHDR on Freedoms and Good Governance in Arab countries, which is now in final stages of preparation.

There follows my comments at Transition Trends regarding the UNDP press statement:

Many thanks for following up on this story we've been watching with great interest at Liberals Against Terrorism and chez Nadezhda.

The wording of UNDP's release is more than a little telling. The key words are "formal," "asked" and "threatened."

Pretty clearly the following has happened. US staff from State or another agency have expressed to UNDP the likelihood that, given the various sources of great displeasure with Kofi Annan and the UN expressed on Capitol Hill these days, the Arab Human Development Report would be the last straw, and a brouhaha of over-sized proportions would explode. Since the text would be critical of both the US gov't and the Israelis, the Bush Admin wouldn't be able to defend UNDP vigorously. Congress has already cut the US' contribution to UNDP in the past, and there are some folks in the key committees who would be happy to have the new AHDR as an excuse to make further highly-publicized major cuts.

UNDP has realized that they can't leave themselves and the AHDR of Arab reformers at the mercy of the US Congress every year, simply because Congress has the power of the purse over UNDP's funding.

Rather than issue the third AHDR now, and then clean up the political mess later, they've tentatively decided to use the third AHDR as the first "product" of a to-be-created regional institution that can take over the process of issuing new reports going forward.

UNDP has issued the press statement because this whole matter is in the process of escalating out of control. At the very least, US State Dept wants a statement out there because otherwise it appears that Richard Boucher and other officials have been lying when they've said they haven't insisted on changes or forced UNDP to delay publication. Boucher, when he says they'd like the thing issued and that the US policies on reform in the region benefit from the contents of the reports, is in fact telling the truth from the perspective of the State Dept. He can't very well say, "We'd like it issued, but Congress would have a tizzy fit" when it's his party that controls Congress.

The question for UNDP now is what type of institution to set up, where, who will "own" it, how will it continue to be funded (especially if it keeps taking on the regional governments, it's not as if the Arab League is going to sponsor the thing). Can another multilateral, such as the World Bank, take on an oversight/governance function to give it some international credibility and protect it from regional governments without running afoul of the US Congress. How much will UNDP "seed" the funding of the new institution, etc. beyond transferring its ownership rights to the current draft. Gets very, very complicated for them.

We'll be watching how this develops with great interest. Keep us posted if you learn anything further! Thanks again.

So now the ball has moved to the Arabs' court, and to mix sports, Rami Khouri says "it's showtime!"

Set up an independent Arab Human Development Center

For all those activists and reformers in the Arab world who have worked for years to promote democracy, civil society and political freedoms, this may be the moment to act decisively to promote their goals in a practical manner.
[...]
The irony is that this third AHDR, which is now ready for printing but is still being held up by UNDP until the diplomatic controversy is resolved, focuses on political freedoms in the Arab world - an issue that the U.S. government has pushed in the past three years with exuberance and militarism that have sometimes verged on hysteria. The report, which is written by respected Arab scholars and activists, represents precisely what the U.S. wants to see happening in this region - free-thinking Arabs analyzing their societies and proposing means to make them more free, democratic, pluralistic, accountable, transparent and happy all over.
[...]
So what does the Arab world do in the face of this difficult situation? The urgent aim must be two-fold: The Arab world itself must move quickly to prevent damage to UNDP's credibility and programs because of its courage in publishing the first two AHDRs, and, the Arab world must find a way to continue this series of useful reports and make them more effective as instruments of Arab modernization, reform and democratization. For in the final analysis, these reports are not about the U.S. or UNDP. They are about us, the people, societies, identities and power flows in the Arab world.
[...]
The most sensible option to do this would be to establish a new, independent, pan-Arab think tank - an Arab Human Development Center - in the Middle East that would publish this report and subsequent ones every year. The talent and policy-making direction for such a center would come from the group of respected Arab individuals that wrote the first three AHDRs.

The key element is finding funding for the new center, and this is where Arab activists and democrats must step forward quickly and decisively. It takes only about $1 million a year to produce and publish each report.

Activist, reform-minded, democratic and wealthy Arab businessmen and women should get on the phones with one another in the coming week, round up $5 million to fund a new Arab Human Development Center for its initial three years or so, publish the third AHDR on time in January 2005, and announce the next three reports that will come out in subsequent years. The fourth report is scheduled to focus on women and the gender deficit in the region (I would suggest that the fifth and sixth reports focus on youth, and civilian control of the military-security systems in the area).

An indigenous research center publishing the AHDR annually should also initiate other activities to promote pan-Arab reform, including publishing annual surveys of political, press and personal freedoms, annual reviews of Arab military vs. human development spending, educational quality, gender- and youth-related rights, and other elements of modernity and sustainable national development. Civil society and, in some cases, possibly some government institutions, might join forces to monitor trends in these key areas, diagnose persistent problems and constraints, propose reform policies, and generate the coalitions in society needed to implement such policies.

Arab private businesses and individual investors have earned tens of billions of dollars in profits in recent decades and it is time for them to repay their societies by funding an independent research institution for pan-Arab human development. All those reform-minded Arab businessmen and women who have spoken out so eloquently at reform-focused gatherings in Dubai, Sanaa, Alexandria, Doha, Beirut and Amman must now step forward and take this process to the next critical level: establishing an independent, indigenous Arab human development research center that would provide quality research as well as play a critical advocacy and monitoring role in Arab societies. It is time for Arabs to protect the Arab human development reports, and to bring them home.

It would seem that action on this should be forthcoming in fairly short order. According to the same AFP article, one of the principal authors of the report, Nur Farahat, a law professor at Zagazig University in Egypt, has confirmed that efforts are underway to ensure the AHDR's release in January.

Farahat supervised the drafting of the legal aspects of the document entitled "Towards Consolidating Freedom in the Arab World."

He said the report's authors and consultants would meet in Beirut Sunday and Monday to review final preparations for launching the document.

Rami Khouri's "call to arms" was reprinted the same day in a number of English-language newspapers in the region, laying the groundwork for an announcement of further steps to "bring the AHDR home."

The establishment of an independent reform research center that was "owned" by Arabs, not by an international agency, would be a terrific step,. It would certainly have added importance and its voice would be enhanced by being seen to have been established in opposition to the US. This would also help remove some of the reformers' current taint of too-close alignment with US policies. The principal worrisome note was that sounded by the Arab League General Secretary, who seemed to indicate that the report would need to respond to a wider collection of criticsms from regional governments.

If such an institution is to be truly effective, it will have to be seen to be independent not only from US influence but from regional governments; that makes its funding and governance structure of special importance. It remains to be seen whether independent action is truly possible by academic experts who depend for their livelihood on funding of their universities or institutions by governments in the region. That is why Khouri's call for funding to come from individuals and investors, not from governments, may ultimately determine whether this is an opportunity that is grasped or the cause of another in a long line of disappointments.

---

[From Dec 21 2004] Maybe Tom Friedman isn't crazy after all! Or to be more precise, maybe his story about the Bush Admin sitting on the release of the UN's 2004 Arab Development Report wasn't just some particularly malicious and unfounded gossip he picked up from his buddies in Dubai.

The same day that praktike noted that Friedman seemed to be talking sense for once, there was a flurry out of which a State Department denial emerged. And that was the last I'd heard.

At the time, I'd assumed there was at least some smoke there -- that Friedman hadn't been totally suckered by someone why had virtually invented the tale from whole cloth, and that the US was in part responsible for the publication's delay. But I figured, given the complete denial from Boucher, that it must have been someone other than State (e.g. NSC) who was yanking the chains of the UN staff, and that State would straighten things out now the press was asking about the matter.

Well, Friedman may not have wanted to get into a slanging match with State over his sources, but someone else has picked up the baton. Rami Kouhri from the Daily Star -- who is generally pretty good on these sorts of things and who, BTW, was in Dubai at the same conference where Friedman picked up the UN story -- has the makings of a little expose in Tuesday's edition.

Democracy in the Middle East, but only on America's terms
U.S. anger over Arab development report threatens UNDP

Document describes impact of Israeli and American occupations on regional sentiment
[...]
Authoritative sources directly involved in the matter revealed that the U.S. State Department had accused the UNDP of publishing "false accusations" against the U.S. in the third report, which is finalized and ready for printing. The report has been held up since October due to this political problem. Last year the U.S. cut its funding of the UNDP by $12 million, to $89 million, making it clear that the cut reflected its displeasure with some of the contents of the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR).

UN officials believe that the report as it stands now is factual and fair. It has already been heavily edited to meet normal UN standards of fairness and accuracy, and in its present form it describes the impact of the Israel-Palestine and Iraq situations on sentiments and public opinion in the Middle East. The UN's dilemma is that it could never edit or change the text sufficiently to reflect Washington's view that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is "a man of peace" and that the American presence in Iraq is an act of "liberation," as one person involved in this matter noted privately. Yet publishing the report as it is would lead to a severe funding cut.

Options being explored now include suppressing the report (which would be a great blow to UNDP credibility), publishing the third AHDR in the name of the Arab writers and researchers who produced it, without the UNDP's name on it (which would effectively mean the end of the series of reports from the UNDP), or finding a way for this and future reports to be published by a third institution not linked to UNDP. Some UN officials fear that the U.S. could cut its entire budget contribution to UNDP in retaliation for the 3rd report being published in its present form.
[...]

Poor UNDP. No good deed goes unpunished. And the Bush Administration -- not only showing something less than a strong, principled commitment to free speech and opinion from Arab reformers, but also demonstrating a bit of recidivism on still-fresh pledges to not act unilaterally. Wonder whether that was on the agenda during the chats Kofi had with Colin and Condi the same day Richard Boucher was issuing fulsome denials.

So far, I've stayed away from the ins and outs of Social Security debates, both on the merits and in terms of political framing. The really big issues are being mostly ignored and relate to much broader dynamics among America's labor/financial capital/government in a globalized economy. The "risk-shifting" discussions are starting to  go in the right direction. But on the details  we have still mostly a great deal of smoke and little clarity.

I have my biases on specific schemes, however, which I should probably set out in the interest of full disclosure. In a perfect world, I would separate the safety net-social insurance functions from the capital accumulation functions. In a way, as many have noted before me, the fact that they are currently mushed together (and the capital accumulation isn't actually "funded" but rather is subject to Congressional tinkering with benefits) is an historical accident that has been maintained for political reasons.  So here's how I'd pull the two components apart, with some important safeguards.

• The safety net-social insurance scheme would remain on a pay-as-you-go from payroll taxes and be means tested for amounts above a minimum benefit, to which all unemployed above a certain age or disabled would be eligible, regardless of employment history. This is critical if we are to start addressing the gender dimension, which is going to continue to grow for elderly females.
• The capital accumulation or "forced employment retirement savings" component would be "transitioned" to a mandatory Thrift Savings scheme. The amount transitioned would be ratched downward for younger participants in Soc Sec at the upper-income levels, thereby reducing the amount government must fund through transition bonds. Going forward, contributions to the scheme would be via the equivalent of a payroll tax.
• The Thrift Savings program would be involve a small set of portfolio investment choices that would limit competition among program providers. This is critical in order to avoid the inevitable but totally unnecessary marketing expenses incurred to attract what are in fact "forced savings." [BTW -- This is, I believe, THE major lesson from Chile's experience. If the program is structured as a core "quasi-social security" part of an individual's overall retirement savings portfolio, and therefore subject to very strict prudential limitations, financial services companies won't be able to compete on either quality (past performance) or price (due to oligopolistic pressures common to retail financial services), so all they'll have left is to compete on is marketing if left to their own devices.]
• The Thrift Savings program would provide an official mechanism for signing up and managing one's account -- this would confound most of the fraudsters and con artists who are licking their chops at the thought of all those widows and orphans there for easy pickings.
• For efficiency, portability and consumer protection purposes, I have a certain fondness for account maintenace and processing being a service provided directly to the individual rather than hidden in the financial services of the portfolio manager. The government would license qualified account processors -- to start with there would probably be too many, but it would consolidate fairly quickly. If entry remains relatively easy for big qualified data processors, it will stay competitive and individuals will continue to get decent prices.
• As a critical consumer protection mechanisms, the Thrift Savings program would have a mandatory annuitization arrangement upon withdrawal for at least a minimum amount and, again, restrict the choices available, both in terms offered and providers.

Without those key features -- a minimum defined benefit componet and low-cost consumer protections for the "forced savings"  defined contribution component -- the whole scheme will be subject to a giant moral hazard that will make the Asia debt crisis bailout look like small potatoes.

Nonetheless, we haven't a perfect world. The grand political bargaining seems to require either: 

• buying broad support by retaining a significant payout of defined benefits that represent retirement "savings" above and beyond the safety net. But that isn't feasible long-term through a pay-as-you-go system.
• buying support for privatizing accounts managed by individuals (and shifting the financial risk from government to individual, that is from a defined benefit to a defined contribution scheme) through promising to reduce the future claims on the government. But that would do little of good in the meantime, would increase the outstanding public debt to be financed by significant amounts at a time that we're not best positioned to do so, and would require elaborate (and inevitably costly) regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the financial services industry doesn't get caught up in inappropriately costly or risky competition and that the con artists are put out of business before they do too much harm.   [An aside -- since I firmly believe that the accumulation of forced savings in individual private accounts would, on a net basis after all is said and done, do absolutely nothing for individual savings rates, I don't count the ideological assurance that privatized accounts will contribute towards improved macroeconomic balance as part of the political bargain. It does, however, provide powerful political motivation for a whole block of supporters of private individual accounts -- that's more part of the "framing" debate and less part of divvying-the-pie bargaining.]

Neither bargain makes much sense, yet the real shape of each bargain is being disguised by all the smoke being spewed from every part of the political spectrum.

So rather than test each proposal against my personal "ideal," the task I've set for myself is to try to identify "telling points" for or against different approaches (too early obviously to say "proposals") and how they play out against the basic political bargains that seem to be driving early disputes.

Here's the first I've found that seems important to keep in mind. Edward Andrews succinctly noted in the NYT a couple of weeks ago:

The more basic question is this: Should a rational person believe that Social Security's very real financial shortfall can be reduced just by shifting from bonds into stocks?...

What Andrews is getting at is that, whatever the specifics of a proposal the President is negotiating with himself to present in the State of Union and to Congress, so far his comments are clear on one fundamental point. He is conflating two quite separate issues: putting the government program on a sound footing, and adopting private accounts. Instead, he seems to believe in the "alchemy" of finance, whereby the latter will solve the former.

So this is one of those "key points" I personally will watch for in anything that comes from either politicians or pundits.

Somehow, in the post-election shuffling of attention to such matters as Peter Beinart, Fallujah, and Social Security, I've been remiss in tracking the ongoing growth -- still robust I might add -- of the Order of the Shrill.

Reflecting the Order's continued vigor, lots of new recent members of the "non-obvious" category, including William Kristol, Norman Schwartzkopf, and Chuck Hagel (oh, maybe Chuck should be "obvious" by now).

The Order's international representation is also growing, even in that hotbed of willing coalitionists, Poland. Newest member, Lech Walesa, has just earned his acceptance to the Order with this outstanding contribution in today's Wall Street Journal:

"America failed its exam as a superpower," says Lech Walesa, the former Solidarity trade-union leader who became Poland's first post-Communist president. "They are a military and economic superpower but not morally or politically anymore. This is a tragedy for us."

The Order of the Shrill does not rest on its laurels, however. To give recognition where recognition is due, and not to be outdone by Presidential Medals of Freedom or such like, the Order of the Shrill has acknowledged the creation of a new Order -- the Order of the Till.

As prak pointed out earlier, Steve Clemons is keeping an eye open for worthy members of the new Order. Nominations for worthy candidates may also be forwarded to the Order of the Shrill directly.

---

[UPDATE] Walesa, it should be noted, was "equal opportunity" shrill in his interview with the WSJ noted above. On the subject of the EU:

Mr. Walesa laments what he sees as America's squandered leadership because he thinks the EU isn't ready for prime time. Encompassing 25 nations and 450 million people, it struggles to find a common voice or mission: "Even bird-watching clubs have a clear set of goals" -- but Europe, he says, doesn't.

There are certainly substantial differences in the motives and means of intervention by leading nations today in failed states and regions of conflict when compared to those of the imperial nations of the colonial era. But many of the issues confronting both groups are similar, and there may be some broad lessons to be learned from the experiences of the colonial powers.

So argues a new book by an associate professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, Kimberly Zisk Marten. Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past compares the colonial activities of the United States, Britain and France at the turn of the 20th century with the post-conflict peace-keeping/peace-building operations of the 1990s (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor). Her study does not extend to the conflicts of this decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Reviewing the book in AsiaTimesOnline, David Isenberg sets out Marten's central observation and its broad implications for adjusting the policies and approaches of the intervening states. The intervenors have, typically, multiple objectives which may often be somewhat in tension, if not out-and-out mutually inconsistent. And of course the intervenors are operating under constraints, both internal to their own domestic politics and capacitites to act abroad and to the international arena. Isenberg, with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq summarizes the argument as follows:

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Marten's view, represent an oxymoron, or as she more politely phrases it, an "intertwined set of problems". It is the desire by the international community to avoid being tarred with the imperial label while attempting to exert what amounts to political control over foreign societies, and the need to encourage multilateral participation to achieve legitimacy while avoiding inconsistency.

Looking at past experience, both colonial and the most recent decade:

Among Marten's findings are the following:

• Powerful states in both eras have lacked the political will that would be necessary to gain control over political development in foreign societies;
• military organizations are one of the factors contributing to the lack of clear direction we find on the ground; and
• when properly directed to do so, disciplined soldiers can do a good job of providing public order.

The meaning of all this is that peacekeepers should try to limit their goals but expand their expectations of what military forces can reasonably do. Specifically, rather than trying to transform foreign societies, peacekeepers should be directed toward providing security and preventing anarchy in unstable regions of the world. [emph supplied ed.]

Shares some important observations with what Gen. Zinni has been talking about. Though I think both he and Thomas Barnett would say that, given the hyper-kinetic nature of today's combat, the US soldier or Marine who's at the tip of the spear or engaged in days of intense urban combat probably shouldn't be called upon to switch to a policing function within 24 hours of major combat operations.

Perhaps a fit with a somewhat less ambitious version of Barnett's SysAdmin? Martens' caution of not trying to use the force which "enforces the peace" to also transform the local political society is one that should be taken seriously.

There are certainly substantial differences in the motives and means of intervention by leading nations today in failed states and regions of conflict when compared to those of the imperial nations of the colonial era. But many of the issues confronting both groups are similar, and there may be some broad lessons to be learned from the experiences of the colonial powers.

So argues a new book by an associate professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, Kimberly Zisk Marten.  Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past compares the colonial activities of the United States, Britain and France at the turn of the 20th century with the post-conflict peace-keeping/peace-building operations of the 1990s (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor). Her study does not extend to the conflicts of this decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Reviewing the book in AsiaTimesOnline, David Isenberg sets out Marten's central observation and its broad implications for adjusting the policies and approaches of the intervening states.  The intervenors have, typically, multiple objectives which may often be somewhat in tension, if not out-and-out mutually inconsistent. And of course the intervenors are operating under constraints, both internal to their own domestic politics and capacitites to act abroad and to the international arena. Isenberg, with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq summarizes the argument as follows:

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Marten's view, represent an oxymoron, or as she more politely phrases it, an "intertwined set of problems". It is the desire by the international community to avoid being tarred with the imperial label while attempting to exert what amounts to political control over foreign societies, and the need to encourage multilateral participation to achieve legitimacy while avoiding inconsistency.

Looking at past experience, both colonial and the most recent decade:

Among Marten's findings are the following: Powerful states in both eras have lacked the political will that would be necessary to gain control over political development in foreign societies; military organizations are one of the factors contributing to the lack of clear direction we find on the ground; and when properly directed to do so, disciplined soldiers can do a good job of providing public order. The meaning of all this is that peacekeepers should try to limit their goals but expand their expectations of what military forces can reasonably do. Specifically, rather than trying to transform foreign societies, peacekeepers should be directed toward providing security and preventing anarchy in unstable regions of the world. [emph supplied ed.]

Shares some important observations with what Gen. Zinni has been talking about. Though I think both he and Thomas Barnett would say that, given the hyper-kinetic nature of today's combat, the US soldier or Marine who's at the tip of the spear or engaged in days of intense urban combat probably shouldn't be called upon to switch to a policing function within 24 hours of major combat operations.

Perhaps a fit with a somewhat less ambitious version of Barnett's SysAdmin? Martens' caution of not trying to use the force which "enforces the peace" to also transform the local political society is one that should be taken seriously.

Further to questions about the prospects of Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a coming together to create an Iraqi theocracy. I'd earlier mentioned the universal outrage within Iran when the National Geographic had the temerity to place "Arabian Gulf" in parentheses as a secondary title for the Persian Gulf.

Here's the definitive Iranian diaspora reaction, complete with milennia of history and replete with wonderful maps. Worth a look if you have a thing for cartography, even if the dispute itself leaves you non-plussed.

Awkward responses from the US, including at a State Dep't press briefing, re Musharraf's decision to retain his military position along with his presidential duties. From the view of democratic symbolism, certainly not a very positive step, and many are understandably suspicious. The following comment from an Outlook India Online recent thread is not atypical.

Musharraf, like Zia and other khakis who ruled Pakistan; is no better than any other tin pot dictator. He has perfecetd the art of attire according to the occassion. His military dress with all those "tamgas" when talking to Pkaistani public, and hand crafted suits -when abroad, makes for a topic in itself. This man can never be trusted.

Our friends at The Acorn put the matter a bit more elegantly in commenting on Dan Darling's recent Winds of Change.NET report on a conference he attended on Al Qaeda .

Dan does not cover Musharraf’s dealings with Pakistan’s jihadi outfits in detail — if he did, he would have found out that the jihadi groups are just one of the variables Musharraf controls to stay in power. In this context, Musharraf is not actually trying to distinguish between good and bad jihadis (for that distinction is invalid) but manoeuvering to do the barest minimum to keep that other variable (United States) from knocking him down. Pakistan’s military establishment has effective control over all al-Qaeda related jihadi groups as well as on their spiritual leaders, patrons and mentors.

The Waziristan operation was a wild-goose chase — the tribesmen did support al-Qaeda and bin Laden, but only slightly more passionately than millions of their compatriots. The most dangerous jihadi leaders, those who can shed the most light on al-Qaeda and its global operations, remain in Pakistan, free to go about their business as long as they keep their head down.

Osama bin Laden is Musharraf’s golden egg laying gander (to invoke the avian reference again), and the General knows all about that fable. As for those jihadi groups, they cannot even hope to subvert the Pakistani state. Musharraf is far more secure and is in far greater control of the situation that he would like the United States to believe.

And then there's the Pakistani domestic opposition to Musarraf. The circus of Benazir Bhutto's husband's release, rearrest and re-release over the past two days has underlined how tricky the "reconciliation process" may be. The rearrest followed Musharraf's announcement about going back on his promise to relinquish his military leadership post on December 31, which flies in the face of the position Bhutto's group has vigorously supported.

Zardari's re-arrest appeared to dim hopes of reconciliation between former Prime Minister Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party and Musharraf, a key ally of Washington in the war on terror.

However, some analysts said it might have been orchestrated by figures in the military government worried about losing influence should the reconciliation process move forward, rather than by Musharraf himself.

"It's to do with local ambitions and local politics," said newspaper editor and political commentator Najam Sethi. "I don't think Musharraf had a hand in that."

Bhutto herself appears to have taken a rather low-key and non-confrontational approach to the goings-on regarding her husband and re-emphasized the need for dialogue with Musharraf to achieve sustainable reconciliation.

Islamist opposition leaders, on the other hand, have called for nation-wide protests on January 1. From the FT and Reuters:

“Musharraf has become a security risk for the country,” said Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal ( MMA), the coalition of Islamic parties, speaking before a crowd of about 5,000 supporters who braved heavy rain to attend a protest gathering in Rawalpindi, a suburb of Islamabad. “The military dictatorship is the root of all our evils.”

Mr Ahmed announced a nationwide “black day” on January 1, when a series of protest meetings would be held in different cities. MMA officials said the coalition then planned to hold more frequent protests. Opinion was divided over how big a threat yesterday's announcement was to Gen Musharraf[...]

A focus on Musharraf's presidential role, however, while certainly merited, fails to look at the other side of Musharraf's equation. Syed Saleem Shahzad, bureau chief for AsiaTimesOnline, looks at what's going on within the Pakistani army. His report suggests why Musharraf believes he must retain titular as well as de facto control of the "only organized institution" in Pakistan -- and it's not just to ensure his personal safety from further assassination attempts. Shahzad may share The Acorn's view that Musharraf has more control over things than is conventional wisdom, but it's a control that remains vulnerable and will take quite a bit more time and initiatives by Musharraf to consolidate.

Musharraf has forced Pakistan's military into an abrupt and wrenching U-turn. If Pakistan is to modernize and moderate its internal politics, and become less of a disruptive force externally, remaking Pakistian's military certainly must be at the top of the list of critical tasks. And let's be realistic about the process. It's going to be difficult and often violent. If the military in Turkey was the, frequently brutal, force for secularization and internal modernization, Pakistan's military has been built for leadership in "Muslim renaissance and pan-Islamism" as part of a strategy of "political hegemony" in South-Central Asia.

Shahzad sees it as a matter of "Purging Pakistan's jihadi legacy:"   more »