There are certainly substantial differences in the motives and means of intervention by leading nations today in failed states and regions of conflict when compared to those of the imperial nations of the colonial era. But many of the issues confronting both groups are similar, and there may be some broad lessons to be learned from the experiences of the colonial powers.

So argues a new book by an associate professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, Kimberly Zisk Marten. Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past compares the colonial activities of the United States, Britain and France at the turn of the 20th century with the post-conflict peace-keeping/peace-building operations of the 1990s (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor). Her study does not extend to the conflicts of this decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Reviewing the book in AsiaTimesOnline, David Isenberg sets out Marten's central observation and its broad implications for adjusting the policies and approaches of the intervening states. The intervenors have, typically, multiple objectives which may often be somewhat in tension, if not out-and-out mutually inconsistent. And of course the intervenors are operating under constraints, both internal to their own domestic politics and capacitites to act abroad and to the international arena. Isenberg, with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq summarizes the argument as follows:

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Marten's view, represent an oxymoron, or as she more politely phrases it, an "intertwined set of problems". It is the desire by the international community to avoid being tarred with the imperial label while attempting to exert what amounts to political control over foreign societies, and the need to encourage multilateral participation to achieve legitimacy while avoiding inconsistency.

Looking at past experience, both colonial and the most recent decade:

Among Marten's findings are the following:

• Powerful states in both eras have lacked the political will that would be necessary to gain control over political development in foreign societies;
• military organizations are one of the factors contributing to the lack of clear direction we find on the ground; and
• when properly directed to do so, disciplined soldiers can do a good job of providing public order.

The meaning of all this is that peacekeepers should try to limit their goals but expand their expectations of what military forces can reasonably do. Specifically, rather than trying to transform foreign societies, peacekeepers should be directed toward providing security and preventing anarchy in unstable regions of the world. [emph supplied ed.]

Shares some important observations with what Gen. Zinni has been talking about. Though I think both he and Thomas Barnett would say that, given the hyper-kinetic nature of today's combat, the US soldier or Marine who's at the tip of the spear or engaged in days of intense urban combat probably shouldn't be called upon to switch to a policing function within 24 hours of major combat operations.

Perhaps a fit with a somewhat less ambitious version of Barnett's SysAdmin? Martens' caution of not trying to use the force which "enforces the peace" to also transform the local political society is one that should be taken seriously.