The various justifications for abuse of detainees, whether technically torture and whether in Iraq or Guantanmo, ultimately rely on a "torture as self-defense" argument. Whether the rationalizers attempt to justify the behavior itself, or explain it away as just part of the unavoidable ugliness of war, the arguments come down to the imperative to save innocent lives and reduce injury to our troops. This is, in the final analysis, the same sort of position taken by the unilateralist (or Jacksonian) right on a variety of foreign policy issues. They want to be able to use any means (including pre-emption or any type of weapon invented or to be invented) to prevent the possibility of direct harm to American persons and property. And the "rightness" of their position is defined in terms of the right to protect oneself.
This world view has little or no appreciation of the probability that certain tactics are likely to be self-defeating. The unilateralists can't/won't think through the next step or two to see what other probable consequences will result from their action. Inextricably linked to this attitude is the reluctance to deny ourselves any arrow in the quiver, even though its presence may damage the utility of the rest of our arsenal or change the "correlation of forces" to our detriment -- it might come in handy some day when we need to defend ourselves. It is an overly constricted understanding of "interests" to be pursued and protected. And when actual military force is used, it is a fatally narrow understanding of "victory," by ignoring the ultimate objective which is to win the peace. In the terms of William Lind and Fourth Generation Warfare, we ignore the "moral level" of conflict at our peril, because by doing so we make it easy for others to deny us the fruits of victory.
So whether it's invading Iraq, or changing the nuclear equation via missile defense or developing "small" nuclear weapons, or threatening rogue states who are on the road to acquiring nuclear weapons, or blowing up the Cancun meetings with a major high-subsidy Agriculture bill the week before, or refusing to apply international law to Guantanamo detainees, the justification is always protecting Americans from the possibility of harm by outsiders. We hear little or no recognition that the protection is at best temporary, and that the likelihood of greater harm may have been substantially increased.
Yet aggressive acts of "self-defense" inevitably have longer-term impacts because they change, often for the worse, a complex set of relations that, together, provide a global security environment (or in the case of trade or finance, a global economic system). Lost in the chest-beating about saving innocents and self-defense is (1) the need to focus on improving the security environment itself and (2) the broader damage to the security environment that will result from the "self-defense" action.
In the case of Iraq, the unlilateralists will sincerely say that their policy wasn't intended to produce Salafis terrorizing the population and aid providers with bombings, kidnappings and beheadings. These are "unintended consequences," and certainly not their responsibility, but the responsibility of evil perpetrators.
"Unintended" results they certainly are, but the results certainly shouldn't be put into the category of "unanticipated consequences." Nor should we treat as unanticipated consequences the fact that Iraq is turning into the preferred battleground for Pakistani jihadis. Or that Osama bin Laden is being converted into the revered spokesman for a global ideological movement. Or that we are overseeing the collapse of the Iraqi public health system. Or that the level of repression in neighboring authoritarian states is on the rise. Or that Iran's mullahs are accelerating nuclearization and cracking down on reformers. Or that the US has forfeited enormous public credibility in international institutions. Or that the US is seen by most of the world as, at best, a hypocritical bully.
These are all "collateral damage" of the self-inflicted kind -- consequences that can be, and were, anticipated. The military studies what types and amounts of collateral damage are likely to result from certain ways of using force. There are always trade-offs, and "effectiveness" in obtaining military objectives involves an implicit cost/benefit analysis.
The unilateralists don't seem to understand that you have to ask the same sort of questions whenever you use power aggressively, whether against a prisoner or against a country:
- What are the likely reactions of the people you act against directly.
- What are the likely responses of people who have close relations with those who have been harmed by your action.
- How will it affect your reputation -- which, by the way, is an invaluable asset that takes a long time to earn and little time to lose.
- Will others watching from afar change their assessment of how you might behave in the future and modify their own behavior in ways that aren't necessarily beneficial to you.
- Will others who have been willing to work with you before change their mind and withdraw support you've counted on.
- Will others who previously saw you as unfriendly now see you as a danger and decide to erect protections against ways you might threaten them in the future or actively work to undermine relationships or assets of value to you.
Now these are simple home truths we all know from everyday life. I could usefully apply that list of questions to deciding how to launch a controversial business initiative within a corporation. It's called politics. But somehow "politics" has become lost in these debates in which the unilateralists defend their actions by appealing to the overriding legal and moral right of self-defense. Or ignore or dismiss the harm to others in comparison to potential harm to themselves.
As soon as the US border is crossed, they insist we are in a Hobbesian state, denying the interconnectedness of people, nations, commerce and culture. They measure the acceptability of institutions by how effective they are at leveraging US power to get what the US wants, not by how effective those institutions are at contributing to a a more secure and prosperous environment within which the US and its citizens live and operate. Their attacks on the UN, among other international institutions, for "ineffectiveness" is disingenuousness of the worst sort, because their only measure of "effectiveness" is how well it helps the US get what it wants in specific situations, not how well it accomplishes the collective objectives for which its members created it. By their own actions and attitudes the unilateralists help break the interconnectedness, strengthen adversaries on the "moral level," and produce the very Hobbesian conditions they fear. A series of self-fulfilling prophecy.
The contrast with the internationalist branch of the US conservative tradition is striking. One may disagree with the priorities of the presidency of Bush the Elder, but not the commitment to an interconnected world where the long-term consequences of US actions were considered carefully. They were not naive "one Worlders," nor did they see it as necessarily desirable that the UN take on some sort of independent global governance function. But they did see the world as a system of people and nations that formed an interconnected political community.
Not surprisingly, that consummate politician, James Baker, entitled his memoirs as Secretary of State "The Politics of Diplomacy." I quote liberally from its preface, because I find it an eloquent rebuttal to the unilateralist worldview that has dominated our foreign policy for the past four years.
Politics (in its larger sense -- as opposed to specific electoral campaigns) and policy are inextricably linked. It's only through politics that we can transform philosophy into policy. This is particularly true in geopolitics, where the difference between success and failure is often measured by the ability (or lack thereof) to understand how political constraints inevitably shape the outcome of any negotiation Indeed, I would argue, with a nod to Clausewitz, that diplomacy is the continuation of politics -- whether in revolution, war or peace.I speculate that, if George W Bush were not the son of George HW Bush, James Baker would find Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo the exercise of power divorced from our most valued purposes.
We sometimes overlook the fact that most foreign leaders are themselves politicians, frequently elected or members of some ruling party. These senior foreign officials view their problems, and opportunities, through political eyes. To persuade them, it is often helpful to put oneself in their shoes -- to determine how to help them explain, justify, or even rationalize positions to their colleagues and publics. [...]
The political skill extends beyond one-on-one relations to the task of building coalitions. Effective U.S. leadership often depends on the ability to persuade others to join with us so we can extend our influence; to build a coalition, a diplomat needs to appreciate what objectives, arguments, and trade-offs are important to would-be partners. To be successful over time, the politician-diplomat also needs to win the confidence of others. That means words must be matched by deeds and promises must be kept.
[...]
Ultimately, good politicians, like successful diplomats, appreciate power -- its uses and limits. An effective leader recognizes how success can enhance power, and he or she also knows how to husband that precious asset until the timing is right. Power comes in many forms -- economic and military might, group expectations and pressure, and most lastingly, through ideas. And an American political diplomat should always remember that power divorced from the purposes valued by our democracy will ultimately prove empty.
[UPDATE 4:45PM EST 12-4-04] I wrote the foregoing about Baker's approach to geopolitics before I'd caught his op-ed in the NYT on Thursday about restarting the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process. It's a blueprint for taking the political approach --finding the win-win solutions and marginalizing those whose only desire is to destroy any chance of progress.
In his discussion of Baker in Slate, Fred Kaplan reminds us of Baker's position during the run up to the Iraq War, which was to not pay attention to the Cheneys and Rumsfelds who were willing to go it alone without even a gesture to the international community. Bush listened to that advice at least for a time.
Clearly, simple continuing unstinting support for Ariel Sharon isn't going to cut it in the coming period. My concern about the ability of Bush to pursue a political approach is that it seems, in this White House, that anything to do with Israel-Palestine requires the direct engagement of the President. We've not seen the President setting the direction and parameters and then giving a Baker or a Kissinger the authority to go do the deal. The President should come in to close the deal, but there are too many other foreign policy irons in the fire for the Israeli-Palestinian process to be dependent on the President's constant personal attention. And never fear, that particular mare's nest will require constant attention and then some just to keep it from blowing up in everyone's face.
The first afoe European weblog awards