I would certainly not have selected Mr. Wolfowitz if I had the power of nomination. But it is done, he has now been unanimously approved by the Bank's Board, and pace Brad DeLong with whom I agree far more often than not, I think it is time to shift our attention from Wolfowitz the Pentagon official, or Wolfowitz the controversial choice to lead the Bank, to Wolfowitz the international civil servant.
Those of us who believe the World Bank has an important role to play in both making the world a better place and in US foreign policy need to think about what we should be doing to help the institution succeed. And as distasteful as that may be for some, in the coming months that may mean rising to the defense of the Bank and its President against a host of narrow political agendas that wish to pull the Bank off into one meaningless or ineffectual direction or another.
As I've noted before, the Bush Administration could have saddled the Bank with a much worse burden. By background and temperament Paul Wolfowitz appears superior to any of the minor luminaries whose names were in common circulation prior to his nomination. Wolfowitz shares with much of the Bank's staff many of the ambitions and aspirations for the constructive roles the institution can play in development. Under the old principle that "where you stand depends on where you sit," it's likely that a number of the biases he will inevitably bring with him from the Pentagon will begin to disolve earlier rather than later. He has made no indication to date that he has any intention of Meltzerizing the Bank -- he is openly equating his "success" with the Bank's "success," not with dismantling the institution or redirecting it from its overarching goals.
In fact, the common criticism directed at JDW -- lack of focus -- may be equally difficult for Wolfowitz to avoid. Based on initial signals of an enthusiasm for linking economic and political development -- as well as the general discomfort the Bush Administration evinces with social development-oriented activities of many UN agencies -- the risk to the Bank instead may be that it becomes the preferred agency for a hodgepodge of US political priorities and pet-projects.
A US-dominated political agenda would threaten the Bank in a number of ways far more serious than the relatively simple problem of dissipating staff and budget resources. It goes to the heart of the credibility crisis that Wolfowitz' appointment presents for the Bank. As I explained several weeks ago when the nomination was announced:
[O]ne of [JDW's] major achievements was to reduce the level of suspicion about the Bank's agenda(s) with at least a portion of the NGO-civil society world. At a very high cost, I might add, and as [Sebastian] Mallaby also notes, many of these groups will never be satisfied, so there's a legitimate debate about whether [JDW] should have invested so much in the effort.
But the Wolfowitz appointment takes what progress there has been and basically tosses it in the garbage can. And that's the case regardless of any personal views or concrete actions of Wolfowitz himself in the new job. The symbolism -- that the US owns the Bank and can do with it what it will -- is how it's going to be read across the globe.
The irony is that one of the few really strong consensus items in recent years has been the importance of the locals "owning" their own development strategies and projects, and the broader need for the developing countries to feel they've an ownership stake in the multilateral institutions. Again, I think the "local ownership" theme has sometimes gotten a bit out of hand with some of the "comprehensive development strategy" stuff that was JDW's crowning glory. But there's an important bit of wisdom there, and it represented an essential corrective for a Washington-centered institution that had in many ways lost its way. Seems, however, that the message hasn't penetrated the Oval Office.
The first two years in the job for Wolfowitz, at a minimum, will be one of proving himself and reproving the Bank. Very trying times.
The staff face the challenge of credibility with individual client countries on specific projects. This will exacerbate the always-present tensions, sub-texts and hidden agendas (suspected or real) regarding which projects are selected, how they are designed, how they are approved. But beyond the difficulties for the staff, the credibility question presents a major problem for the Bank as a whole. As I noted earlier:
There's already enough opposition to the mythical Washington Consensus, and this will add enormous fuel to the anti-globalization fires as well. The super anti-globalizers will see this as one great big present from Santa, and the staff know it.Those trying times for the Bank and its staff will be brought into sharp focus by the debates to come over the next six months regarding Tony Blair's July push for a major G-7 Africa-centered anti-poverty agenda and a reassessment in September, in the context of the broader UN reforms, of progress on the Millennium Development Goals. Wolfowitz' background and White House connections will not make it easy for him to navigate the inevitable highly-politicized pulls on the Bank that will come from every direction. If he looks to be making a hash of things, then I'll criticize. But for the sake of the countries the Bank is designed to help, and the broader health of the international system, I wish him all the best.
Wolfowitz could personally be the greatest thing since sliced bread, but the Bank is going to get saddled with a lot of his baggage. There will definitely be a "proving period" for him to get it right, or not. And that's assuming the US doesn't come into more intense conflict with anybody else, e.g. Iran, and have that blowback on him and the Bank.
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