I keep hearing various reports of the dissatisfaction with the current Iranian rule, but it would be great to get a clear-eyed and sober evaluation of the possibilities of change in the Iranian regime, both short-term and long-term.

What is the relationship of the miliary leaders to the clerical leaders? The relationship of the civilian leaders, to the clerical leaders? Where are the opportunities for reform/change going to come from?

Did someone say clear-eyed and sober?

Short version: not bloody likely, so we'd best accomadate Iran.

Also, since you are in the middle of the book, may I ask a question? In the foreword does he deal with his LAST book, in any way? Regarding going into Iraq? I would think this would have to be dealt with, for the rest of the book to be credible.

I dont' have the book in front of me, but IIRC he doesn't really address it much other than to say "I was wrong.' He has flagellated himself in greater detail in TNR and The Atlantic, both. I think he feels pretty crummy about it, and he views this book as a kind of penance. Even so, he doesn't pull any punches that I can see.

Reality in Iraq is so incredibly multi-dimensional, and it seems that we have rather routinely operated in dimensions that matter to us, without much regard for the dimensions that matter to Iraqis. But maybe I'm too harsh. It's all very complicated.

A couple of questions. First, is there any reason to think that our intelligence going in was much conscious of these intra-Shiite layers of significance, or that if we were, that we made any conscious effort to exploit them to our advantage?

Second, given the relocation (or reestablishment) of real Shiite power in Najaf, and the apparent disdain that Iraqis like Sistani feel for the Iranians and Khamenei (if memory serves, Sistani very bluntly told the Iranians a few months to back the hell off), doesn't this represent an opportunity for us to conduct a sort of theological proxy war against the Iranian regime (as contrasted with a military confrontation)? Who knows if Sistani and his crowd would ever play ball, but facing down the Khameneis and the rest of the theologically inferior Iranian crowd would seemingly be good for the Najafis, and couldn't be bad for us.

Finally, is the Pollack book any good?

Right now I'm about halfway through the book, which has taken me up to the last few years of the Clinton administration. I'd say that his history is dry and he contradicts himself in places, but his analysis noticeably sharpens when he's discussing things about which he has personal knowledge. It's not especially well-written, but it's good enough and I haven't gotten to the current situation yet, so I don't think I can give you a fair read. It's the first thing I've ever read about the Iran/Iraq war though, so that part has been most interesting so far. I'd like to read more because Pollack only summarizes.

As to your other question -- my understanding is that going in, there might have been a few people in the State Dept. or CIA who had some understanding of Shi'ite politics, but the military planners at the Pentagon were in charge and they were mostly clueless. There was definitely a hope on the part of the neocons that the Shi'ites would adulate Chalabi and, I think, Prince Hassan of Jordan who was also parrt of somebody's plan. And of course, keep in mind that we were working with several Shi'ite exile groups, notably SCIRI and Da'wa, who were based in Iran. SCIRI's Badr Corps had fought in the Iran/Iraq War and Da'wa had basically been an underground terrorist organization sponsored by Iran.

I should add: any theological proxy war is going to be waged by them and not us. Although it's true that Sistani has been helpful, he's nobody's puppet and, as a quietist, he doesn't really believe in getting involved in politics unless he has to. IIRC, the reason for Shi'ite quietism is that the marja aren't supposed to get involved in politics because that's the 12th Imam 's (the Mahdi's) ball of wax. Thus Khomenei is considered something of a heretic by most of the other Grand Ayatollahs. From what I gather, much of Qom was in lockdown for a while because the clergy there were speaking out against the regime. While Khomenei was still around, he could dominate all political discourse by virtue of his revolutionary authority and charisma, but Khamenei doesn't get the same kind of respect. In any event, Sistani does seem to be actively trying to court clergy away from Iran, and the return of the pilgrim and coffin trade has allowed him to expand his influence by setting up offices hither and yon. That's one of the reasons that it was so important for him to retain custodianship of the Imam Ali shrine.

Reading his book, it's mystifying why he would have thought that invading and occupying Iraq was a good idea. Pollack says we should never have gone into Lebanon in the first place; Of course Iran was going to cause trouble with us in their backyard, surrounding them.

This decision looks dumber every day.

We shouldn't have gone into Lebanon... what about the Israelis. Might that not have been a more apt immediate comparison? Like it took them 20 years to extract themselves without, it seems, accomplishing much more than what they had done once they got to Beirut in the first place in 1982? And in the meantime, each of the multitudinous shifting sides used the Israelis to play off against each other, drawing out the interminable chaos. And the Israelis are left with a stronger, implacable opponent across the border in Hezbollah (with Iranian help I might add).

There are lessons upon lessons to learn from that region, even if we only focus on the 20th century without knowing the millenia that proceeded. But that means one would have to be open to learning lessons, huh?

We should take a careful look back at the Israelis' experience in Lebanon now. Because we're now smack in the middle of a civil war -- and the US Army and Marines are the main military forces in the war zone. All we can do is what we've been doing. Throw our weight behind one group after another in various internal showdowns. First in Najaf. Now in the Sunni triangle.

Our primary strategic objective has to be simply to keep the turmoil from spilling outside Iraq itself. My fear from before the invasion has always been a Lebanon writ large, across the whole crescent, with various forest fires popping up here and there, but with Iraq the center of the conflagration. Let's hope Singh and Musaraffaf can keep Kashmir from igniting again. Though what the Pakistani army's likely to do as it keeps losing its raison d'etre as the pride of the nation, and is down to hunting bandits in the hills, is a little unclear.

In some ways, we've made progress in the last couple of weeks. It's pretty clear now that it's not about terrorists and insurgents fighting an occupation anymore -- although the US presence certainly complicates things. And if Zeyad's comments last week are any indication, a growing number of Shi'ia and Kurds are starting to see things that way as well.

But if the all-out civil war nature of the conflict becomes apparent to all, how in the world there can be elections is a mystery. One advantage -- the blame can't be only on the US. Looks like the case is being made rather forcefully that a portion of the country just doesn't want elections and a government on the same terms as the other parts, US or no US. So at that point, are there electons in the parts of Iraq that can hold them, and then try to impose the constitutional results on the Sunnis or "rebel areas"?

One problem with the recent fighting is the election schedule foreced the US to move more rapidly than I'm sure the generals would have preferred. A few more months of gradually increasing the intensity of skirmishes and pressure on Fallujah itself, building up collaborators and inteligence, doing a few more Samarras -- losing them, retaking them is part of the process.

But patience would have more likely been rewarded than this early full-bore assault with no forces to hold onto the territory taken when the other cities blew up in violence. I'm as sure that the generals expected that as I'm sure of my own name, but not much they can do, undermanned as they are.

Patience would have allowed the general civilian population to get more and more tired of attacks on Iraqis, of the radicals and foreigners behavior than the behavior of the Americans . Giving the Iraqi troops and police more time to train. Having more bodies ready and equipped to go into areas to hold them once pockets had been cleaned out. The likelihood of course is we'll have to keep retaking the same places.

If the prospect of elections fades rapidly in the face of the whole Sunni triangle exploding, and violence continuing in Baghdad and points south, we may be able to return to a more patient approach. And it will have been the Iraqis and the UN who concluded that elections weren't feasible, not us.We'll have to see what happens at the conference on Nov 25. Guess since Colin has resigned, who goes in his stead? Know when it's effective? He was planning a trip to the W Bank as well.

In the fluid fights to come in Iraq, we and the Iranians may wind up from time to time being more on the same side than not. But as anything close to a "final settlement" approaches, we and the Iranians will have just about as much in common as the Israelis and the Syrians. If I were the Kurds, I'd be making a break for Turkey sometime about when it's clear elections are going to have to be postponed. Sheeesh...

Keep in mind that in talking about the Bush administration you're likely talking about a great number of people who think Israel's invasion of Lebanon was the right thing to do, and that the concept of installing a friendly Maronite government was the right way to do it. So it's not clear that any lessons are being learned here. The likely lesson they will draw, it seems to me, is that Iran is the common thread between the two situations and therefore must be taken out. You and I had both thought that the situation in Iraq would tie Bush's hands vis-a-vis Iran, but with the USNews data dump and Colin Powell's resignation (after declaring that the use of force in Iran is off the table), I'm not too sure anymore.

On the civil war question, it seems localized at this point but on the brink of widening. I'm sure that many Sunnis have noticed that prominent Shi'ite leaders were not so eager to condemn the reduction of Fallujah. I imagine as well that if you had the names of tribes involved and some basic assumptions about codes of vengeance, you could even map and predict the tipping point at which revenge attacks become full-blown war.

The question going forward for the Americans is: how much do we want to depend on the peshmerga and Badr Brigades, and how much are they willing to be depended upon. I can imagine that there are a large number of Kurds up in the north thinking, especially in regards to what's going on in Mosul, maybe we shouldn't be sticking our necks out like this. I'm reading stories of Kurdish students fleeing Iraq for Kurdistan due to rising incidents of persecution. Turkey is anathema to most Kurds, but it looks like the most realistic option, as you suggest, since Iran seems to be backing Ansar al-Islam and other anti-Kurdish groups, cracking down on dissent within Iranian Kurdistan, and getting nervous about Israeli intelligence in its backyard, while most if not all Arab states couldn't care less about the Kurds and would back the Sunnis in any conflict.

As for the timing of Fallujah, I read in the Times that it had to be completed before Allawi went to Cairo, probably so that he could present the Arab Leaue with a fait accompli. It doesn't look like we had the intelligence to let us know that half or more of the insurgents had snuck out, so I'm not sure I buy your theory that we knew what was going to happen. Certainly Mosul was a big surprise, no?

Looking ahead, I think you're right that the strategy will be to shore up our position with the Shi'ites and Kurds and try to impose our will on the Sunnis. That was the tenor of Newt Gingrich's remarks on the Sunday talkies, and I imagine he speaks for many within the administration as well.

I'm going to be sounding like Ken White and Irving -- let's not forget that the US military aren't idiots. They knew full well that giving a month-plus warning they were coming was going to mean not rounding up all the bad guys. Or even a majority of them.

They had to give the warnings due to the civilian situation. Basically, anybody still around once the offensive was launched was there at their own risk. A certain amount of resistance was to be expected from the Fallujans, and maybe even the Zaqarwi-types. But it was basically up to the bad guys to decide how much of a fight they wanted to make. One very clear option they had was to launch counter-offensives elsewhere, as they have done.

Where would those counter-offensives be launched? How many? How intense -- hit and run or take territory? There's where intelligence weakness is probably a large problem, combined with informants on the inside of especially the police. But the generals and the colonels and the Lt colonels and down the line are not idiots. Without even reading any comments from them, I agree with Ken and Irving that the breathless reporting that's been suggesting various surprises for the US at the overall strategic level, etc. -- like rushing troops in from the border -- is simply incompetent by journalists who are clueless.

As for the timing, I agree that Alawi needed to have made the attempt before Cairo. Otherwise, how would he be able to discuss election timing, the various options for partial elections, what type of international assistance he needs for different scenarios -- unless he demonstrated that the Sunni triangle is off limits right now. Remember the brouhaha that flared when Alawi and Rumsfeld noted that January elections might have to be held in only a portion of Iraqi territory? Would have thought that by stating the self-evident they had exposed the tip of a grand conspiracy to undermine democracy. Talk about reality-based.... Sheesh!

The problem has now been adequately demonstrated, I hope to everyone's full satisfaction in Cairo. And this time, without being able to pin the "cause" of the political dilemmas exclusively on resistance to the American occupation and widespread Iraqi aversion to excessive levels of force vis a vis civilians.

Unofficial "Cite Spencer Ackerman Day" here at chezNadezhda, it's worth pointing out as Spencer and Noah do that the Army does not appear to be following its own counterinsurgency doctrine.

Noah quotes Joe Katzman, who makes my point -- the guys know quite well how they'd prefer to handle things. They've learned quite a lot over the last year and a half in Iraq that may indeed be reflected in that revised doctrine. But ultimately, the political exigencies trump adherence to doctrine (or even the voice of experience) every time.

Wish these comments could be edited.

Dropped the ;) on the last reply. :(

There's a rather neat French site -- Institute of Comparative Strategy and a couple of other French military research institutes -- that has the text of all sorts of articles, monographs and books on strategy, geopolitics and military history.

They also publish a journal. The site is in the links list in the sidebar STRATISC.org

Their site's been down for a while, but it just came back up and they've put up a tome on the influence of Clausewitz on American strategy since WWII, especially in the doctrinal changes after Vietnam.

They also have a fairly recent piece on the revolution in military affairs, especially its impact on NATO.

Looks very interesting if you're into that kind of stuff.

And appropos of the proprietor of a certain web site, Les limites de l'empire: La strategie romaine vue par Tacite.

Spencer Ackerman has another excellent post on the political and military problems the US and the Shi'ia face going forward, now that the Sunnis have exploded. I hadn't been reading him lately, shame on me. He's quite good.

Here's the bundle that together create the big problem the miiltary faces (he doen's even bother to explicitly refer to the lack of trained and loyal Iraqi security forces and police, since that's such a fundamental given):

First, while the U.S. had months to prepare the invasion of Falluja, the inflammation of other cities, including once-a-model-of-success Mosul, appears to have caught the U.S. military somewhat off guard and will subsequently prompt a more ad hoc tactical strategy to reclaim those cities, if such operations occur. [as I argued in other comment, I agree re shift to a more ad hoc strategy required, but not that the fact of a counter-offensive wasn't anticipated, ed.

Second, it's unclear whether the 140,000 U.S. troops can sustain an operations tempo comparable to what seizing Falluja required. [not just unclear, they can't, ed.]

Third, reconstructing Falluja is a massive undertaking of a sort that the U.S. has proven unable to handle over 20 months of occupation, and to expand those needs around the country at this late hour represents a serious strain on resources. [at this late hour? we've only just begun. Actually, the bigger problem pointed to by Ackerman in his piece today is that it's going to take an immense effort to hold Fallujah, let alone reconstruct it ed.]

And finally, the elections themselves are extremely likely to represent a new level of Sunni disaffection with a now-formally Shia government, which risks replenishing the ranks of the insurgency.

As I noted in the post above, Spencer Ackerman " doesn't even bother to explicitly refer to the lack of trained and loyal Iraqi security forces and police, since that's such a fundamental given."

John Robb at Global Guerillas sees the weakness not just as a given, but a very much worse given that it even was before this month. An irremedial given as far as I can tell. He views the lead-up to Fallujah and the fighting there as the final melt-down of the Iraqi security system. Definitely worth a read.
Bottom line:

The systemic failure of Iraqi security, creates the following situation:

* Ethinic passions on the rise. The use of Kurdish fighters in both Fallujah and Mosul has exacerbated the insurgency.

* The US in the hot seat. Left with the security burden, the US is in a tough position. Its firepower intensive tactics (force protection 2GW methods) are causing more damage to the Iraqi government's legitimacy than it provides. Further, we also don't have the troops in country to even approximate what is needed to provide a modicum of basic security.

* Complete system failure. This has set the stage for ongoing attacks by innovative guerrilla entrepreneurs on all other aspects of globalization in Iraq (people, resources, and investment). The economy will remain in failure, as will the state.

But in the Murphy's Law world of Iraq, it's pretty clear that "complete system failure" isn't as bad as it's going to get.

While I agree with what John Robb says, this post of his needs a lot more backing there isn't any detail.

Also, I am trying now toconsciously notice when I, and others put all Iraqi events through various "evidence inference operators". Meaning, that people come to conclusions far too rapidly, using any event to justify their pre-existing theory. Still good information.

Agreed, especially when, like Robb, the commenter has a very strong structure to his filter. But I find it helpful to look through his prism regularly to see some of the angles he identifies I wouldn't view in that way.

At this distance, all we can do is try to piece together what we think's going on, kind of like doing a jigsaw puzzle by feel in the dark. And that means taking some of the reporting from the ground with the proverbial grain, both because it's too soon/they're too close to it, and I suspect all too many of them don't really understand what they're seeing (or more acurately what their Iraqi stringers are seeing).

Still going, according to this.