A Fistful of Euros notes that papers are now available from a conference held in Berlin this week on the Ukraine elections (scheduled way in advance of the crisis over the second round fraud). The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) and the German-Ukrainian Forum hosted a range of speakers including the leader of the OSCE election observation mission and the the director of the school of political analysis at the National University in Kiev.

The KMT and its allies have apparently won the parliamentary elections.

Taiwan opposition wins parliamentary poll

An opposition alliance which favours friendly ties with China defeated a pro-independence grouping in Taiwan's parliamentary election according to official vote count figures quoted by Eastern TV.

As long as Chen is still President it's unlikely the Chinese will loosen up on their refusal to talk with Taiwan. But since the elections were viewed by both sides as a referendum on whether to proceed with amending the Taiwanese constitution, this will hopefully reduce the amount of delicate navigating the US is forced to do.

For an interesting view of the problem for the US, which argues that Taiwan and others, such as Israel and Georgia, can't be allowed to hijack US foreign policy, see Wagging the Dog, by Nikolas K. Gvosdev & Travis Tanner in in the Fall 2004 issue of The National Interest (sub req'd unfortunately).

I see that Daniel Drezner really, really likes Sebastian Mallaby's book about the World Bank and its head, James Wolfensohn. I just started it last night, and so far it's as good as Drezner says. As is my wont, I'd like to share a brief passage from it that relates to the current Colemanian brouhaha over Kofi Annan and the UN (btw, I'm willing to admit that I could well be wrong on the politics and/or the merits, especially given McCain's position).

Here's Mallaby:

We veer between contempts for international bodies--the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and likewise the World Bank--and unrealistic pronouncements on what they ought to do: forge peace, banish financial instability, lift every person out of poverty. It has become commonplace to say that our global institutions are not up to the challenge of our unprecedented global interdependence. But the reason for this mismatch lies partly in our shizophrenia. Sometimes we pour scorn on the Bank and other international bodies, and starve them of resources. Sometimes we talk as though they must have superhuman strengthm and we lumber them with impossible objectives.

That graf could have been written by our own inimitable Ms. Nadezhda, no? More concretely:

When President George W. Bush took office, it was the contempt that seemed most threatening. In 2001 and 2002, the Bush Treasury assailed the Bank with a mixture of aggression and plain ignorance, as this book will describe later [Note: I haven't gotten there yet. -p]. In early 2003, the Bank was left out of the planning for Iraqi reconstruction by the Pentagon, even though it had valuable experience from other nation-building exercises. The Pentagon's attitude did not prevent the Treasury from attacking the Bank for doing too little in Iraq; days after Jim Wolfensohn visited Baghdad in the summer of 2003, and days before a World Bank expert was killed by Iraqi insurgents, The Wall Street Journal published an editorial broadside about the Bank's lack of involvement in the country. Throughout this period, the very idea of the international system was called into question; some parts of the administration believed we lived in a unipolar world--that the United States was the international system. The unipolar fantasy is a trap, for it is only in military matters that American power is overwhelming. In the economic realm, the United States is the leading power, but it is not the only power; it depends on foreigners to open up trade, to prime the pump of global growth, and to provide savings that pay for the federal government's spending habits.

Idiots. Thomas Barnett would probably agree that you can't, er, connect "the Gap" to "the Core" unless you, um, actually try to connect them to the Core. Argh.

I'll likely never take the time to offer a comprehensive review once I finish the book, so treasure this brief snippet accordingly.

And now a question for our knowledgeable readers: do the regional combatant commands (e.g. CENTCOM) have liaisons to major international bodies like the World Bank, does the State Department handle those things on the ambassadorial level, are there interagency coordination groups back in Washington, do they employ their own development specialists, etc.? To make this more concrete, how (if at all) would someone in charge of World Bank development projects for Nigeria coordinate with United States European Command, who runs training projects for the Nigerian military (but doesn't talk about it on its website)? I bring this up in light of my growing concern about the militarization of American foreign policy. I thought this passage from Dana Priest's The Mission was particulary illuminating:

Operation Focus Relief said a lot about the times. For decades, the federal government and Washington's inside-the-Beltway brain trust had poured money into studying the Third World and Africa. Even so, no one had gotten very good at mapping out, and then executing, long-term strategies to solve Africa's massive problems. Funds and programs came and went with each new administration and each new majority in Congress. As a result, sixty U.S. soldiers might walk through hip-deep bushy fields with a battalion of underfed Nigerian soldiers, showing them how to conduct an ambush, but no cadre of U.S. economists flew there to train officials in the country's economic ministry. No legion of agronomists camped out in the middle of nowhere to help improve farming techniques. Battalions of teachers did not deploy to repair the educational system. The Peace Corps was marginalized and outdated.

Using the American military to address global problems had become almost a reflex in Washington. But even the best U.S. troops could deal only with the symptoms, not the causes, of incipient problems. Military programs did little to help political systems move from dictatorship to democracy, or economies from government control to the free market.

I echoed my concern in comments to Steve Clemmons, and a smart commenter responded:

Praktike, don't blame the CinCs (sorry, I mean "combatant commanders"); as Congress gutted our foreign service, the task of diplomacy didn't go away, it just devolved to the military. The CinCs are very cognizant of the importance of diplomacy, and they'd like a heck of a lot more civilian support in what they're doing. Our elected officials, Republican and Democrat, have basically abdicated much of their responsibility and forced unwanted responsibilities upon military leaders. (Shades of "The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012.")

To be clear: I don't blame the CinCs (most of whom "get it" and are trapped by the system). I blame Congress. Development alone won't solve the terrorism problem (and as Mallaby says, the World Bank can't exactly wave a magic wand), but boosting failed or failing states is part of a long-term solution. States that work and can find hope for their people are states that will fight terrorism. But we're eating soup with a knife on a global scale here, or using hammers on what look like nails but are actually screws, or whatever. I'm sure there's some cliche that sums it all up.

In any case, this has to change, because we're trying to solve problems too late, with too few resources, and sometimes with the wrong resources. Maybe we have to get more creative about boosting the non-military capabilites of the regional commands, or at a minimum, improve our coordination with, say, the World Bank, which employs thousands of brilliant technocrats. It benefits from having a board that, unlike the United Nations Security Council, isn't set up in such a way that politics routinely interfere with doing good; unlike the UN, it's well-funded and highly driven. Still thinking out loud here ... maybe the State Department should be reorganized to match the regional commands. Why, for instance, do State's geographic divisions not match the Pentagon's? Why doesn't "jointness" extend beyond the military?

Now ... tell me why none of these inchoate thoughts are realistic. Imagine that George Bush is not the current president if that helps my case.

Note: good thinkin', Matt, but the U.S. is not about to give up its veto.

More news and views from Ukraine and bloggers following the action.

News: Looks like a first-step compromise has been reached that could result in a new run-off by mid-December, if Yuschenko has his way. But lots of legal twists and turns, to say nothing of behind the scenes maneuvering by Kuchma, still to come.

Today's events include:

• Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament turned out Yanukovych's government in a vote of no-confidence. Kuchma could veto parliament's move, which then would require a 2/3 vote, rather than the thin margin obtained today. He has indicated, however, he will accept the vote, and so has 60 days to install a new government. That is, of course, assuming he's still President, since his term has just expired.
• Some analysts have assumed Kuchma is likely to name parliament speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn to head a caretaker government. Other analysts have opined that Kuchma would turn to the former head of the National Bank and head of Yanukovych's election campaign, Serhiy Tyhypko, who only gave up those posts this weekend.
• There's a general agreement that in some fashion or another there will be more voting. There are, however, several scenarios possible, and the Ukrainian Supreme Court's treatment of the cases before it (which may or may not include Yanukovych's last moment filing of complaints of fraud as well) may determine which scenario is implemented.
• The candidates and Kuchma have agreed that, prior to whatever voting next takes place, Parliament will adopt a set of reforms to the voting process, about which there seems to be a fairly wide consensus.
• All parties are stressing the importance of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Although regional barons in the east have backed off threats to split away, there is apparently a planned referendum in the Donbass region for early January to consider greater autonomy within a federation. That's a development to be watched closely.
• Yuschenko agreed that his supporters would call off their blockade of government offices, but has not withdrawn them from the streets entirely.
• AP is the only wire service so far with fairly full reports of Yushchenko's comments to the crowd after the talks. He indicated a revote of the second round could be set for as early as Dec 19.

  "Our ranks mustn't shrink," Yushchenko told tens of thousands of his supporters who gathered on Kiev's central Independence Square for the 11th straight night since the election commission declared his rival the winner in a vote he says was stolen. "We mustn't leave until we have a revote date firmly set."
  
  Hours after the deal was signed, throngs of Yushchenko's supporters continued to besiege the Cabinet and the presidential administration buildings, while thousands clad in his orange campaign colors crammed the central square under fireworks and listened to rock bands in a raucous celebration.
  
  Yushchenko said he expected the Supreme Court to deliver a ruling Thursday on his campaign's appeal to invalidate the runoff result — based on claims of widespread violations across Yanukovych's eastern and southern strongholds.

• The compromise was reached with the mediation of international representatives -- not only the European group (EU's Solana, plus the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania and the Secy Gen of the OSCE) but also, according to Interfax, Russian Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, who arrived in Kyiv along with Russia's ambassador to Ukraine, Victor Chernmyrdin. Solana had delayed a scheduled trip to Moscow to participate in the talks, and would be discussing Ukraine in Moscow on Thursday. He has repeatedly emphasized that the situation should not affect EU-Russian relations.

Clearly, the devil's in the details, and many Yuschenko supporters fear he may have compromised too much, as reflected in entries in Foreign Notes and Le Sabot Postmoderne.

Moscow Times has a front page article on Kuchma's likely next moves -- first and foremost to ditch Yanukovych it seems. Kuchma has been pressing for a full rerun of the election, starting with the first round. A full re-run, which has been rejected by Yuschenko, would allow Kuchma and his allies to substitute another candidate for Yahukovych, and delay the process as well. By March, probably the earliest a full new election could be organized, Yuschenko's orange crowds will be off the street. Peter Lavalle's analysis, described in our earlier post, is well worth reviewing in this context. He seems to have got it spot on.

Another serious concern arguing for calming things down and getting the crowds off the streets -- apparently shared by all sides -- is the economic impact of the ongoing work stoppages. Also, there are ongoing worries about the financial system and the country's exchange rate. Authorities have said they have plenty of reserves. But as for the local banks, Moscow Times reports:

Ukrainians across the country continued a run on banks, fearing that a financial crisis will follow the political crisis. Dozens of depositors crowded outside Kiev banks hoping to withdraw their savings. The panic has been fueled by a Central Bank order limiting depositors to $1,000.

Views: Lots of first-rate reporting and analysis around the blogosphere. Crooked Timber (John Quiggin) and Fist Full of Euros publish another lengthy eyewitness report from Tarik Amar. Le Sabot Postmoderne has first-hand accounts and some great photos, including the fireworks shown above, taken in Kyiv as the crowd celebrated the Rada's no-confidence vote for Yanukovych's government.

For further discussion of the complex ways the electorate may split in the Ukraine, see Notes From Kiev and Orange Ukraine. Orange Ukraine has two interesting posts covering both the Ukrainian and Russian angles, first re Yuschenko and then re Yanukovych.

Another very interesting discussion of the Russian angle is at Fist Full of Euros, where Tobias Schwartz looks at Russia and the broader issues of the CIS with a longer-term perspective.

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[Further views 12:45AM EST 12-2-04] Via Le Sabot Postmoderne, who writes: "Proof that cretinism knows no ideology -- an attack on the democracy movement from an elitist Tory-conservative perspective!"

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Photos: Fireworks celebrating the downfall of Yanukovych in parliament, Le Sabot Postmoderne, Dec 1 2004.
Parliamentary deputies celebrating the non-confidence vote, Gleb Garanich, Reuters, Dec 1 2004.

News: Le Sabot Postmoderne does a round-up of today's developments, which involved a lot of to-and-fro of different quasi-offers, rejected out of hand by Yushchenko:

Yushchenko has broken off negotiations with Kuchma and Yanukovych. Their position was, "Make a deal based on an unenforceable promise that we'll make you a strong Prime Minister under President Yanukovych, and then disperse the protesters." Thankfully, Yushchenko was born in the morning, but not THIS morning.

Kuchma/Yanukovych's other bargaining position is to call for entirely new elections. They've made noises that both Yanukovych and Yushchenko wouldn't be allowed to run, but instead new candidates would be fielded. This would conveniently let them dump their currently radioactive Donetsk thug, while robbing the Opposition of their wildly popular candidate. You can start to see why Yushchenko stopped negotiating.

Other news of the day:

• The Supreme Court continued to hear the voting fraud cases for a second day.
  
• Javier Solana and Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski will be meeting with the rival candidates on Wednesday, together with OSCE Secy Gen Jan Kubis.
  
• Fears of a geographic splintering of Ukraine eased with some backing down by local officials who had spoken of autonomy moves in some eastern regions.
  
• Some analysts see the new elections/delay scenarios fitting Kuchma's agenda -- put off relinquishing power as long as possible but get rid of Yanukovych as prime minister in the meantime.

New source to check out if you want to follow development closely, in addition to previous links: HotLine news service, frequent updates that seem to track closely with eventual international wire service reports (Russian, Ukrainian, English)

Views: Two very interesting pieces, giving a broader set of perspectives and agendas than can be found in most coverage. It's not just about democracy, fair elections and rule of law, it's not just about people power, it's not just about east-west history of the Ukraine, or oligarchs and economic interests, or Russia vs the West. It's all of the above and then some.

First, from the blog The Russian Dilettante, on how an ordinary voter in Donetsk might view the goings on. Shorter: There's a compelling logic to "Sure they're thugs and thieves, but they're our thugs and thieves."

It's amazing that the border between Yuschenko- and Yanukovich-supporting regions can be traced to the politics and demographics of the 17th and 18th century and the first half of the 19th. I've tried to reconstruct -- speculatively -- a Donesk voter's point of view:

1. Our region and its neighbors produce most of this nation's GDP -- let's just say wealth. Granted, our oligarchs syphon off most of this wealth but some trickles down to us, too.
2. The good people in the streets of Kiev want to break the oligarchs' monopoly on power. We wouldn't mind that, too. But we don't trust their leaders.
3. Their leaders are oligarchs from other parts of Ukraine who aren't satisfied with what they've got. When they grab assets from our local oligarchs, we'll be even worse off.
4. Also, when those new oligarchs from the West come to power, they'll spend the tax money -- and most of that comes from us -- on their cronies.
5. They'll try to Halycize Ukraine; we Easterners will become second-class citizens. Our kids will have a problem getting into Kyiv universities.
6. So you see, it's not about democracy, it's just us against them.
7. We'd rather become autonomous and deal with our oligarchs ourselves.

From this angle, there's no argument over values; it's Us vs Them. (Alas, I'm not quite impartial to this simple dichotomy, either.) The best I can say now is that I am hoping Ukraine becomes a federation, which would reflect its geographically-distributed cultural diversity. Let the people of the East take on their oligarchs without fear that outsiders will step in to grab the spoils.

For daily analysis that's both indepth and big-picture, covering things both Russian and Ukrainian, Untimely Thoughts by Peter Lavalle is a must-read. He writes on Russia for a variety of news organizations, especially UPI and papers like Moscow Times. His website his articles as well as analytical pieces, interviews, and occasional items from other analysts. With the intense coverage of Ukraine recently, his UPI stuff has been daily. Today's article outlines the possible gamble Kuchma may be taking with a call for further elections, and how it could play out on a number of levels:

[...]
Depending on the Supreme Court's findings, a third round of voting appears likely. But how the third round is characterized will be key. Will the court find the runoff vote invalid, or the will it go further and deem both rounds invalid? Kuchma and his supporters are angling for the latter.

The voiding of both rounds opens the door for Kuchma to finally rid of himself of Yanukovych as prime minister. Kuchma might have intended to fire Yanukovych this week, but Timoshenko's demand that he do so might have interrupted his plans. Kuchma has been given an ultimatum before by political foes while president and did not back down.

With a third vote on the horizon, Kuchma is looking for a suitable candidate to replace Yanukovych. That person appears to be Serhiy Tyhypko. Resigning from his position as head of the National Bank and Yanukovych's campaign manager, Tyhipko is a perfectly placed regime insider who would very much like to take on Yushchenko. Yushchenko dearly would like to run against Yanukovych again, but will have no choice if Yanukovych backs out - something Kuchma can easily arrange.

A Tyhypko candidacy could be very interesting. He is an insider, but can easily spin himself as a centrist, opposed to Yanukovych's separatist leanings and Yushchenko-Timoshenko's "right-wing, nationalist, and street-extremism." Tyhypko could spin himself as a unifier - politically and as an advocate if an indivisible Ukraine.

Additionally, if the Supreme Court suggests another election and legislation is passed toward this end, Kuchma could declare a state of emergency in the name of allowing a "cooling off" period before the extraordinary third round is set. "Cooling off" in this case would mean the end of street demonstrations.

Should this scenario worry Yushchenko? Yes. Yushchenko's coalition of political forces are not as cohesive as most media report. As the last few days have demonstrated, the much more nationalistic Timoshenko often acts an independent political actor beyond Yushchenko's control. Timoshenko and her supporters have polarized Ukraine's political atmosphere just as much as Yanukovych unofficial support of regional separatism.

The international angle of a third election round would also be important. Vladimir Putin would have the opportunity to disentangle himself from the Kremlin's over-zealous support of Yanukovych's candidacy. The West would be forced to distance itself from outward support of Yushchenko.
[...]

As discoshaman of Le Sabot Postmoderne puts it so aptly:

We all agree that the strategic picture here is almost impossible to grasp in its entirety. There are so many unknowable variables, and so many individual agendas coalescing and falling apart simultaneously. It's somewhere in a gray area between complex and chaotic.

[UPDATE 12:30PM EST 11-29-04] Potentially, some very good news. Kuchma has proposed new elections. From Reuters:

Outgoing Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, facing mass protests over a disputed presidential election, Monday called for a new poll to help end the crisis tearing the nation apart.

If we really want to preserve peace and consensus and build this just democratic society, of which we speak so much but have failed to carry out in a legal way, let us have new elections," Kuchma said in a statement.

Kuchma, in power for 10 scandal-tainted years and widely accused of mismanaging the economy, said he had no intention of running in a new poll.

He spoke as the Supreme Court sat to try to resolve the election stalemate, though a decision could take days.
[...]

Another positive sign is reports that some of the Ukrainian "oligarchs" may be switching sides, or at least backing off their support of Yanukovych. The English language Kyiv Post is generally viewed as reliable. The internet activist site, Maidan, has a mix of rumor and reliable reports. Volunteer translators are apparently working non-stop to provide English-language versions of as much as they can. Worth visiting simply as a remarkable example of "citizen internet."

Dan Drezner has a good analytical roundup from early this morning, when he was not feeling very upbeat.

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Want a feel for "as it happens" -- check out Le Sabot Post-Moderne, a passionate Western partisan for Yuschenko's "people power" movement. Lots of photos connected with blow-by-blow what's going on with negotiations, rallies, etc. Although he admits he's so close to the on-the-ground action that it's hard to keep sight of the broader strategic goings-on.

Nonetheless, he has very interesting explanations about how the election was stolen and the Orange movement, not only in Kiev (or Kyiv if you spend more time with Ukrainians than Russians). Especially helpful is the correction, echoed by other bloggers, of the distorting East vs West narrative being imposed by outside commentators. [Map: The Economist, Nov 25 2004 "Europe's New Divisions"] This post from Le Sabot Moderne Saturday rips apart the Guardian. It starts:

Jonathan Steele's hit piece in the Guardian is a sad example of the condescension that so many hold for Ukraine. He insists on spinning this as a West-Russia dispute, as if the Ukrainians themselves have nothing to do with it. If he'd troubled himself to talk to some actual Ukrainians, he'd know that they're viewing this as a fight against a Mafia-esque ruling class which is using its powers to repress dissent, monopolize political power and cannibalize the nation's infrastructure through corrupt "privatization" schemes.

These oligarchs sound like just the sort of people a nice Lefty like Steele would be against. But I guess it's just more fun to poke a stick at the United States.

In an incredibly Orwellian moment, he dings the US for "provocatively" financing exit polls. Let's get this straight, the oligarch government was financing rigged polls to help justify their theft of the election. Yet it's the WEST who is trying to use exit polls to perform a coup? What a jackal.
[...]

Another blogger from Kyiv, Tulipgirl has a rich collection of Ukrainian activist details as well as a good variety of other links to blogs, sites and photo collections. Especially recommended is a just-created "blog of the revolution," Orange Ukraine, by a former Peace Corps volunteer who lives in Kyiv with his Ukrainian-born wife.

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[UPDATE 8:30PM EST 11-28-04] For those of you who just can't get enough Ukraine. A lengthy background piece -- giving a good deal more on who's who and the various events leading up to the current situation -- can be found on John Quiggin's personal blog, via Dan Hardie, by Tarik Amar, "who, Dan says, is doing a PhD on Soviet history and speaks Ukranian, German and Russian, among other languages, and knows the place very well."

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Other bloggers following developments closely are Fist Full of Euros and Daniel Drezner, who has a running news roundup. Drezner catches this interesting bit from the Kyiv Post:

Roman Olearchyk's analysis in the Kyiv Post suggests that elites in the eastern parts of the country would take steps beyond autonomy to protect their interests:

The business tycoons in eastern Ukraine that supported Yanukovych appear to be taking extreme measures to protect their interests, which include lucrative assets in Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkiv and Luhansk. Government officials and legislators in these oblasts have in the past two days demanded the formation of an autonomous eastern-southern Ukrainian republic and are threatening to split their oblasts away from Ukraine altogether.
[...]

Similar story in MosNews.com [Map: MosNews.com, Nov 26 2004 "Pro-Russian Eastern Ukraine Threatens to Secede if Yushchenko Wins"].

And in further apparent confirmation, this just in from AFP: Yuschenko calls for prosecuting "separatist governors," while Yanukovych is off with Moscow's Mayor, Yury Luzhkov, visiting the Russian-speaking regions. "After a short meeting [in Lugansk] they were due to head to Severodonetsk to attend a meeting of 3,500 local officials from 17 regions that was expected to discuss holding a referendum on autonomy."   more »

[UPDATE 10:30PM EST 11-30-04] John Robb has translated the Afghan terror/drug conundrum into his "Global Guerrillas"-speak.

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From AdamSmithee, a first-rate source of interesting observations on development economics:

Moral Conundrum

Afghanistan has managed to drag a fair number of people out of absolute poverty in the past two years, with some effect on a range of health indicators. One huge reason is a rebounding opium crop, which may have accounted for as much as 60% of Afghanistan's economic output in 2003. As Brad DeLong points out, if you don't buy Third World products, their makers just have to go off and do something less rewarding. In the case of Afghanistan, that's likely to throw people back into absolute poverty, and that in turn means higher mortality. Heroin addiction is terrible. But death is surely worse. Given that, how hard should we pursuing opium growers in the country?

Well it may not be how we ought to be proceeding, but it seems the way we'll claim we're proceeding is to fight the "war on drugs" as the great scourage of a free and democratic Afghanistan. Via the FT, from a press conference Nov 18 2004:

Britain, the lead nation in the anti-narcotics drive in Afghanistan, admitted that there was a risk of the opium boom re-creating the conditions that the “war against terror” was supposed to eliminate.

Bill Rammell, the British foreign office minister responsible, said Afghanistan was a “narco-economy” and that the west needed to take urgent action.

“We have always held the view that if you have a narco-economy, those are the very conditions in which terrorism breeds,” he told a press conference in Brussels.

On Wednesday the US announced an $800m plan to fight Afghanistan's ballooning opium industry a big increase in spending that reflects growing concern about the threat of the drugs trade to the fragile country.

But the UN report made it clear that such a move could further destabilise the country.

The UN's drugs and crime office suggested that the lucrative poppy crop is one of the few things keeping the lawless country from falling further into anarchy and poverty.

“Narcotics are the main engine of economic growth and the strongest bond between previously quarrelsome people,” it said. The crop is now grown in all 32 Afghan provinces.

Afghanistan's opium economy is put at $2.8bn, producing 87 per cent of the world's total supply.

Now don't get me wrong, and I'm sure we're dealing with different time periods here, but $800 million in anti-drug trade efforts is almost one-third of the drug contribution to GDP. Maybe a simple set of cash transfers would do more to get some other economic activity going than trying to stamp out 60% of the economy?

Maybe it's not such a bad idea after all that the next Secretary of State is an old Kremlinoligist. November has been an active month for Russia-watching, some good news, some not so good news.

Main areas of interest in this clippings collection:

1. A second term for President Bush -- views from Moscow
2. Black Gold - Russia has more... and then some
3. The evolving structure of Russia's political economy, and the dilemma of low growth and investment outside the energy sector
4. The CIS and the Near-Abroad -- Russia's posture in its sphere of influence, and the West's responses
5. NATO -- areas of collaboration and friction
6. Nuclear weapons and treaties
7. Chechnya

   more »

[UPDATE 10-29-04] by nadezhda

Things are getting a tad nastier in Bahrain's tug-of-war over free speech, and Mahmood in his den doesn't appear terribly optimistic about either the commitment to Freedom of Speech or the political IQ of certain MPs (Concentration Camps: A Natural Progression). Even with the apparent leadership of a modernizing crown prince, the forces of conservatism act as a dead weight. Mahmood's cri de coeur is, unfortunately, one heard all to frequently across the region when attempts at reform are taken.
   more »

[UPDATE 10-29-04] by nadezhda

For a more thorough "political science" discussion of this episode and its importance for the future evolution of the EU, see Henry Farrell's prognostications at Crooked Timber. It's the latest of several, and it seems to support Henry in a running "friendly argument" with Dan Drezner "over whether or not the European Union is a standard international organization (i.e. a creature of its member states) or something more." As John Quiggin notes, this looks like a data point in Henry's favor for the "something more" position.

So I was taken aback a bit by Matthew Yglesias' characterization of the outcome as "continuing the drift toward supranationalism." If a "supranational" is an organization of states that has independent governance functions, but with limited autonomy vis a vis its members, this recent brouhaha would seem rather to be adding another dimension not usually included in the concept -- some form of separate accountability to voters other than through the "transmission belt" of their own countries.

In line with Henry's predictionss and Le Monde's reasoning cited below, Barroso has the opportunity to wrest more actual autonomy from the national members. As the Economist notes:

Mr Barroso's allies in the national capitals, on the other hand, will be enraged. They jealously reserve the right to nominate whomever they want as commissioner, however unfashionable his views. Rome will not readily bow to Strasbourg.

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[original post 10-28-04]
Unfortunate for Sr Barroso, but good for European democracy, is the conclusion of a number of European commentators, including in the FT and Le Monde.

No one could disagree that it's been a tough way to start though. Even before taking office, new President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, has had to withdraw his slate of 24 candidates to fill his cabinet. The climb down came after Barroso's initially stone-walling and then trying to manage the uproar over the comments on homosexuality and single mothers by the candidate for the Justice portfolio, Italian Christian Democrat and friend of the Pope Rocco Buttiglione.   more »