News: Le Sabot Postmoderne does a round-up of today's developments, which involved a lot of to-and-fro of different quasi-offers, rejected out of hand by Yushchenko:
Yushchenko has broken off negotiations with Kuchma and Yanukovych. Their position was, "Make a deal based on an unenforceable promise that we'll make you a strong Prime Minister under President Yanukovych, and then disperse the protesters." Thankfully, Yushchenko was born in the morning, but not THIS morning.

Kuchma/Yanukovych's other bargaining position is to call for entirely new elections. They've made noises that both Yanukovych and Yushchenko wouldn't be allowed to run, but instead new candidates would be fielded. This would conveniently let them dump their currently radioactive Donetsk thug, while robbing the Opposition of their wildly popular candidate. You can start to see why Yushchenko stopped negotiating.
Other news of the day:
  • The Supreme Court continued to hear the voting fraud cases for a second day.
  • Javier Solana and Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski will be meeting with the rival candidates on Wednesday, together with OSCE Secy Gen Jan Kubis.
  • Fears of a geographic splintering of Ukraine eased with some backing down by local officials who had spoken of autonomy moves in some eastern regions.
  • Some analysts see the new elections/delay scenarios fitting Kuchma's agenda -- put off relinquishing power as long as possible but get rid of Yanukovych as prime minister in the meantime.

New source to check out if you want to follow development closely, in addition to previous links: HotLine news service, frequent updates that seem to track closely with eventual international wire service reports (Russian, Ukrainian, English)

Views:
Two very interesting pieces, giving a broader set of perspectives and agendas than can be found in most coverage. It's not just about democracy, fair elections and rule of law, it's not just about people power, it's not just about east-west history of the Ukraine, or oligarchs and economic interests, or Russia vs the West. It's all of the above and then some.

First, from the blog The Russian Dilettante, on how an ordinary voter in Donetsk might view the goings on. Shorter: There's a compelling logic to "Sure they're thugs and thieves, but they're our thugs and thieves."

It's amazing that the border between Yuschenko- and Yanukovich-supporting regions can be traced to the politics and demographics of the 17th and 18th century and the first half of the 19th. I've tried to reconstruct -- speculatively -- a Donesk voter's point of view:

1. Our region and its neighbors produce most of this nation's GDP -- let's just say wealth. Granted, our oligarchs syphon off most of this wealth but some trickles down to us, too.
2. The good people in the streets of Kiev want to break the oligarchs' monopoly on power. We wouldn't mind that, too. But we don't trust their leaders.
3. Their leaders are oligarchs from other parts of Ukraine who aren't satisfied with what they've got. When they grab assets from our local oligarchs, we'll be even worse off.
4. Also, when those new oligarchs from the West come to power, they'll spend the tax money -- and most of that comes from us -- on their cronies.
5. They'll try to Halycize Ukraine; we Easterners will become second-class citizens. Our kids will have a problem getting into Kyiv universities.
6. So you see, it's not about democracy, it's just us against them.
7. We'd rather become autonomous and deal with our oligarchs ourselves.

From this angle, there's no argument over values; it's Us vs Them. (Alas, I'm not quite impartial to this simple dichotomy, either.) The best I can say now is that I am hoping Ukraine becomes a federation, which would reflect its geographically-distributed cultural diversity. Let the people of the East take on their oligarchs without fear that outsiders will step in to grab the spoils.
For daily analysis that's both indepth and big-picture, covering things both Russian and Ukrainian, Untimely Thoughts by Peter Lavalle is a must-read. He writes on Russia for a variety of news organizations, especially UPI and papers like Moscow Times. His website his articles as well as analytical pieces, interviews, and occasional items from other analysts. With the intense coverage of Ukraine recently, his UPI stuff has been daily. Today's article outlines the possible gamble Kuchma may be taking with a call for further elections, and how it could play out on a number of levels:
[...]
Depending on the Supreme Court's findings, a third round of voting appears likely. But how the third round is characterized will be key. Will the court find the runoff vote invalid, or the will it go further and deem both rounds invalid? Kuchma and his supporters are angling for the latter.

The voiding of both rounds opens the door for Kuchma to finally rid of himself of Yanukovych as prime minister. Kuchma might have intended to fire Yanukovych this week, but Timoshenko's demand that he do so might have interrupted his plans. Kuchma has been given an ultimatum before by political foes while president and did not back down.

With a third vote on the horizon, Kuchma is looking for a suitable candidate to replace Yanukovych. That person appears to be Serhiy Tyhypko. Resigning from his position as head of the National Bank and Yanukovych's campaign manager, Tyhipko is a perfectly placed regime insider who would very much like to take on Yushchenko. Yushchenko dearly would like to run against Yanukovych again, but will have no choice if Yanukovych backs out - something Kuchma can easily arrange.

A Tyhypko candidacy could be very interesting. He is an insider, but can easily spin himself as a centrist, opposed to Yanukovych's separatist leanings and Yushchenko-Timoshenko's "right-wing, nationalist, and street-extremism." Tyhypko could spin himself as a unifier - politically and as an advocate if an indivisible Ukraine.

Additionally, if the Supreme Court suggests another election and legislation is passed toward this end, Kuchma could declare a state of emergency in the name of allowing a "cooling off" period before the extraordinary third round is set. "Cooling off" in this case would mean the end of street demonstrations.

Should this scenario worry Yushchenko? Yes. Yushchenko's coalition of political forces are not as cohesive as most media report. As the last few days have demonstrated, the much more nationalistic Timoshenko often acts an independent political actor beyond Yushchenko's control. Timoshenko and her supporters have polarized Ukraine's political atmosphere just as much as Yanukovych unofficial support of regional separatism.

The international angle of a third election round would also be important. Vladimir Putin would have the opportunity to disentangle himself from the Kremlin's over-zealous support of Yanukovych's candidacy. The West would be forced to distance itself from outward support of Yushchenko.
[...]
As discoshaman of Le Sabot Postmoderne puts it so aptly:
We all agree that the strategic picture here is almost impossible to grasp in its entirety. There are so many unknowable variables, and so many individual agendas coalescing and falling apart simultaneously. It's somewhere in a gray area between complex and chaotic.