1. A second term for President Bush -- views from Moscow
2. Black Gold - Russia has more... and then some
3. The evolving structure of Russia's political economy, and the dilemma of low growth and investment outside the energy sector
4. The CIS and the Near-Abroad -- Russia's posture in its sphere of influence, and the West's responses
5. NATO -- areas of collaboration and friction
6. Nuclear weapons and treaties
7. Chechnya

Americans are troubled by the country’s deep-seated division following the outcome of the Nov. 2 elections. But if only they knew how things looked on the ground in Russia! The division there is even greater. As public opinion polls indicated, everyday people were rooting for John Kerry, while the Kremlin openly expressed its support for George Bush. At least the American people were split over their own candidates. But what could have motivated Russia’s leadership to so unabashedly place its bets on the Republican president? Do they really think that Russia’s fate is in better hands with Bush at the helm, so much so that they completely turned their backs on the Democrats? Apparently, the Kremlin’s ill-famed pragmatism failed them. Instead, plain old egotism won the day.

While congratulating Bush on his victory, President Putin said affairs between the two countries had noticeably improved. Evidently, he didn’t have the United States and Russia in mind, because, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, their relations have reached an all-time low. Moscow’s congratulatory words served merely to illustrate how fragile and unreliable those relations are and how narrow and personalized the foundation is on which they are built. While the Kremlin looked on passively over the past four years, Washington managed to whittle down bilateral cooperation to its politico-military aspect only. Bush needed an ally in the Kremlin for little more than his war on terrorism, and by showering copious amounts of empty flattery on Mr. Putin, he has achieved this. Simultaneously, the White House did nothing for Russia; on the contrary, it went to great lengths to prevent relations from deepening or becoming more strategic.

Bush’s expressions of praise addressed to his Russian partner have in no way kept America from squeezing Moscow out of almost every sphere of international authority; neither have they compelled Washington to consider Russia’s interests, especially as they relate to the former Soviet Union. With the exception of Belarus, Moscow has lost military, socio-political and economic influence over practically all parts of the world where it once enjoyed it. Today, Russia means less to the world and to Bush than it did four years ago, and this process continues. If it were not for oil and Iran, Russia would be even less relevant.

Still reeling over their defeat, the Democrats offered to return the United States to its traditional foreign policy course. They believe that American leadership can only be achieved by creating a network of strategic allies with which America cooperates on the basis of common values. This is, after all, the way America reached world domination. Democrats are interested in Russia as a potential ally; hence, their interest in what is happening inside the country. George Bush, who has rejected any kind of alliance, doesn’t see Russia this way at all. His policies are predicated on the sole power of the United States, which has no need for strategic support from others. Of course, America may receive assistance within a framework of temporary alliances. But tomorrow these countries may just as quickly become irrelevant for America, or even become its enemies. This is how Washington and Moscow currently operate. Such a myopic approach is not in Russia’s national interests.

We can be certain that, just like in the past, Bush in his second term will prevent opening wider dialogue with Moscow and reject making long-term guarantees. Nor will he sign any bilateral agreements. Russia’s economy and socio-political development will not be among his priorities. All Bush really needs from Russia is that it stand shoulder to shoulder in America’s war on terror, which, in turn, is the principal value the Kremlin sees in Bush. In this way, it is counting on keeping its hands untied in its own domestic affairs.

However, there is in fact no guarantee that its hands will remain free. [...] And the last thing Republican leaders want in the 2008 elections is for their party to be accused of “losing Russia,” that is, of overlooking the disintegration of democracy in the former Soviet Union while working to build it in the Middle East.

It will now be easier than before for Bush to change his position vis a vis Russia; all the more so, as some of his policies have already been modified since the Beslan tragedy. The White House’s isolation from most of the American establishment, with respect to Washington’s position on Russia alone, could complicate Bush’s task of resolving a whole number of other issues. For the Neocons, Russia’s movement away from democracy represents a major defeat, which they will attempt to counter any way possible. Politically, they are more globalist than traditional Democrats. World democracy for them is paramount, loftier than the war on terrorism, more important than befriending Russia. Knowing Bush’s messianic nature and his policies, we can assume that he will be receptive to this argument.

During his second term, it will be important for Bush not only to focus on his main task: spreading democracy and freedom throughout the world, but also rallying his party around this mission and, simultaneously, attracting uncommitted Democrats and independents to his cause. Bush secured his victory on a platform combining political, moral and ethical values, which was supported by a record number of American voters. Russia is distancing itself from exactly these values, and by doing so, is growing further apart from Mr. Bush and America. President Putin’s backing of the White House did nothing to help the American incumbent get reelected, but it did turn off the Democrats. For the Kremlin, four more years of Bush can be compared to the high price of oil: seemingly straightforward and advantageous, yet representing no real economic improvement.

European Commentary Nov 22 (Business Week - European Edition) With oil still hovering near $50 a barrel, the last thing people want to hear is that there's even less of the stuff out there than previously thought. This year investors in the oil industry have been shaken by the revelation that Royal Dutch/Shell Group (RD ) overstated its proven reserves by at least 23%, some 4.5 billion barrels, with more possible downgrades to come. There's growing disquiet that other major oil companies may also have inflated reserves.

But there's one place -- Russia -- where reserve estimates just seem to go up and up. In its annual statistical survey of world energy, BP PLC (BP ) has recently revised its estimates of Russia's total proven oil reserves to 69.1 billion barrels, 6% of the world's total, up from 45 billion bbl. in 2001. But according to auditors with a worm's-eye view of what's actually going on in the depths of Siberia, such estimates may just scratch the surface of Russia's real potential. According to a recent study by Dallas-based energy reserve auditors DeGolyer & MacNaughton, whose clients include leading Russian energy companies such as Gazprom and Yukos, Russia's true recoverable reserves are between 150 billion bbl. and 200 billion bbl. That's up from industry estimates of 100 billion bbl. a few years ago.

Why such a big gap in the estimates? Because it's one thing to be sitting on oil reserves, another to be able to exploit them commercially. In Russia's main oil-producing region in western Siberia, proven reserves represent just 18% to 24% of all oil in the ground, in contrast to about 45% in Western oil-producing regions such as Alaska and the North Sea. But as Russian oil companies adopt technologies, such as horizontal wells and computerized reservoir management systems, the estimated recovery rates are being revised. Thanks to new techniques, which make it possible to obtain oil even from apparently depleted fields, Russian oil companies already have managed to boost their output by 50% since 1998. "The biggest thing is the [new] technology being deployed in western Siberia. The results are beginning to show," says Martin Wiewiorowski, senior vice-president of DeGolyer & MacNaughton in Moscow.
[...]

LONDON. Nov 23 (Financial Times) The US dollar fell to a fresh low against the euro on Tuesday, breaching the $1.31 barrier for the first time. The cataylst was a hint from the Russian central bank that it plans to step up its policy of switching its foreign exchange reserves into euros, at the expense of the dollar. Alexei Ulyukayev, the first deputy chairman of the Russian central bank, told reporters: "Most of our reserves are in dollars and that's a cause for concern. It's a real problem. "Looking at the dynamics of the euro/dollar rate, we are discussing the possibility to change the reserve structure."

MOSCOW Nov 26 (Moscow Times) Editorial The media have been portraying the Ukrainian presidential election as a contest between East and West, between entrenching a cronyist authoritarian regime and creating a liberal democratic one: pro-Moscow Viktor Yanukovych vs. pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko, each candidate with radically different visions of Ukraine's future. In reality, there is less difference in substance between the two candidates than first appearances might suggest.

Both a Yanukovych and a Yushchenko administration would face a similar set of external and internal constraints. Neither has much choice but to establish good working relations with Russia (by dint of dependence on Russian natural gas and geographical proximity) and the West, while catering to various domestic constituencies.
[...]
If Yushchenko prevails despite the state machine being fully mobilized against him, that would establish a precedent that would resonate throughout the CIS -- not least in neighboring Russia.
[...]
This is perhaps what Putin fears more than the victory of a "pro-Western" candidate and why the Kremlin's interference has been so excessive. A democratic transfer of power in Ukraine could have a powerful demonstration effect on its neighbors to the east -- not something that Putin necessarily wants to encourage as he ponders his own succession in 2008.

A successful democratic handover in Ukraine would also serve to undermine a key myth underpinning Putin's increasingly authoritarian regime -- that Russia is not yet ready for democracy and that without "continuity of power" the country will be condemned to chaos and collapse.

By Pavel K Baev, Nov 10 (Eurasia Daily Monitor) [...] Putin consistently acts on the conviction that there is no such a thing as too much control. He refuses to acknowledge that the tightly managed election of a totally compliant parliament has eliminated an important forum of public dialogue and pushed the process of political bargaining underground (Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 27). He does not want to see that promoting his trusted cadre from the special services leads to the diminishing efficiency of management and the proliferation of blatant corruption (Novaya gazeta, August 30; Ezhenedelnyi zhurnal, September 20). He dismisses both the dry statistics and emotional expert opinions that establish beyond a doubt that the mounting pressure on big business and the destruction of Yukos combine to produce a sharp decline in investment activities, leading to economic stagnation amid the oil boom (Moskovskie novosti, November 5). This pattern of denial resembles too closely the "Socialism-will-triumph" mentality of the GDR leadership, concerned only about the corrupting influence of Gorbachev's perestroika. But each time a disaster unexpectedly strikes -- such as the sunken Kursk submarine, or the Nord-Ost theater seize, or the captive children in Beslan -- the Kremlin appears frozen in a panic that this event would trigger an avalanche of discontent (Polit.ru, October 25).
[...]

By Pavel K. Baev, Nov 24 (Eurasian Daily Monitor) Russia's investment climate is undergoing profound changes, but expert opinions about the direction of these changes differ far more than traditional quarrels between economic schools should warrant. In mid-November Fitch Ratings awarded Russia one extra step and thus raised its rating to investment level (Kommersant, November 19). The World Bank, however, has published a report that warns of the negative impact of inconsistent state interference in the economy on the investment climate (Vremya novostei, November 22). The sustained flow of petrodollars has allowed the Central Bank of Russia to accumulate a small mountain of $110 billion, which should provide for mid-term financial stability (Gazeta.ru, November 18). The government, however, remains reluctant to admit that its target figure for inflation (10%) has already been surpassed and is struggling to check the undesirable appreciation of ruble against the weakening dollar (Kommersant, November 11).

These simultaneous shifts in opposite directions reduce "scientific" economic forecasts to guestimates about the cyclical or structural character of an observable slowdown in the growth (Ekspert, November 8). There are few doubts that the slowing down of the economy, against Putin's strict orders to double the GDP, is caused primarily by the decline in investment activity (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 12).

Evgeny Yasin, a grand master among Russian economists, argues again and again that such key indicators as the volume of money confirm the sustained decline in demand for investment capital (Ekho Moskvy, November 16). Presidential economic adviser Andrei Illarionov boldly asserts that this decline is caused by the political attack on the oil company Yukos, even if Putin himself denies any political agenda (Izvestiya, November 12). Indeed, several contradictory signals that tax authorities are preparing to strike several other companies with huge bills for past "optimizations" have created a panic on the market (Kommersant, November 12; Ezhenedelny zhurnal, November 16). The tendency to sit on profits has spread, however, far beyond the energy sector and is distinguishable even in a fast-growing industry such as beer production (Polit.ru, November 12). In the meantime, Russian investments abroad in the first nine months of 2004 increased by 55% compared to the same period of last year (RosBusinessConsulting, November 18).

There is, therefore, a visible contradiction between the complex changes in the investment climate and the very straightforward downward trend in domestic investment activity. Two recently published indexes might help to explain this contradiction. The first one is the Corruption Perception Index released by Transparency International in late October (Economist, October 21). For 2004, it places Russia in the "rampant" category, tied with Tanzania and Mozambique for 90th place. Many Russian experts are even more critical about the scale of this problem, arguing that the market for corruption has grown to $40 billion in volume and is the only one that is actually booming (Ekho Moskvy, November 18). They also point out a new mode for this traditional phenomenon, as Putin's trusted siloviki from the special services prefer to camouflage their administrative racket as a "patriotic duty."

The second index was compiled by the Economist as a part of its "World in 2005" overview and ranks countries by their "quality of life," which is measured by a wide range of indicators, from GDP per capita to life-satisfaction surveys (Kommersant, November 19). Russia comes out in 105th place, below Pakistan but above Nigeria. Some middle-class Muscovites might accuse the respected newsmagazine of an anti-Russian bias, since their life in one of the most expensive cities in the world might appear not that bad (Moskovsky komsomolets, November 19). But those 74% of Russians who dismiss Muscovites as selfish rentiers who consume a disproportionate share of the oil profits might have a point (Kommersant-dengi, November 22). The dramatic decline of public health services that leaves the epidemics of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis-C unaddressed makes an even stronger case for Russia's deteriorating quality of life, a case that the government has chosen to ignore (Gazeta.ru, November 22). While there is no direct connection between public health and the investment climate, apparently many entrepreneurs find few incentives to invest in this environment, whatever ambitious goals were proclaimed at their November congress (Kommersant, November 17).

Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov has recently expressed his disappointment in the "lack of enthusiasm" among the Russian business community (RosBusinessConsulting, November 18). It would be easy to point out that Fradkov's own policy, including the botched administrative reform, is the main source of this attitude (Ekspert, November 22). It would not, however, be quite fair. He was brought to this prominent position, far above his level of incompetence, in order to impersonate "stability," so it cannot be his fault if the oil bonanza gives way to stagnation.

MOSCOW, Nov 24, (Reuters) Shares of electricity monopoly Unified Energy Systems, or UES, shed as much as 5 percent Tuesday on reports of a delay in power-sector privatization, a key battlefield in Russia's stalling reform plans.

UES shares fell after Vedomosti reported the government had put off the privatization of wholesale power stations, a key plank of electricity sector reform, until next year.
[...]
Analysts say that if the government were to drop the reforms, UES' generation assets would be worthless. Russian brokerage Aton cut its investment rating on UES to "hold" from "buy" following the decision for a delay.

In its current state, the power sector is characterized by inadequately low and regulated tariffs, rising fuel costs, often uneconomic investment decisions and poor management, which results in low or negative returns on invested capital.

Analysts said market reforms have stagnated since President Vladimir Putin won election for a second four-year term earlier this year.

"We have always feared that the government would decide not to privatize ... until the liberalized electricity market was fully functional," Aton analyst Alexander Korneyev said.

If confirmed, this would mark the second delay in a year in the politically fraught reform process of UES after Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in the summer delayed key decisions on privatization to December.

[...]

By Lionel Martin, Nov 17 (Eurasian Daily Monitor) On December 3-4 Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold a summit with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has already gone to India to lay the groundwork for this summit (Itar-Tass, October 9). Putin's agenda in India comprises security and economics.

Although India is Russia's long-standing partner, many in Moscow still pursue former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov's 1998 idea of a strategic triangle with India and China (Itar-Tass, September 24). This triangle's purpose is to build the multi-polar world each of these states claims to want but has not yet achieved. It would also allegedly strengthen the UN Security Council to which India now seeks entry, and thus restrain American power. Finally it would also buttress Russia's position in Central Asia. Yet to date no triangle has emerged. Indo-Chinese mutual suspicion, China's aversion to alliances, each state's desire for a close working relationship with the United States, and the fact that Russia has little to offer in tangible, material terms to them beyond what they already receive have impeded formation of this triangle.
[...]
Reports from New Delhi say that during the summit India will announce a $3 billion Indian investment in Sakhalin-3 and the joint Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oil field in the Caspian. Thus India's Energy Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, has stated, "What I am talking about is the strategic alliance with Russia in energy security, which is becoming for India at least as important as our national security" (The Hindu, November 14). Similarly, Indian ambassador Kanwal Sibal has stated that India wants to invest in Russian oil fields and move beyond importing Russian military technology and equipment to participating in joint studies and development of new technologies (RIA-Novosti, November 5).

This asymmetry in objectives underscores Russia's concerns in approaching Asian governments, not just India. Despite significant economic progress under Putin, Russia remains a marginal economic player in Asia outside the energy sector. While India is investing large sums in this sector, Russia has still to prove itself a fully competent or reliable partner who can send large quantities of energy to their customers. Meanwhile it remains uncompetitive in trade and investment in other sectors, even where it might seem to enjoy a comparative advantage.

Strategic partnerships to address major issues in contemporary international affairs will continue to diminish without a corresponding economic base for partnership with countries like India. Good will, cooperation against terrorism, and arms sales reflect the legacies of the past, but do not necessarily build a basis for a strong relationship in the future, especially as India has increasing opportunities to go elsewhere to get the same benefits, often with higher quality. Indeed, as India 's capacities for indigenous production or for attracting other exporters grow, Russia's role as supplier will diminish. Rosoboroneksport has already announced that arms sales in 2005 are expected to decline 13% to $5 billion, hardly an encouraging sign (Moscow Times, November 9). While Indo-Russian relations will certainly not become antagonistic, their future quality remains an open question, especially if the status quo does not change dramatically soon.

Eurasian Daily Monitor, Nov 22 (Jamestown Foundation)

[...]
Russian and U.S. national interests may diverge too: geostrategically, there are potentially strong tensions inherent in the coexistence of U.S. and Russian power in places like the Caucasus and Central Asia. Many Russian pundits see the presidential election in Ukraine as a geopolitical tug-of-war between Moscow and Washington. Margelov also concedes that there are other contentious issues: they include "the transit of Caspian oil, the inclusion of post-Soviet countries in NATO's orbit, and a rivalry for influence in other former Soviet republics" (Moscow Times, November 18).

In addition, as some other Russian analysts point out, the Iraq war confirmed that the United States increasingly sees special value in the so-called "new" allies and partners -- both inside and outside NATO. Most of these countries -- such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, as well as some CIS countries -- are wary of Russia's geopolitical designs. While the East European countries of the former Soviet bloc have already escaped to the protective umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan would like the United States to counterbalance Russia in the post-Soviet space, notes Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director at the USA and Canada Institute.

[...]

By Quentin Peel, Nov 24 (Financial Times) Poor Ukraine. For centuries this great flat fertile plain has been the battleground for other people's empires - Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, German, you name it. Then, 13 years ago, the implosion of the Soviet Union thrust nationhood upon it - a nationhood dreamt of but never seriously expected. And now the territory seems destined to become once again a zone of confrontation between external forces, the new faultline between Russia and the west.
[...]

Ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russians of all political persuasions have found it hard to accept that Ukraine should break away from the Motherland. Most Russians regard Ukrainian independence as an aberration, to be corrected in the fullness of time. That a Moscow government should make clear who is the preferred presidential candidate in Kiev is taken for granted.

[...]

MOSCOW, Nov 25 (Moscow Times) Editorial. As President Vladimir Putin and the new European Commission chiefs gather for a summit on Thursday in The Hague, disagreements over the Ukrainian election cast a dark cloud over their first meeting. Putin may have been planning to cash in the chips Russia earned by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol -- indeed, welcoming Russia's support for the environmental treaty was at the top of a to-do list for the summit as recently as Monday, according to an EU press release. Instead, it looks more likely Moscow will be playing defense.
[...]
Russia's relationship with Europe -- and with America -- was already under pressure, ever since Putin unveiled plans to do away with elections for governors and single-mandate Duma deputies.
[...]
Putin's stamp of approval on an election that has been uniformly criticized in the West won't help. In its relations with Europe and the United States, Russia has long been walking a tightrope: Western concerns over Russian democracy, Chechnya and Yukos were leveraged against improving economic ties, measured cooperation in the war on terror, cheery rhetoric, and a few other odds and ends like the Kyoto Protocol. But the Ukrainian fiasco, coming after Putin's proposals for changes to Russia's electoral system, reveals a widening gap between Russia and Western democracies.

MOSCOW. Nov 25 (Interfax) - Russian President Vladimir Putin has sent a telegram to Viktor Yanukovych congratulating him on his election as Ukrainian president, the Kremlin press service reported on Thursday. "I congratulate you on your election as president of Ukraine. The Ukrainian people have made their choice in favor of stability, stronger statehood, and continued development of democratic and economic reforms. Most Ukrainian citizens have supported your desire to expand neighborly and multifaceted cooperation with Russia, all the CIS member-states, and other countries of Europe and the rest of the world," the message reads.

By Vladimir Socor, Nov 17 (Eurasian Daily Monitor) On November 9 and 16, the OSCE's Joint Consultative Group (JCG), meeting in Vienna, witnessed Russia's overt repudiation of its obligation to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova.

The 30-country JCG deals with issues related to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the 1999 OSCE Istanbul agreement on that treaty's adaptation, and the 1999 Istanbul Commitments whereby -- as part of the adaptation package -- Russia pledged to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia wants the 1999-adapted treaty to be ratified, and the Baltic states to be placed under its restrictions, despite Moscow's ongoing breaches of the Istanbul Commitments and of the adapted treaty itself in Moldova and the South Caucasus.

In its statements to the JCG's November 9 and November 16 meetings, Russia rejected any linkage between the Treaty and the Commitments. It went on to charge that "the United States and its allies" were using that linkage illegitimately "in order to promote their geopolitical interests in the post-Soviet space." Thus, Russia now implicitly equates keeping its forces in a perceived sphere of influence with resisting Western policies there. Moreover, the Russian statements insisted that issues related to Russian bases and troops in Georgia and Moldova are bilateral issues between Russia and each of those two countries, outside the adapted CFE treaty's purview and thus outside JCG's legitimate agenda.
[...]
The positions of Georgia and Moldova met with general sympathy on the unofficial level but only lukewarm official support in the two JCG meetings. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, firmly insisted on the linkage between ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty and withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. He also reaffirmed the U.S. offer (in concert with some allied countries) of financial support for Russian base closure and ammunition disposal. However, U.S. official statements did not address the political issues and other pretexts that Russia raised for keeping those troops in place and repudiating its 1999 Commitments.

Moreover, the European Union did not speak at all in the two JCG meetings. The EU has difficulty finding a common position because several countries, with Germany in the lead, advocate concessions to Russia at the expense of Georgia and Moldova, and clearing the way for Russian-desired ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty. This seriously weakens the leverage that the West tries to use by delaying ratification of the CFE Treaty in hopes of inducing Russia to fulfill its Istanbul Commitments. The two JCG meetings very nearly coincided with those Commitments' fifth anniversary. An emboldened Russia seems to treat them with increasingly open disdain.

By Roger McDermott, Nov 16 (Eurasia Daily Monitor) Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, met with senior NATO personnel on November 15, taking part in working meetings aimed at resolving issues relating to interoperability between Russian and NATO forces. At SHAPE HQ Mons, Belgium, he met U.S. General James Jones, Supreme Commander of Allied Personnel in Europe. Their discussions centered upon expanding existing NATO-Russia cooperation plans, currently being explored by the NATO-Russia Council. Agreement was also reached on the future supply of Russian weapons to the Iraqi army, as well an offer of Russian military training to the new Iraqi army in using these weapons on the condition that the training takes place outside Iraq (Itar-Tass, RIA Novosti, November 15).

NATO, keen to play broker between Washington and Moscow, will welcome success in the area of Iraq, an issue that has divided Russia and the United States and its allies. Russian interest in supplying weapons to Iraq is explained by the presence of Soviet weaponry in the country, and in this sense it is now a readily accessible market to Russian arms exporters. Baluyevsky justified these Russian supplies, since the Iraqi government will specify the exact levels and requirements and sales revenues will be reinvested in the Russian armed forces.

At a deeper level Baluyevsky, in fact, attaches great importance to the participation of the Russian Navy in joint exercises with NATO, known as "Active Endeavor." These included 11 exercises involving the Russian Navy in 2004: three in the North Atlantic, three in the Baltic, and four in the Mediterranean Sea. The entry of a Russian Northern Fleet nuclear submarine into a foreign port, at the French port of Brest, was an historic though largely symbolic event, which Baluyevsky believes signaled a genuine intent to develop further the levels of military cooperation with the Alliance. The results of these exercises are being studied in depth in order to resolve technical questions relating to joint operations. Yet the whole basis of these Naval exercises is to promote joint action in the area of counter-terrorism. "Active Endeavor" concentrated on the interception, detention, and inspection of vessels suspected of involvement in terrorism. This sphere is therefore key to furthering Russian military cooperation with the Alliance.
[...]
Baluyevsky chose to highlight key threats to the security the Russian Federation during his interview with the official publication of the Ministry of Defense (Krasnaya zvezda), which may signify a shift away from the traditional Russian rhetoric about NATO as an outdated and anti-Russian alliance. Instead, he selected the one real tangible threat to Russian security: international terrorism, unambiguously suggesting that Russia could benefit from closer cooperation with the Alliance. He purposefully avoided controversial areas of NATO policy that cause a negative reaction within security circles in Moscow. Russian President Vladimir Putin is driving these new practical priorities in Russian military thinking, desperate as he is to show real progress in the post-Beslan security environment in Russia. Moreover, his military chief can determine the levels of interest in pursuing practical cooperation in this crucial area for himself at first hand.

Nov 25 (Le Monde) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, a exigé, mercredi 24 novembre, "une révision du résultat de l'élection présidentielle" en Ukraine et "une solution non violente". S'exprimant avant la proclamation du résultat par la Commission centrale électorale ukrainienne, M. de Hoop a aussi évoqué la "très grave préoccupation" de l'Alliance à l'égard des fraudes relevées par les observateurs internationaux.

L'OTAN et l'Ukraine sont liées par un partenariat spécifique consigné dans une charte signée en 1997 et approfondie en 2002. Elle prévoit une coopération dans les domaines militaire, économique, scientifique et politique. Le texte spécifie notamment l'importance d'élections libres et équitables et du respect de l'Etat de droit. Selon le secrétaire général de l'Alliance, celle-ci a "tous les droits de discuter avec l'Ukraine et d'être très critique envers la fraude électorale". L'OTAN a ouvert à Kiev, en 1999, un Bureau de liaison et un autre chargé de l'information. - (Corresp.)

[

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary General of NATO, demanded Wednesday, Nov 24, "a review of the results of the presidential election" in Ukraine and "a non-violent solution." Speaking prior to the announcement of the results by the Central Electoral Commission, Mr de Hoop also expressed the "very serious concerns" of the Alliance regarding the fraud uncovered by the internatonal observers.

NATO and Ukraine are linked by a specific partnership created in an agreement signed in 1997 and expanded in 2002. It covers military, economic, scientific and political cooperation. The text specifically notes the importance of free and fair elections and respect for the rule of law. According to the Secretary General, the Alliance has "every right to discuss and be very critical about electoral fraud." In 1999 NATO opened a liaison office in Kiev as well as an information office.

]

By Pavel K. Baev, Nov 22 (Eurasian Daily Monitor) [...] Surprisingly, Putin mentioned "testing the most up-to-date nuclear missile systems" and spoke of "developments of the kind that other nuclear powers do not have and will not have" (The Guardian, November 18). What did he really mean?

Experts pointed to a new maneuverable warhead for the Topol-M inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) and to the new sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Bulava (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 19). The first missile, in fact, is old news and inescapably transparent due to ever-vigilant satellite monitoring. The second system is more a problem than an achievement: development of the new SLBM is lagging far behind schedule. The first strategic submarine of a new generation (Borey-class Yuri Dolgoruky) was started back in 1996 and was supposed to be ready in 2000. However, it will not be able to enter service for at least two more years because the missile is still not ready (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, October 1). A prototype Bulava was successfully tested in September, but the distance between prototype and mass production of missiles cannot be shorted by applying political will (Lenta.ru, September 23; Izvestiya, November 16).

There are two direct and worrisome consequences of this delay. First, in the next two or three years the naval leg of the Russian strategic triad will have to rely entirely on missiles that are past their expiration date and prone to misfiring. Second, the new generation of strategic submarines will not come soon enough to replace the aging Delta-IV and Typhoons, so by the end of this decade most of Russia's strategic naval forces would be beyond their retirement age. It is not entirely clear to what degree Putin is aware of this irreversible trend, but the growing concerns in the West can hardly be lifted by statements resembling Khrushchev's promises to mass produce missiles like sausages.

An element of strategic bluff was certainly present in Putin's five-minute long statement, but he could also mean one area where Russia indeed has a technological edge: super-sonic anti-ship cruise missiles (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, October 22). These technologies were prioritized in the 1980s when the Soviet naval command was obsessed with the threat of U.S. aircraft carriers, and they have been perfected nowadays as a potential source of export revenue. The plain fact is that there is no defense against these low-flying and fast-maneuvering ship-killers. Were Iran to deploy a few batteries of these missiles along its southern sea border, it would become too risky for the U.S. Navy to deploy an aircraft carrier group into the Persian Gulf. These missiles are quite deadly with conventional warheads, but if China would equip them with nuclear ones, the balance of naval power in the Pacific would turn against the United States. It could be significant, in this context, that Putin used the words "missiles" and "nuclear" but did not mention "strategic," since this weapons system falls into the sub-strategic category -- and there is no treaty limiting tactical nuclear weapons.

At the same time, it should be remembered that Putin was addressing first and foremost his generals, men who are worried about the Army's shrinking ranks due to demographics, but unwilling to abandon the draft; dreaming about past glory but disheartened with the vast technologic superiority of the present-day U.S. military. Putin probably does not want to confirm what they already know: the proposed increases in the military budget, burdensome as they are, would not signify even a small step towards a first-class army. The generals are not exactly enthusiastic about combating terrorism, so he gives them what they want to hear: a nuclear pep talk.

THE HAGUE. Nov 25 (Interfax) - Russia has applauded Iran's decision to suspend its uranium enrichment program, President Vladimir Putin told a news conference following the EU-Russia summit in the Hague.

"We welcome Iran's statement that it will not produce nuclear fuel cycle technologies," Putin said.

"Today's statement by Iranian officials on this issue requires further discussion. I hope that all these issues will be closed at the expert level," the president said.

"In any case, we think that serious progress has been made in efforts aimed at closing the Iranian nuclear dossier," he said.

Nov 17 (Chechnya Weekly) The Vienna-based International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) held its General Assembly in Moscow on November 11-14, bringing together representatives of Helsinki Committees from throughout Europe, Central Asia and North America.
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As reported by Novye izvestia on November 15, Dokka Itslaev, who represents Memorial in Chechnya, took issue with the oft-made claim of Russian and Chechen officials that the organs of state power are functioning normally in Chechnya. Federal troops, he said, continue to detain Chechen men during zachistiki, or security sweeps, and the detainees are subsequently found dead or simply not heard from. Over the last four years in the Urus-Martan district alone, he said, there have been 102 murders and 205 disappearances. At the same time, servicemen suspected of involvement in the crimes are almost never interrogated about them. "Therefore it cannot be said that a prosecutor's office has been created and is working on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the form envisaged by Russian law," Itslaev said. He also said that Chechens swept up in anti-terrorism operations have been unable to seek redress in the republic's courts, adding that Chechnya's Supreme Court leaves in force any verdict reached by a lower court.

Addressing the roundtable on the subject of the "political process" in Chechnya, Moscow Helsinki Group program director Tatyana Lokshina [...]she said that recent zachistki have been carried out by mixed groups of federal military and local Chechen security forces, making it even more difficult to determine who committed crimes. She also gave an example of official Russian obfuscation concerning human rights in Chechnya. During recent Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe hearings on the subject, one of the speakers painted a grim picture of the situation in the republic, after which Deputy Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky, who was in attendance, criticized him for incompetence and using information "spun out of thin air." According to Lokshina, the speaker responded: "But, Mr. Fridinsky, you personally gave me that information in your own office on May 26 of this year." "To lie also requires ability," Lokshina observed.

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Nov 17 (Chechnya Weekly) Amnesty International (AI) has also weighed in on the situation in Chechnya. In a report timed to coincide with the European Union-Russia summit, which was postponed earlier this month and is now scheduled for November 25, AI put together "detailed testimonies" showing how victims of rights violations in Chechnya who complain to European institutions have been killed or "disappeared."
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By Roger McDermott, Nov 17 (Chechnya Weekly) Reports of Russian military losses in Chechnya, though varied and difficult to confirm, indicate the ongoing struggle within Russia's army to realign its Soviet thinking, doctrine and tactics to deal adequately with terrorism and counter-insurgency. For instance, The Chechen Times on November 4 cited Chechen sources as reporting that rebel fighters had succeeded in killing several Russian troops and injuring up to 17 in various attacks carried out against Russian checkpoints and other attacks using remote controlled landmines. Incidents such as these illustrate the continued threat posed to Russian soldiers by rebel tactics which use landmines and target specific checkpoints using small numbers of gunmen, who attack armored personnel carriers and other infantry vehicles, as well as soldiers on patrols. [...] Such operations and casualties amongst Russian troops serving in Chechnya may in fact be more commonplace than the authorities wish to publicize.

The battle for hearts and minds within the republic is also revealing a picture that the Kremlin would rather conceal from the Russian public. As reported by Interfax on October 20, General Valery Astanin, head of the main mobilization and manning directorate in the Russian Defense Ministry, had to take the unusual step of denying that the autumn draft had been cancelled in Chechnya, underscoring numerous allegations that Russia cannot recruit sufficient levels of Chechens to serve in the army.
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While confirming that the 42nd Motor Rifle Division, which constitutes the backbone of the Russian military deployment in Chechnya, will continue to be stationed there "forever," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has publicly recognized the long-term futility of continuing to rely upon a military solution alone. As reported by Itar-Tass on November 12, Ivanov commented: "Of course, using only methods of force, we will never resolve the situation. The component of force and civil, economic and social components must run in parallel." Ivanov stated that the 42nd MRD will be fully professional by January 1, 2005, and holds out hope that the professionalizing of the division will, in itself, bring greater efficiency and raise combat readiness amongst Russian troops in Chechnya. Around 90 percent of the 15,000-man division is currently serving on contract. The number of NCOs has been enhanced and barracks have been constructed that will help in making the transition successful, while also confirming the permanence of the Russian military presence in Chechnya.

The key to understanding the counter-terrorist campaign in Chechnya, which has run concurrent with President Putin's time in office, is to identify the government-led effort to promulgate an image of progress in the popular media.
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Though the Russian authorities have long defined the conflict as a "counter-terrorist" operation, the removal of the 76th Airborne Division marks the transfer from a counter-insurgency phase of hostilities to actual counter-terrorist operations. Thus the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Interior Ministry (MVD) will be placed in charge of more units and overall control of the campaign in the Chechen Republic. Yet the continued and necessary deployment of the 42nd MRD also reveals contradictions at the heart of Russian security policy towards the troubled region. Colonel-General Vladimir Zaritsky, commander of missile and artillery forces, highlighted the prominence of artillery firepower in Russian military tactics and security thinking. "Missile and artillery forces can manage 50-65 per cent of all missions of inflicting attrition on the enemy, and the figure was even 70 per cent during the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya," Zaritsky said, Interfax reported on November 12. The 42nd MRD, professionalized or not, will continue to figure largely in the estimations of Russia's troop deployments in Chechnya, while for their part, militants will not distinguish between conscript or contract servicemen in planning and executing future operations.

Thus, Ivanov's estimation of the security dynamics involved – "using only methods of force, we will never resolve the situation," he said – seem accurate. Meanwhile, reports of Russian soldiers dying in Chechnya continue to emerge. The Kremlin, however, does its best to minimize these figures in the wider media, while commanders try to relay good news to their political masters regarding the downsizing of rebel formations, both attempting to suggest that the military has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in Chechnya.

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