[W]e should not lose sight of the fact that conflict and genocide are fundamentally different phenomena, even though they may occur in tandem as in Darfur and Rwanda. Genocide, as distinct from conflict, is a crime against all humanity regardless of race, religion or region, and it is the obligation of the entire world to stop it.
Well, yes, the deliberate mass killing of innocents certainly has a large moral claim on our attention and available resources. From a moral standpoint, I would agree that genocide has an even stronger claim on all of us than the slaughter of innocents as collateral damage in a civil war (although the distinction between "genocide" and conflict can often be difficult to draw where there are long-standing conflicts and grievances). I agree that we should not distinguish between genocide that occurs in Africa and elsewhere, as though Africans are less valuable or worthy of protection (although Rice's analogy for intervention in Darfur -- the Balkans -- had a geopolitical dimension for NATO regardless of whether "genocide" was involved). Most importantly, putting a halt to massacres of civilians provides the strongest legal justification for other countries to ignore the sovereignty of a government, because it is either engaged in genocide or too feeble to stop one.
But the fact that intervening to halt genocide is easier to justify than interventions in other violent conflicts doesn't make it a "fundamentally different phenomenon" for other purposes. Putting a halt to the killing is only the beginning, not the end, of any intervention. Whether a conflict involves genocide or just terrible violence does not change the fact that those who intervene should have a pretty clear idea of what the desirable "end game" will be for neutralizing, if not permanently resolving, the conflict. There also must be a consensus on how to get to the "end game," the military and non-military resources required, and what impact the desired outcome would likely have on neighboring countries. Regardless of whether the methods used by one of the sides in a violent internal conflict is "genocide," those who intervene will have taken upon themselves the long-term responsibility for overseeing the hard political and practical challenges of peace-keeping and peace-making, reconstruction, and -- depending on the political outcomes -- reconciliation or separation of the conflicting groups.
I will grant that, if labeling a conflict a "genocide" makes it easier for a larger part of the international community to share long-term responsibility, then "genocide" is different from other conflicts. It becomes easier to mobilize an intervention to halt the violence, makes it more likely that international political support for long-term post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction can be maintained, and improves the odds that there will be widespread support for those countries who undertake to act as "guarantors" of the outcome. The fact that a conflict involves "genocide" does not, however, absolve proponents of intervention from sketching at least the broad outlines of what should come after the killing is halted and emergency relief is provided.
I agree with much of Rice's discussion of the limited capacity -- both politically and militarily -- of the nascent African Union. It would be a mistake for the US or NATO to rely on the AU as an effective response to the government of Sudan. Even handling the immediate humanitarian crisis requires a great deal more of both external pressure on and support for the AU. But Rice's analysis and recommendations are missing a few crucial elements about what comes after the escalated response she advocates. Simply claiming that "genocide is different" isn't a good enough excuse for that glaring omission.
I have yet to hear from proponents of expanded US, NATO or UN intervention in Darfur just what they are proposing for a long-term resolution of the conflict, how to reach and sustain that resolution, as well as the likely impact of such a resolution not only within Sudan but for neighboring countries. The feebleness of the African Union's responses has reflected, in part, a number of legitimate concerns throughout the region about what comes next if monitoring becomes a more assertive type of intervention.
Regarding the crisis in Darfur, surely the past two decades of war and fitful attempts at peace in southern Sudan have taught us that the Sudanese political, ethnic and sectarian conflicts are not only remarkably complex, nearly intractable, and remarkably impervious to outside influence but also that the political cultures and institutions in the region are extremely fragile. Regarding intervention more generally, surely the past three years in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us all something about going into a country without a plan or thought of unintended consequences or with starry-eyed notions that getting rid of tyrants is a final solution.
So no, genocide and other conflicts are not "fundamentally different phenomena," because moral outrage, good intentions and wishful thinking do not a plan make.
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