Introduction

On the surface, the US has been saying it wants Russia's cooperation on Iran's nuclear program in the Security Council this week. So praktike wonders what to make of the timing of Cheney's anti-Russia speech in Lithuania, in which he accused the Russia government of using oil and natural gas as "tools for intimidation and blackmail," "unfairly and improperly restrict[ing] the rights of her people," and taking "actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor, or interfere with democratic movements."

After that bit of raw chutzpah, Cheney proceeded, in the words of the NYT, to wade into the energy battles in Kazakhstan while embracing Nazerbayev with smiling praise for Kazakhstan's "political development." Cheney finished his tour in Dubrovnik with the endorsement of NATO membership for an unlikely trio of candidates, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia.

Altogether, the trip was a tour de force -- a nicely judged combination of high-minded Cold War-style ideological conflict with cynical Great Game competition, carefully tailored at each stop to play to the specific anti-Russian (and pro-US) interests of key local players.

Strategic linkages

I don't think there can be any question that the Bush Admin has been making a number of anti-Russian moves in recent weeks and that Cheney's trip was deliberately designed to be provocative. It appears to me that the Russophobe hardliners within the Bush Admin, led by Cheney, have won the internal debates about how to deal with Russia leading up to next month's G-8 summit in St Petersburg.

As important, I also think the provocations directed toward Russia are part of a parallel program to delegitimize the UN process for dealing with Iran, where the US is transparently engaged in faux diplomacy.

In my view, recent moves by the Bush Admin are comprehensible only when they are seen as linked -- part of a broader "forward-leaning" effort to aggressively reassert US hegemony. My fear is that the tactics the US is using in playing the "diplomatic route" re Iran may not only be extremely dangerous as a way of dealing with Iran itself. Those tactics are likely to have far broader and more profound long-term effects on the structure of the international system.

Where are US foreign policy elites?

Why so little reaction to the Bush Admin's tougher line on Russia by American foreign policy elites ("realists" and "liberal internationalists") who aren't the natural allies ("neocons" and "national greatness" conservatives) of the Bush Admin? Perhaps it's because most foreign policy elites tend to be experts in one area or another with limited overlap -- e.g. nuclear proliferation, Middle East, former Soviet Union, China, Latin America, defense, etc. Or perhaps it's because they've lost the old Cold War habits of seeing linkages across diplomatic and security issues and across regions.

I also think, in part, it's because almost all "schools" of American foreign policy share unquestioningly the assumption that being the sole superpower is in the natural order of things. American hegemony is, at least in principle, assumed to be necessary and/or benign, and its maintenance and assertion is a good thing. What the various schools quarrel about is how best to maintain and assert American power (soft and hard) and "leadership." When liberal internationalists like John Ikenberry and Anne Marie Slaughter question whether maintenance of a unipolar system is actually in American interests, note how gingerly they approach the issue in order to avoid being treated as anti-American heretics.

"Realists" and "liberal internationalists" may tut at Cheney's confrontational style, and some may question his blatant hypocrisy on the subject of democracy. But I'm rarely seeing any challenge to the basic narrative that Russia deserves a smack-down from the US. First, it's become conventional wisdom (albeit of the ahistorical variety) that Russia is rolling back democracy and increasingly flirting with dictatorship at home [ed. - without really explaining why, it seems to be assumed that Putin's "soft authoritarianism" at home should automatically have a negative impact on US-Russia relations on everything from terrorism to trade]. Second, there's a general feeling that Russia has been getting a bit uppity abroad [ed. - Russia is seen as somehow "meddling" where it doesn't belong, even where some American elites actually agree more with Russia's position than that of the Bush Admin -- e.g. issues such as Iran or the Palestinians]

So maybe it's not surprising that it takes a rabid anti-imperialist who doesn't belong to any of the mainstream foreign policy schools, Justin Raimondo, to produce the first article I've read that condemns Cheney's anti-Russia attacks as something more than just undiplomatic and hypocritical. Even Raimondo, however, doesn't fully link Cheney's moves with the diplomatic games vis a vis Iran.

A five-pronged strategic offensive?

To see how recent Bush Admin policy moves are part of a broader strategy of reasserting hegemony, I find especially helpful the following observation by DrLeoStrauss (Stop the Spirit of Zossen).

The U.S. is currently conducting five separate strategic grand offensives:

(a) the roll back of the old Soviet imperial periphery across Eastern Europe, down through the Russian 'Near Abroad' of Ukraine and Georgia and Central Asia;

(b) the on again off again stuttering efforts to isolate China as the new 'Peer Competitor' across both the Asian Pacific rim and also in Central Asia [ed. - and in recent months, competition in Africa has been added to the list];

(c) conduct an international war on 'terrorism' (such as it is);

(d) lead new international cooperation regarding nuclear and WMD proliferation [ed. - "lead" is a charitably neutral way of describing the Bush Admin goals of (i) leaving to the US the determination of which countries are worthy of obtaining nuclear technology and weapons and (ii) ensuring that no unfriendly state can achieve deterrence against the US use of force]; and

(e) bootstrap the Middle East into modernity through unilateral American force of arms.

(Sprinkle 'democracy' on all of the above).

What's remarkable is that Iran intersects with all five "grand strategic offensives" plus "democracy." That helps explain how and why the Bush Admin has turned the nuclear dispute with Iran into a "crisis" (with considerable help from the Iranians themselves, of course). The Iranian situation offers the Bush Admin an opportunity to make "progress" on a number of its strategic offensives simultaneously -- not just with Iran or with the nuclear proliferation regime but with China and Russia as well.

The UN process is set up for "failure" in the sense that the Bush Admin is not going to obtain the sort of robust steps against Iran that it has sought. Either the Security Council negotiations will produce some sort of deadlock over the statement or, as Bolton has suggested this weekend, the US intends to proceed without Chinese and Russian support. Either outcome would give the US the excuse to ignore the Security Council going forward -- Rice has already been claiming that the Security Council would suffer a fatal "loss of credibility" if it fails to take action on Iran. Next stop, as again Rice has already suggested, is "coalitions of the wiling."

The Bush Admin will likely pin the blame for failure on the "ineffectiveness" of the UN (and international institutions), in general, and on China and Russia, in particular. We should expect the bill of particulars against China and Russia to be three-fold:

• they are authoritarian regimes that cozy up to tyrants for their own narrow economic and geopolitical purposes
• they threaten global energy security (in their roles as major consumer and major producer, respectively), and
• they are potential threats to their neighbors.

Marketing the program

This three-pronged attack draws on several different policy rationales or motives, each with a different way of defining "threats" to American interests:

• Cold War-style: ideologically-defined enemies, based on the "nature of the regime";
• Great Game-style: challenges to US influence/control of global energy;
• US "global leadership"-style: threats to US predominance in any region.

As DrLeoStrauss suggests, even if the Bush Admin's strategic goals were commendable (which I dispute), the simultaneous pursuit of such an ambitious collection of strategic objectives is likely to produce considerable incoherence in execution. Furthermore, as Cheney's trip illustrated, that incoherence will be compounded by relying on such a mix of "styles." It's difficult to reconcile the Cold War-style (e.g. Cheney's ideological assault on Putin's supposed lack of democracy) with the Great Game-style (e.g. fishing for gas deals with Nazerbayev while praising his fifteen-year contribution to Kazakhstan's "political development").

The advantage of this mixed bag of rationales, however, is the same the Bush Admin enjoyed in assembling support for the Iraq war: a bit of something for everyone -- liberal hawks, ideological warriors, "national greatness" conservatives, and old-fashioned military hawks. The fact that no one can explain the "real reason" the US went to war in Iraq isn't a bug, it's a feature.

Of course, such an ambitious program can't be left entirely to the Bush Admin. They need help from pundits and politicians to frame, legitimize and sell the program. Not surprisingly, we've already begun to hear from the usual suspects. A mere four days before Cheney's appearance in Lithuania, Robert Kagan warned in the op-ed pages of the WashPost of a global threat to liberalism potentially greater than Al Qaeda: a "League of Dictators" (read China and Russia) that will use their positions at the UN to undermine the promise of a new international order. Although Kagan's essay is primarily an example of the Cold War-style, he deftly weaves in the "energy security" card by showing how China's ideological and strategic interests (i.e., access to energy) are likely to coincide in places like Africa or Venezuela.

Max Boot has similarly been busy on the op-ed pages. The day before Cheney began his trip in Vilnius, Boot was lamenting the "dictatorship dividend" -- the windfall from rising oil prices enjoyed by "noxious dictators" like Putin and Chavez. Boot hit the trifecta -- the challenge to global "energy security," an ideological conflict, and the threat of "regional contagion."

Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chavez can buy off their publics with generous subsidies and ignore Western pressure while sabotaging democratic developments from Central America to Central Asia.

Since in this article Boot is concerned with nefarious energy suppliers, his list of villains doesn't include China, with which he is willing for the US to make common cause, at least as fellow energy consumers. In a longer piece, I'm confident he'd be able to find a way to lodge China in the enemy camp a la Kagan. As Matt Yglesias notes, Francis Fukuyama reminds us that the PNAC folks always need an enemy, and China was their pre-9/11 favorite. So they may just be reverting to form.

If John McCain's speech at the Brussels Forum on transatlantic relations a week ago is any indication, the "national greatness" conservatives are on the same page as the neocons and, according to Dan Drezner, the "muscular liberals" in the person of Richard Holbrooke are in full agreement with McCain. And of course the human rights folks and democracy true believers have long had China in their sights and are delighted to hear Cheney take on the Russians.

Reporting on his attendance at the Brussels Forum, Drezner notes:

The general tenor of the conference so far has been to focus less on transatlantic frictions and more on the geopolitical and geoeconomic difficulties that Russia and China are posing to the West as a whole. More later, but a question to readers -- will the realpolitik of a rising China and a renegade Russia... be the ultimate driver for a closer transatlantic partnership? And should that be the main driver?

Snark aside, Kagan and Boot give us a taste of the sort of arguments, from the same unholy alliance that brought us Iraq, that I expect to hear against Russia and China as the Bush Admin seeks to reassert American hegemony.

This post certainly requires quite a bit more fleshing out, so let's call it an "Intro." As and if I develop some of these thoughts further, I'll update with links to future posts.

cross-posted at American Footprints

Cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism

So argues the Armchair Generalist today, citing a straight-talking Marine, Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson, commander of Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC). The good General doesn't think much of the "war on terror" as a conceptual basis for determining what the US military should be doing -- and not doing.

The pernicious effects of talking about a "global war on terror" has been a long-standing personal hobby-horse -- both regarding military operations and the US' broader grand strategy for foreign policy. Until President Bush recently chose to reinvigorate the bogus GWOT-9/11-Iraq linkage for tactical political purposes, we'd seen a gradual and welcome shift in the Administration's global strategy via a steady but rather surrepticious substitution of "extremism" for "terrorism" in public remarks, combined with an increased emphasis on democracy promotion and "soft power" tools. I'm pleased to see some US military leaders address the matter explicitly and hope that the President's tactical reversion to GWOT-speak won't impinge on the improved thinking that Gregson's remarks suggest.

The AG links to Eric Umansky, who quotes from a recent Naval War College address by Gregson, as reported in Inside Defense. Gregson's argument fits nicely within the framework of a "marginalization" strategy I've previously advocated as a replacement for a GWOT strategy. Gregson is arguing that the our strategic objective shouldn't be to wipe out terrorists but rather to reduce their effectiveness -- to marginalize extremists from the "vast majority" of the local populations in the societies in which they operate.

more below the fold   more »

For some time, praktike and I have been observing a change in the way the Bush Administration is approaching the Global War on Terrorism, and I promised him I'd try to put some thoughts down in writing. Last week, Jim Hoagland confirmed our observations, flagging a shift underway to a Global War on Extremism, with some reassignment of bureaucratic roles. Then yesterday, Ivo Daalder of Brookings (with whom I am in agreement far more often than not) posted some observations about the changes in Bush's second term foreign policy. He basically concluded that Bush has lost interest in the war on terrorism and has reverted to his pre-9/11 policy priorities and worldview.

Praktike's reaction to Daalder's post was mixed. Among the points prak raises, he hits on the topic I promised to write about:

I also think Daalder is missing the Bush administration's shift away from a "global war on terrorism" to a "global war on extremism," which we've been tracking here. In truth, this change in emphasis from a primarily military to a primarily ideological struggle is what Democrats and counterterrorism experts have been talking about for some time. If done properly (always iffy with the Bush administration), it will be a good thing,..

I agree wholeheartedly. Here's a lengthy very-sketchy-first-draft-essay on why I agree with prak, together with some implications from the view of strategic doctrine.

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Like praktike, I am somewhat disappointed with Ivo Daalder's opening contribution to Josh Marshall's new policy blogging venture. Criticism of the Bush Administration's specific moves on dealing with terrorism are certainly merited. Where Bush's actions (or non-actions) notably diverge from his political rhetoric, he should be especially fair game for his electoral cynicism and fear-mongering.

But Daalder's critique of Bush as "all hat" on terror is pushing us in a direction we don't really want to go. Or rather, it's inadvertently hanging on to a set of Bush-defined narrow policies when Bush has himself begun to shift towards a strategic approach far more in keeping with policies liberals have long advocated. We should get out in front of that process.

The "Global War on Terrorism" as a flawed strategy

From the outset, the "Global War on Terrorism" was widely derided as a strategic concept by scholars and experienced policymakers both in the US and internationally, and within both the foreign policy and military establishments. As emphasized in the report of the 9/11 Commission and the Defense Advisory Board's recommendations on Public Diplomacy, the GWOT is a distinctly unhelpful way of thinking about the complex phenomena of politico-religious extremism which manifest themselves, in part, through terrorist acts aimed at the US or at US friends and interests. A GWOT provides little strategic guidance for defining objectives or for framing policy options, choosing actions, and assessing the effectiveness of those actions (e.g. Rumsfeld's "metrics" problem).

more below the fold

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I realize I'm about nine years too late to this argument by now, but I finally got around to reading Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations during the course of my paper on him for my "Ideas in American Foreign Policy" course, which has been one of many things keeping me preoccupied lately. Anyone who's interested can find the final draft after the break — it's a little book-reportish at points, and my conclusion was a little muddled since I'm still not sure what I ultimately think of Huntington's arguments, but maybe some will find it interesting.   more »

Warning, this is not a thoughtful post. This is a cranky post.

In "Time for a Rethink?" praktike offers a review of positive comments and views from the liberal or "left" part of the American political universe on the encouraging signs of political change in the Middle East. Though he points out some of the continued weaknesses of the Bush Administration's policies, he calls on opponents of the neocon approach to Iraq to get behind those Bush policies we can support. Time to be constructive.

This is not a new theme for prak, and it's an approach I've consistently endorsed. I've advocated elsewhere that opponents of Bush's foreign policy nonetheless give vocal support to specific policies that are consistent with what we ourselves would be promoting if the Bush team weren't still running the show.

With those principles in mind, I have been supportive of the shifts being made gradually over the past six months by the military field commanders in both strategy and tactics. I have been supportive of the shift in approach which appears to have been adopted by the US embassy since the handover to the interim government at the end of June. My most recent endorsements of Bush policies have included supporting the Iraqi elections and the Administration's broad strategy toward Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. I have repeatedly cautioned against reproducing a domestic Vietnam-style polarization. To my way of thinking, an America polarized by foreign policy debates is a dangerous America for the rest of the world. But I have also vigorously opposed the disinformation campaigns that the Bush Administration waged as part of the presidential campaign or the gamesplaying with military budgets and force planning. So I want it understood that these comments are not an attack on prak's overall intentions which I share.

Two things have me seriously out of sorts. First -- and more on a personal level than anything I suppose -- I am quite resentful of the notion that somehow, as a vocal critic of the Bush policies regarding the invasion and occupation of Iraq, I have something to explain or apologize for. I don't think I'm misreading the subtext, even coming from those who aren't engaging in the recent rounds of "traitors on the left" triumphantalist hyperbole. The suggestion seems to be that if as critics we "can't admit we were wrong," we're being partisan or we're somehow not for democracy and freedom. That it's our lot to accept the "olive branch" offered by the David Adesniks of a bipartisan policy based on "democracy promotion." Gracious in defeat, don't you know.

Sorry, if there is an olive branch to be offered by the victorious, it should in point of fact be extending the other direction, from those of us who have long advocated policies that the Bush Admnistration is only now begining to adopt. I am eager to be magnanimous in victory, but it appears quite unlikely that my branch will even be acknowledged by the Administration's supporters, let alone accepted by a foreign policy team that's never made a mistake.

This brings me to my closely related second source of crankiness. The so-called "left" is being diverted by the unnecessary self-justifying squawks that have been coming out of the liberal hawks. Those who opposed the first Bush Administration shouldn't be wasting time squabbling on who was more right or more wrong about the war. They should be joining together now be saying to the new Bush team, "Glad you guys have finally come to your senses. Nice to have you back on board." We should be looking forward, trying to make sense of this post-Iraq world that's starting to emerge, to see what we think about the current Administration's priorities and policies as they are starting to take shape.

As I see it, the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq adventure have represented a severe dis-continuity in American foreign policy, and we're now returning to something approaching our normal balance. This is an idea that requires a much longer and more developed essay that's still rummaging around in my brain. For purposes of this discussion, let's simply focus on the issues of political change (not other elements of global politics like NATO or environment, trade etc).   more »

Stephen Hadley, briefing the press on President Bush's itinerary for his round of European fence-mending:

On Monday afternoon, the President will deliver a speech at the Concert Noble. The speech will focus on his vision of a united transatlantic community, working together to promote freedom and democracy, particularly in the broader Middle East. The speech will build upon the President's inaugural address and State of the Union remarks. It will be an opportunity for him to communicate directly with the people of Europe, and will show America's desire to work in partnership with Europe, based on common values, to advance the cause of freedom.

To be followed by a working dinner with Chirac.

This could be interesting. Get ready with your text parsers, your dog-earred copies of the inaugural and the SOTU, and tune your browsers to your favorite Continental rags.

Praktike has cut to the heart of Peter Beinart and his occasional advice column to lovelorn Democrats on recasting a winning foreign policy. Seems Beinart is of the Dear Abby school in which the right atmospherics can solve a host of problems -- greet hubby at the door in a provocative nightdress, and if necessary try a few trips to Beinart's counseling services -- rather than head straight to divorce court.

I think prak's probably right. He's s already taken Beinart apart several times for an excessively narrow casting of the scope of foreign policy debate -- effectively making Iraq and the war on terror the touchstone. One might well ask where China and India fit within his scheme. And prak and others have also noted Beinart's unfortunate habit of appropriating historical figures of Democratic Party history is a somewhat disingenous fashion. But let's try one more time to take Beinart's recipe for success seriously.

First -- and most important for an advice columnist who wants to be successful -- from a tactical vantage, Beinart is still fighting the last war (and trying to justify his part in it I might add, which makes him a singularly suspect spokesman for the views he's pushing). Beinart overlooks a simple fact of life: Democrats (as well as the anti-neocons in the Republican party) are going to lose as long as the focus is whether/how the invasion of Iraq was a first major step in an idealistic refashioning of the world, and whether it was a well-chosen or well-executed example. That ground has been claimed by Bush and the neocons. Any attempt to point out that Iraq should not be taken as a model of success for future foreign adventures becomes an assault on Iraqis and freedom writ large (and increasingly providing aid and comfort for tyrants and terrorists). Any discussion that tries to make intelligible and principled distinctions within that framework is a mug's game.

Now for the substance of Beinart's argument.

Here's the dilemma as presented by Beinart, and as presented there's clearly only one answer:

Democratic politicians, who have to answer to their liberal base, have only two choices: a realist-isolationist language that does not depict the United States as a global democracy-promoter, or an idealism without illusions that recognizes America's flawed history on questions of global freedom.

Sorry, but I don't recognize me and mine in those two choices. Beinart frames everything in democracy-promotion or not-democracy-promotion -- which is a pretty queer way to think about foreign policy if you're anything other than an American who has little familiarity with the residents and actual political and economic systems of other countries.

In the process of framing a policy choice that would be acceptable to "the liberal base" (whoever they may be) he's lost a whole lot of other parts of a potential anti-Bush anti-neocon electorate. As a traditional liberal internationalist, I don't see why I should buy the call to arms that Beinart is peddling. Furthermore, an opposition to the Bush Doctrine (v 1.0 or 2.0) is quite possible from "realist internationalists." As Steve Clemons has noted, the fault lines in US foreign policy are shifting, and some of the old adversarial schools are finding themselves on the same side of the fence when it comes to opposing the Bush Doctrine and its corollaries.

But, Beinart says, you've got to appeal to your liberal base, who will only accept one of the two alternatives. Yet he doesn't explore other ways to slice the much broader potential non-Bush electorate on foreign policy issues and still satisfy some of the moral imperatives of Democratic activists.

If he's going to make a convincing argument, first he's got to define who these liberals are who have to be satisfied. I'm not including in "liberals" those who are "anti-globalization" per se or anti-war absolutists, or the issue-driven activists who define foreign relations exclusively through the prism of their favorite theory (structural imperialism, world systems, etc) or cause (environment, human rights, poverty, etc). Those groups won't be satisfied with anything that would be acceptable to either the US electorate or most of our international partners, so they've already taken themselves out of the foreign policy conversation. If they're a core part of the party's base, they're just going to have to be satisfied with domestic policy and making sure that their favorite issues aren't totally ignored.

Within the bounds of a real world discussion about a foreign policy for Democrats (that would resonate with non-Bushites and non-neocons who are not Democrats), what are the real options?

How about a foreign policy that doesn't use the words "democracy" or "liberty" or "freedom." If there is one thing evident from the presidential campaign, it is that each of those terms has by now been drained of all content. The meaning of each is totally in the mind of the perceiver of the symbol as is the case with other potent symbols, like flags and fireworks and coffins. The policies for pursuit of each know no limits.

Each of these connotation-laden terms, when uttered by the US, carries historical baggage outside our borders about the selectivity with which we apply these notions to others. This is not simply a fastidiousness about American "hypocrisy." The Monroe Doctrine and its twentieth century manifestations continue to be a source of conflict that structures relations adversely with otherwise-friendly democratic regimes in this hemisphere. "Democracy" is often greeted as a code word for regime change a l'Americaine.

Why do we think that a global Monroe Doctrine is going to be greeted with hosannas? Placing "democracy" front and center in our attempts to communicate our policies to the rest of the world is, in practice, likely to be inimical to our interests. There appears to be a broad consensus within the US that "hearts and minds" must be won in a longer-term "battle of ideas" with radical Islam. Do we think the display of "humility" somehow will eradicate the taint of association with American policies that is currently the kiss of death for reformers in the Middle East? How much "humility" will be required in Latin America to neutralize the deeply-ingrained suspicions when we call for "democracy" to get rid of the leader of a government voted into office in a vigorously contested election? Think what one might about the nature of the Chavez regime, we should be able to admit that labelling him an anti-democratic tyrant probably isn't the best move in a "hearts and minds" campaign in the region.

Why do we think a "forward strategy of freedom" -- one which aggressively places unfriendly regimes under the threat of instantaneous transfiguration into US-defined democracies -- will encourage a process of regime change that will produce viable, stable, prosperous societies? Where has such a policy produced positive results, even where our power would appear most overwhelming, ninety miles off our own shores? Why should we abandon the approach that has served us well -- the long, patient slog of cooperating with our partners within a Helsinki-type framework that presses for internal reforms while making meaningful adjustments in external relations?

How about a foreign policy that's based on "respect," not on "humility" or mea culpas for past sins? As Matthew Yglesias has pointed out, the American public isn't going to be big on the mea culpa business, so that's probably not a marketing angle that will have legs. In Democratic focus groups pre-election, it was pretty clear that "respected abroad" was something that resonated strongly with large parts of the American public. They can handle -- and even welcome -- a change of style from cowboy arrogance. And in fact, that is precisely what the White House is currently trying to stage manage with the Condi-charm-offensive currently in swing. It's a change of style that's popular with the American electorate, even with the hardcore right.

How about a foreign policy that's based on a strategic assessment of the opportunities and threats that are not those of America alone but are shared by the US and large portions of the globe? How about a foreign policy that paints the US as a leader among a partnership of wealthier nations that are already cooperating through a whole host of international mechanisms to make the world a more open, prosperous and secure place?

How about a bit of "modesty" of ambitions rather than "humility" -- modesty both in ends and means? How about a foreign policy that doesn't call for a world-wide revolution -- especially when the ultimate stated motive is to make the world safer for Americans? How about a foreign policy framed in language that resonated with the American public on the domestic front -- that insists that "we can do better" rather than "we can remake the world"?

How about a foreign policy that returns to the foundations of what the American empire has offered -- and even in relative decline can continue to offer -- to the world to make it and America itself a better place?

American elites should have both more confidence in and more concern for the example their country sets to the world, through their institutions, their values and the visible well-being of ordinary Americans.... These institutions and values constitute America's civilizational empire, heir to that of Rome. Like the values of Rome, they will endure long after the American empire, and even the United States itself, has disappeared. The image of America as an economically successful pluralist democracy, open to all races and basically peaceful and nonaggressive, has been so powerful in the past because it has largely been true. Americans must make sure that it continues to be true. Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, quoted by Brian Urquart in Feb 24 issue of NYRB.

How about a foreign policy that recognizes that what we are at home is vital to how we influence the world outside our borders -- that adhering within our own borders to democratic principles and our cherished values of liberty and freedom is inextricably intertwined with our ability to manage foreign relations in our interest.

Once Beinart has articulated a policy that is "democracy" and "liberty" free -- once we eliminate "freedom on the march" from the vocabulary -- then if he needs some "democratic" gloss to sell it, come back to me.

In the meantime, he's just BushLite: an international revisionist who thinks not only that the US still has the imperial suasion to impose its will on swaths of the world but that the world needs the hegemon to exercise its will. That is a profoundly radical agenda for a foreign policy, which goes well beyond Beinart's deceptively simple choice of realistic isolationism or idealistic engagement.

Beinart's is an engagement that is not satisfied to engage. Rather, it elevates to the prime strategic goal -- the primary organizing principle of policy -- the remaking of not just the international system but the internal systems of all participants in the international community. It is the height of hubris and the antithesis of the sort of basic respect that America's partners have called for -- even with his nice bit of filigreed "humility."

Perhaps his response is that this is all rhetoric, to sell the American public, and not how we'll actually behave. But when there is a major disconnect between words and actions, words are used to justify the actions one desires and are readily ignored when it's a matter of convenience.

So if Beinart recognizes from the outset that democracy and liberty aren't actually going to be very good guides to policy, what are the guiding principles he would offer as to when rhetoric applies and when it's to be ignored? Other than, of course, his personal tastes and gut instincts with a bit of political and moral correctness as window-dressing.

Honestly, why should I prefer Peter Beinart's gut instincts -- as refined and superior as they may be -- over George W Bush's?

{update Feb 7 2005} by nadezhda

This article generated an interesting discusson when I posted it a week ago. It identifies a common -- and to my mind highly objectionable -- strain in the policies of the Bush Adminstiration both in foreign policy and in domestic politics.

For those of you interested in the topic, I've taken up the same theme, the inseparability of basic princples of democratic governance both at home and abroad -- in a new post at Liberals Against Terrorism. It's a response to David Adesnik of OxBlog regarding the promotion of Elliott Abrams to a deputy National Security Adviser position on the National Security Council, with the government's portfolio for democracy promotion and Middle East policy, including Iran.

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originally posted Jan 27 2005 by nadezhda

I had not expected to be writing anything lengthy tonight, but praktike has produced two excellent pieces at LaT (No on Gonzales and Clarification) that I view as being part of a single piece, and I felt compelled to spell out how I see them fitting together.
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I must apologize for being remiss in my duties here at chez Nadezhda over the past few days. The front desk has been left empty for extended periods, and it's really my fault. Praktike has been on an amazing production streak at LaT and the Chef has been covered with dust from head to toe reclassifying the entire central library collection at TerrorWiki. Prak has been kind enough to cover the front desk here from time to time.

I've been off doing some remodelling, as well as planning another room (I'm afraid I'm a frustrated interior designer at heart!). And I forgot to leave a note on the door to go round back.

So here's a bit of something until the crew leaves and I get the construction mess cleaned up.

These are comments I wrote over at Eric Martin's place a week before the inauguration. I think you might find some of it relevant to discussions since the inaugural address -- how the Bush Administration is repositioning re the "GWOT" vocabulary, the relations between the CIA and DOD in covert operations, and the rumbles of cross-border excursions in Iraq.

The comments aren't addressed to the specifics of the current brouhahas, but sometimes I have to remind myself to keep the big picture in mind as I react to specific events or disclosures, especially the more outrageous. So I find it helpful to occassionally go back to look at something I said, even if it was only a week ago. [ed., no comments about senior moments now, you hear?]

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For context, the discussion at Eric's was about Norman Podhoretz' "revisionism in real time" (to use Eric's felicitous formulation) and the various "enemies within" to which Norman's salvo was likely addressed. My remarks begin with an important and timely question from Alex:

A serious question: If Bush decides to invade another country [i.e. Iran or Syria, ed.], do you think he will attempt to use the congressional authorization from the Iraq War for permission, OR do you think that he will ask for a new authorization, OR do you think he'll just go ahead?

Sorry, I'm impatient. Can't wait for your answers. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS CONGRESS WITH AUTHORIZE ANY NEW WAR DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS PRESIDENCY, excepting following an attack of course. Zero.

My response, edited a bit for readibility but otherwise just stream of keyboard:

See the excellent recent Lawrence Freedman piece on The Iraq Syndrome, which will be Rumsfeld's legacy, in the same way Robert McNamara's was the Vietnam Syndrome. My very quicky remarks on Freedman are here.

I believe Freedman is absolutely correct about an Iraq Syndrome. There's a big difference between a significant portion of the public being willing to continue to support (or at least not openly oppose) Bush and the US invasion because "America right or wrong." They get their backs up when somebody suggests that the President and the US did the wrongn thing.

It's another thing altogether for those same people to support a further adventure. They're going to be awfully gun-shy, pun intended.

The causus belli would have to be sufficiently major that it triggered the viscera of Americans across the political spectrum. The US would have to feel itself under direct attack -- not some argument of possible future threat that must be prevented or preempted. Unless we have a meltdown of our political system, the Bush Doctrine as a military strategy is dead, but there's not anything yet in its place.

If a new intervention were pushed by the Bush Administration, a much larger portion of the general public this time around would want to know in great many more of the details about military overstretch, quagmires and exit strategy, possible "blowback," etc. These issues were dismissable in the wake of 9/11, with the drumbeats being echoed by the MSM, and with the "lessons of Vietnam" dismissed as either irrelevant or "we've gotten over Vietnam by now."

By contrast, Iraq is, shall we say, still fresh in the mind? We've got a new situation that's looking more and more like quagmire from any and every angle. And this time around, the MSM has a whole other narrative in which to filter and frame pronouncements from the Bush Administraton.

I'd say the foregoing description of a general public that is more cautious or less willing to take Bush's pronounements on faith is similarly equally true for a goodly portion of Repubs on Capitol Hill. Most are not of the neo-con persuasion. Also, they're politicians, so the reluctance of a larger portion of their voters, and the willingness of a larger number of their home districts to take a hard look at the bill-of-goods the Bush Admin would be selling if they followed the Poddy script, is likely to put the brakes on any adventure. We're already hearing rumbles from Repub Congressmen after visiting their home districts.

All of this is equally applicable, BTW, to any proposal for humanitarian interventions that involve peacemaking -- not just helping disaster victims like the tsunami. The Iraq Syndrome will put any thoughts of a repeat of interventions in the Balkans, or going into a Sudan, under the microscope across the political spectrum, not just from the old-fashioned anti-war Left or the isolationist Right.

The thing to watch for is mission creep in Iraq. Please note that although Rumsfeld was pretty direct about denying US-supported Iraqi death squads (by the Pentagon, didn't say anything about the other agency, heh) he was notably less straightforward about crossing the border into Syria by US special forces.

[ed., I highlighted Rumsfeld's statements on Syria because I found astounding the naivete of certain right-wing bloggers when they dumped on Rumsfeld for being too "casual" in his reaction to the Newsweek article on the Salvador option. Donald Rumsfeld may decide to appear breezy some times in responding to the press, but his responses are never "casual." If he said he hadn't read the article, you can go to the bank on the statement as being factually accurate. If you inferred, however, that he was unaware of every last jot of every sentence in the article in terms of what he could and couldn't safely say, you are a fool. He is the only one of the leading lights of BushAdmin1 to have been caught in an out-and-out falsehood over the invasion of Iraq only once. And that case appears to have been a slip of the tongue he has regretted fiercely. Always, always parce Rumsfeld -- most especially when he's being "casual."]

I hate to keep returning to Vietnam, but there are features of that conflict that should at least be examined occasionally. One is the understandable temptation by both the WH and the military to go to where they think the source of the problem lies -- across the neighboring borders. The international and domestic political fallout can be considerable, as the Cambodian bombings demonstrated. And mission creep can also be a factor in spreading instability outside of the country of conflict. That's just a commonsense observation, not a moral judgment.

Now one of the big problems is that, unless we take Kristol's proposal and bomb the Syrians openly, the BushAdmin and the military have to conduct deniable operations. That means one or both of two things. We ultimately engage unofficial/paramilitary groups to do the incursions. We lie through our teeth about it publicly.

The latter course was adopted by the Nixon WH with respect to Cambodia (hey -- Kerry's Cambodia story to this day can't be documented because it's shrouded in a system designed for deniability). And at some point, deniability exploded in their face, and LBJ's Credibility Gap became Nixon's Grand Canyon of government-by-deceit. That was a terrible scar on US domestic politics writ large, not just on the future conduct of US foreign policy.

Now, as for Finlandization [ed. appropo of Podhoretz]. I don't have a reference for you at my fingertips that gives you a broader history. But it's the Poddy codeword for the sinister policies of creeping appeasement of the guys who were running the show in Reagan II -- not the stalwart anticommunists of Iran-contra and the NSC but the (sneer) diplomats. He and Midge were still yammering about Finlandization at conferences on Europe after October 1989!

The reemergence of Jimmy Baker must have them in a cold sweat. Baker is the incarnation of evil because he's so much more plausible than the cartoonish anti-war Left. Granted the Podhoretz crowd is all geared up for realtime revisionism (take a gander at Roger Simon's comment section on the Podhoretz article if you want to see an awesome example of your [Eric's] meme in action). But if you want to know who their real enemy is, it's Jimmy Baker and his ilk because that smooth talker is one dangerous man.

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Follow-up from Alex:

[O]ne major difference between now and Cambodia is the media. I think secret runs into Syria would land on Al Jazeera in a heartbeat, although I do allow for the possibility that there is lots going on in Iraq that we simply don't know is happening. From what I understand from press reports, the press is quite restricted from moving around by the insecurity.

Another question that I find interesting to contemplate is the military force size question in relation to the possibility of invading "the next country." Unless all the retired military analysts are lying about our force strength, attacking a new country doesn't seem feasible at this time. And that begs the question of just what we would do if WE were attacked here and wanted to retaliate. Shift forces from Iraq or Afghanistan?

I think if it really came to that, particularly following an attack, that there would be a serious readjustment in the world view to send troops, including NATO and maybe UN, to replace troops in Iraq and redirect them (maybe borrow some from Afghan., too). What I don't like is being in the position of being so vulnerable, especially for no good reason.

I heard that Baker had made a statement, but I haven't tracked down what he said yet. In fact, I have been waiting for him to speak ever since Scowcroft's and Zbig's comments last week. What I would dearly love to know is the current status among Bush 41, Brent and Baker. Can you say strained?

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From nadezhda to Alex --

Here's a link to a press report of Baker's speech.

It's about time! However, the way I read the situation, Baker is out there running interference for Dubya. This is where the BushAdmin is generally headed, but somebody's got to tell the faithful that it's time for a reality-based policy. Rude awakening for many, I fear, if the comment thread on Roger Simon re the Podhoretz article is any indication.

Shortish Norman Podhoretz:

Yes, folks. World War IV is in trouble and barely hanging by a thread. The anti-World War IV-forces are feeling their oats and seem to think they have WWIV beating a hasty retreat and only moments away from being put to flight. The only way to save WWIV from an ignimonious fate is to call out the troops in its defense. Certain signs might lead one to think Bush may be starting to go wobbly. Oh, where is Maggie and her handbag when you need them. Tony Blair's fundamental wetness and unreliability as a stalwart ally is starting to show through. But never fear, a new handbag wielder seems to be on the job, just as soon as she gets confirmed to her new State Dep't duties.

James Wolcott seems to have triggered this marshalling of forces with an all too casual flinging of the gauntlet (as is his wont, I'm afraid). Said our Jimmy:

It's going to break Norman Podhoretz's peach-pit heart, but it will soon become time to recognize the inevitable and blow the whistle on the World War IV he and the neocons have been so determined to wage.

And back came Norman firing his exhortation to the faithful defenders of poor, misunderstood WWIV. [ed., Well, if we're to get the timing absolutely right, seems Norman's broadside had been in the works for some time and it was now publication date regardless of whether Jimmy had published his cutting remarks , but let's not let a few minor details get in the way of a sweeping narrative.]

If the initial response of the faithful to Norman's call to arms is any indication, the partisans of WWIV can rest easier, knowing that renewed support is on its way. And in any event, Norman (after a rather lengthy analysis of every sliver of a "foreign policy school" across the US political spectrum) concludes that, amazingly enough, maybe Condi isn't going to need that handbag after all.

...I think (to say it one last time) that the amazing leader this President has amazingly turned out to be will—like the comparably amazing Harry Truman before him when he took on the Communist world—have the wind at his back as he continues the struggle against Islamist radicalism and its vicious terrorist armory: a struggle whose objective is the spread of liberty and whose success will bring greater security and greater prosperity not only to the people of this country, and not only to the people of the greater Middle East, but also to the people of Europe and beyond, in spite of the sorry fact that so many of them do not wish to know it yet.

The fight's not out of our Jimmy yet, however. Back he comes today with this next fling of ye olde gauntlet:

Pessimism, schmessifism. It doesn't matter if the glass is half-empty or half full if the glass is filled with blood needlessly shed.

And today [Roger] Simon is all caffeinated about another urgent summons from Norman Podhoretz to gird our loins and show the fortitude to wage World War IV. Ledeen, Chalabi, Podhoretz--these are your comrades, Mr. Simon, and you're welcome to them.

Defenders of WWIV, be prepared not just for some minor skirmishes. Your opponents seem to be gearing for a full-fledged offensive.

[posted on nadya's basket]