I had in mind writing an appreciation today of each of the candidates, and I do plan later today to publish a piece on Senator John Kerry. But I really don't want one of my opening posts at chez Nadezhda to be a partisan polemic more strident than anything I ever posted at Tacitus, so I'm not going to attempt to fully express myself on Mr. Bush here and now.

But I will briefly state my opinion, without attempting to make an argument on behalf of it, and wishing no offense to those who hold opposing views. I believe that George W. Bush is a strong competitor for the title of the worst President in U.S. history, although, in the end, I have him shaded out by another recent Republican President, Richard Nixon, who governed capably but criminally, and whom I hold personally responsible for the larger part of the excessive cynicism and bitterness that has gripped the body politic and is slowly strangling our democracy.

Instead of trying to support my opinion about Mr. Bush with an essay, instead I will assume that it is true or close to it, and write instead about one of the lessons those who agree might take therefrom. Two of the last three Republican Presidents, Ronald Reagan and the younger Bush, are men who came late in their lives to politics, patently lacked extensive policy knowledge, and were notoriously unable to engage in nuanced extemporaneous policy discussions. Both of these Presidents have won enthusiastic support nearly verging on the worshipful from a large core of true believers who scarcely bother to argue with the perception that their beloved leaders fell somewhat below the level of policy scholars. What is important, those supporters argue, is that the President have a clear and consistent vision, clearly enunciated, not that the President should be able to micro-manage the various departments and policies of the Federal government. What does the record of the Bush Administration tell us about this model of a President as a titular chief who delegates real authority to agency heads while concerning himself primarily with the duty of providing themes for his Administration? I believe it highlights the dangers of that sort of leadership style.

Specifically, the danger is that the titular executive, who has been chosen for his inspirational quality with the expectation that he will leave the details of governance to professionals with whom he shares a broad philosophical agenda, is at times forced to act, especially on the international stage, as the personification of the government, and at other times will either be forced by circumstance or will choose to exercise his Constitutional powers in a hands-on way, perhaps at crucial times and perhaps to disastrous effect. With Mr. Reagan, it seems you mostly got what you bargained for: a profoundly hands-off President, a true delegator disinterested in the details of government. For example, Treasury Secretary Don Regan has stated that Mr. Reagan never once sought him out for a face-to-face conversation, and even his political allies complained that he often simply didn't understand what his Administration was doing, whether because of his partial deafness or his simple disinterest in governance.

In sum, it is at least arguable that the government ticked evenly along, without intervention by Mr. Reagan that might have been uninformed and misguided, while the President used his strong communication skills to rally the electorate and set the broad directions down which the government's routes would run. As a result, much of Mr. Reagan's Administration may be described as "conservative" within the Burkian model: i.e., falling squarely within the bounds of precedent and conventional wisdom, cautious and risk-averse in the classic style of government by bureaucrats. On the other hand, the worst scandal of his Presidency, the illegal funneling of monies gained from illicit arms sales to private Iranian contacts into unauthorized support of Nicaraguan "Contra" guerillas, could fairly be characterized as a result of over-important subordinates running amuck in the absence of properly constraining guidance from a strong leader.

Mr. Bush has acted similarly to Mr. Reagan in most of the Federal government's many realms: he is said to be disinterested and little informed about economic policy, beyond his insistence on tax cuts, and an insider has famously complained of the almost total absence of policy discussion within the entire Bush White House. Most of Mr. Bush's department heads undoubtedly encounter little White House supervision beyond the political realm.

But who really speaks for the government when the time comes for crucial and timely executive consultations between our nation and another? And what happens when a single, crucially important policy intersects multiple Federal departments whose stewards strongly disagree on its course? Or what if the otherwise unengaged President takes a personal interest in a key policy decision here or there? Article II of the Constitution, which defines the executive power of the United States and vests it in the President, does not differentiate between Presidents who are or are not qualified by education, ability, and temperament to make the nation's key policy decisions.

Some might fear that disastrous policies would result; others might argue that they have. At any rate, it seems to me that a government where all the important decisions are made by below-the-radar underlings cannot be said to truly be empowered by the consent of the governed. A government where the executive at the very least checks off on and claims joint responsibility for the key decisions of his or her most important departments is not only more democratic but more flexible and less likely to make the kind of disastrous misjudgments that can accrue when history and precedent are little- or ill-considered.