Most of the criticisms of Iraq reconstruction are aimed at poor planning and implementation by the US government and contractors -- inordinate bureaucratic delays in contracting and execution of projects, poor-to-nonexistent results in the most critical sectors such as utilities and the oil industry, sky-rocketing costs as security problems continue to mount, inadequate employment of Iraqis, etc.
Criticism from a different and refreshing perspective is offered by Cpt Christopher Ford, a Command Judge Advocate for a Brigade Combat Team in the 1st Cavalry Division stationed in Baghdad, in a recent article in Parameters. He describes how the design of reconstruction programs and the spending of project funds fail to work as effective "carrots" within an integrated counter-insurgency strategy. Several of his points echo comments I've made elsewhere, such as the need to think about not only how to "buy" supporters in a given locale, but how those supporters will "stay bought," as well as the importance of using reconstruction programs as a method for strengthening the capacity of the Iraqi government.
Never let it be said that the US Army doesn't try to learn from other disciplines or examine new ways of thinking about what they're doing. Cpt Ford's analysis reads as if it were written by someone with hands-on experience in political and economic development programs in developing countries. He pays attention to getting incentives right, gaining local buy-in, and building local institutional capacity.
The principles underlying Ford's recommendations apply to promoting sustainable political and economic change, whether the change is occurring in a peaceful environment or one of considerable political violence. And successful political and economic change is precisely what's involved in shifting the attitudes of key elements of a population from one of passive "neutrality" towards counter-insurgent forces -- which plays into the hands of the insurgents -- to one of "support" for the counter-insurgent forces. This isn't "winning hearts and minds" but rather persuading segments of the population that it's more in their interest to be with the authorities (Iraqi and, by association, US forces) than to remain passively neutral.
Cpt Ford's article covers other ways he would adjust US counter-insurgency operations so as to better "target a population’s neutrality to defeat an insurgency," especially distinguishing among different ways to use force. Although the rest of the article makes interesting reading, here's the bit I especially liked on getting the carrots right. He also makes an interesting argument about the efficacy/feasibility of involving civilian agencies in reconstruction in Iraq (see especially footnote below), which would equally apply to the US military's relationships with non-US agencies involved in reconstruction, such as the World Bank or other foreign donors.
The “carrot approach” presumes first a goal and second a motivating factor to encourage the people to work toward that goal. In Iraq, the goal is a supportive population that resists insurgent activity and fosters stability, and the motivating factor is billions of dollars of reconstruction projects. As noted earlier, the fallacy of this approach as frequently applied in Iraq has been threefold: (1) reconstruction projects are not incentive based; (2) the reconstruction process is not holistic in nature; and (3) the reconstruction process often undermines the authority of the Iraqi government.[UPDATE] Just to clarify, I'd have a number of questions for Cpt Ford before I endorsed all of his specific recommendations. But I do think he's asking the right questions and thinking about the process in the right way.
Most critical, perhaps, is the general failure to establish the link between behavior and reward. Often, the reconstruction projects in a particular town or section of a city are not initiated as a reward for the peaceful nature of that geographic locale. Indeed, reconstruction projects are more frequently targeted at the most restless locales in an effort to persuade the people in those areas that the coalition is the better of the two sides because it provides projects and employment. This tactic provides little incentive for the people to turn against the insurgents and risk their lives for the benefit of the coalition. By merely remaining passive, they reap the benefits of the projects while maintaining their personal safety from the insurgent threat.
A more effective system would treat reconstruction projects as an incentive through which the incentive-giver can influence the activity or behavior of the population. Adopting this approach would require a cessation of all reconstruction projects in sectors or cities that present a level of violence above a threshold established by the local commander. The population would be given notice that the projects have stopped because the security situation does not permit their continuation.
The impact of reconstruction projects is often further diluted by awarding construction projects to those individuals claiming to represent the community, often Sheiks, Imams, or prominent businesspersons. The extent to which these individuals represent the people, or have the ability to control the people, can rarely be quantified. A stated goal of operations in Iraq is the restoration of the rule of law. Awarding contracts to allegedly well-connected persons simply widens the wealth gap, increases resentment toward the coalition, and strengthens the positions of people of unknown character. More critically, this process undermines the power of the government because the coalition is empowering nonstate actors (Sheiks, Imams, etc.) to act in a state-like manner—executing infrastructure projects, building and staffing medical clinics, maintaining security, and providing disaster relief. The reconstruction focus should shift from trying to appease powerbrokers to empowering the Iraqi government.
The way to achieve this end involves selecting construction companies based on competency not connections, managing fewer projects to ensure better quality, and training and empowering local and national governments to execute their own reconstruction projects. Further, just as the Iraqi army and police are provided with extensive military and police training, the Iraqi government should be furnished with reconstruction training. This latter point highlights the third issue with reconstruction assistance: the piecemeal nature of the reconstruction.
During the course of operations in Iraq, the vast majority of the reconstruction was, and continues to be, conducted and administered by the military. The Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have also contributed significantly to the reconstruction process, though their efforts have been limited at times due to the security situation and, initially, because of organizational obstacles.** The Iraqi government has participated on a somewhat diminished scale due to their lack of resources and lack of institutional skill and knowledge. The participation of the State Department and USAID largely has been a component of security and coordination, whereas the participation of the Iraqi government has been a function of resources and ability. Closer coordination between all parties and an emphasis on assisting the Iraqi government would produce more reliable projects, spread the wealth across the population, and empower the Iraqi government.
** The US Agency for International Development is the government agency charged with “long-range economic and social development assistance.” Despite this charge, the US military has taken the lead in both planning and executing reconstruction projects. The oft-stated reason is that only the military can operate in the present security situation. This is a common fallacy. The Department of State and USAID can develop and manage a comprehensive reconstruction program immaterial of the security situation. At the strategic level, the threat is minimal, and at the tactical level, military units are eager to support embedded USAID staff. That is not to say military participation is improper. 10 U.S.C., sec. 3062, and Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 specifically contemplate military participation in the advancement of US national policy.
cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism
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