With all the ink split and airwaves filled about John Bolton and UN reform, very little in the way of "what exactly do we mean by reform" has been discussed by either proponents or opponents of Bolton's nomination. I admit to a certain sympathy for Tom Friedman's recent takedown of the GOP cries for "UN reform."

"Reforming the U.N." is without question one of the most tired, vacuous conservative mantras ever invented. It is right up there with squeezing "waste, fraud and abuse" out of the Pentagon's budget.

Still, I think Suzanne Nossel does us all a terrific service at Democracy Arsenal in explaining where UN reform really does matter. She outlines a number of key issues, as well as the stands being taken by different players.

Suzanne presents her piece as "on the margin of the Bolton debate." If, however, as has been speculated, the White House is considering pushing Bolton to the Senate floor even if the Committee sends his nomination with a negative recommendation, the sole reason -- other than an assertion of presidential power -- will be to tar the Democrats as "UN-huggers" who don't want an "effective UN." Such a circus will do neither the Democrats nor US foreign policy any good.

For that reason, I think it's extremely healthy for the policy blogs like Democracy Arsenal to expand beyond Bolton himself to the specifics of UN reform. The point is not that the Bush position on reform (at least as it's likely to be pursued by Rice) is either necessarily disingenuous or bad per se. Nor is it that the Bolton opponents are opposing Bolton as a way of undermining Bush's position on the UN. Rather, it's that Bolton is the wrong guy to pursue a reform agenda that is broadly shared on both sides of the aisle.

To make that case effectively requires Bolton's opponents to do more than simply saying "me too." It's not enough to say vaguely that the UN needs reform. That isn't very persuasive, and it has the added negative effect of being just general UN-bashing, rather than focusing on expanding on what the UN does well and changing it where it needs to change.

Suzanne also makes the point that it's important to identify where specific reform priorities overlap with Kofi Annan's proposals, and where the sticking points are. As she illustrates, a lot of those sticking points will be found in disagreements between the US and either Annan or other groups of countries, NOT between a majority of Republicans and Democrats.

Suzanne points us to a recent speech at the UN by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, the person Condi Rice has put in charge of the reform effort and the response to Annan's proposals. There are lots of tricky issues that are finessed in the speech. But I think most of us will find there's much to like in the Rice agenda so far. Which just makes the Bolton appointment all the more maddening and inexplicable!

{cross-posted at Liberals Against Terrorism}

Publius has been on a roll lately, what with Sir Bork rescuing the fair maiden Original Understanding from the evil denizens of the Enchanted Liberal Forest and Publius himself tracing a path back to the foundation on which liberalism stands. So I can't call today's contribution "the best," but it's well worth a read, both for entertainment value and for a sober message.

Let me set the scene. This is the entr'acte before the curtain rises on Act II of our Social Security drama. After Act I, during which the Democrats have for most purposes won on the grounds that the emperor's wardrobe is empty, the story shifts to a search for new ways for the Democrats to defeat themselves. In this scene, a nice little bait-and-switch farce, the punditocracy has become complicit, even if unwitting in some cases. And here the pundits find themselves on much more comfortable ground -- not substance, mind you, but opining on the elaborate gavotte of power politics. They know the notes, and they're singing them from the chorus, but Publius to their distress isn't following the score. So they sing even louder the inevitable calls for a gesture from the victorious of "compromise for the greater good" -- though in this case it seems a bit premature given the fragility of the apparent victory in what has been so far merely a minor skirmish in Act I.

As Publius warns, compromise is only possible if two sides are basically talking about the same thing. When they're not, suggestions of compromise are simply... well, read it.

Here I was, feeling all mellow about how we should be able to rally around some commonsense principles in response to the complex prospects of political changes in the Middle East, and The New Republic strikes again. Their editors sure know how to put me seriously out of sorts. These guys give "idealism" a bad name, and I'm beginning to contemplate embracing "realism" with fervor.

The message from our grand political strategists at TNR is not that we should pull together behind sensible policies to promote better governance and open societies. Oh, that's all well and good, and Teddy Kennedy gets a nice little pat on the head for being a good boy and saying democracy in the Middle East is a good thing. But that's missing the Big Idea -- it's time to get into the democracy bidding wars. Who can be more "pro-democracy." And to give us just the incentive we need, they point to the silent regrets we all must share that Bill Clinton didn't make Middle East democracy the obsession of his administration. If we miss the bandwagon this time, we're really, really, really going to regret it.

The editors certainly make a valid point regarding the track record of the Bush Administration. It's important to force this Administration to pay attention to the long, hard, patient, frustrating slog at the level of institutions. Democracy can indeed be a devil once the details are examined -- both getting there and keeping it functioning to produce stable, effective governments. Fareed Zakaria wrote a best-seller about that in 2003 I seem to recall.

It's also true that one would be hard pressed to find many members of the Bush Administration who have demonstrated they have sound democracy-nurturing or institution-building instincts. They seem to fall either in the "we don't do institutions" school of Donald Rumsfeld or the "Dr Pangloss" school of Paul Wolfowitz. But the evolution of their policies in Iraq over the past year has shown they've done some learning, albeit the hard way, and they should be encouraged -- loud and often -- to keep up the good work, as I hope my most recent comments indicated.

I'm not sure which gets me more steamed -- the suggestion by the editors that Bill Clinton's efforts were misplaced to focus on strengthening the international economic architecture, halting destabilizing ethnic turmoil in the Balkans and bringing Yasser Arafat to a deal he should have taken, or the notion that the touchstone of US foreign policy for the foreseeable future is taking "democracy" -- whatever that may be -- to the dark reaches of the globe. They just can't get off their hobby-horse of remaking the world.

I do know that their rationale -- that the Bush Administration won't let liberals in on the action in places like Russia if we don't raise the ante -- is proof once again they don't understand how the Bush Administration plays politics. The proper role of liberals in the Bush universe is as punching-bag foils -- regardless of what any liberals actually do or say -- or as members of the anonymous cheering section well hidden behind the pom-poms on the sidelines.

But more important, the issues our policymakers have to deal with can't be addressed by sticking ideological labels on them. As I've noted before, the concept of "democracy" is content-free as a guide for policymaking. The choices facing the US are far more multifaceted and interdependent that some artificial choice between promoting "democracy" or acquiescing in "stability." And a single-minded "obsession" with remaking the world is as likely to erode American strategic strengths on a wide range of fronts as enhance its security from terrorists.

The problems US policymakers have today with Russia are not that Russia isn't democratic. There are certainly aspects of the Russian political system that are part and parcel of the irritations and tensions that are emerging in how Russia interacts with the rest of the world, and recent domestic political trends have exacerbated those external problems. But those problems would remain -- and might be substantially worse -- if Russia were overnight suddenly "democratic" or if "democracy" came to dominate the complex agenda the US and Russia share. Talking in terms of "democracy" is increasingly self-defeating in Latin America, where politicians of all stripes are working their way toward second-generation economic and political changes after the liberalizations of the 90s; and in doing so, they are often defining their visions in terms of how different they are from Washington. Does "democracy" help the US manage the lions' share of issues in its inter-hemispheric relations, which are principally in the economic and social spheres? Does "democracy" help the US find its way forward in defining evolving relations with China, or India, or Japan? Will it help Americans sort out when and where they should support interventions in horrific civil wars in Africa?

I have my own opinions on what US policies should and should not be doing on many of these issues, though I don't believe any are capable of clear-cut answers. What I do believe is clear, however, is that any group of self-proclaimed liberals who would criticize the Clinton Administration for failing to be sufficiently obsessed with democracy needs their collective heads examined. I certainly wouldn't look to them for guidance or trust them with either the fate of the US or of the global system. The French have an expression that I find apt for this sort of self-important nonsense: Ils ne sont pas serieux.

Warning, this is not a thoughtful post. This is a cranky post.

In "Time for a Rethink?" praktike offers a review of positive comments and views from the liberal or "left" part of the American political universe on the encouraging signs of political change in the Middle East. Though he points out some of the continued weaknesses of the Bush Administration's policies, he calls on opponents of the neocon approach to Iraq to get behind those Bush policies we can support. Time to be constructive.

This is not a new theme for prak, and it's an approach I've consistently endorsed. I've advocated elsewhere that opponents of Bush's foreign policy nonetheless give vocal support to specific policies that are consistent with what we ourselves would be promoting if the Bush team weren't still running the show.

With those principles in mind, I have been supportive of the shifts being made gradually over the past six months by the military field commanders in both strategy and tactics. I have been supportive of the shift in approach which appears to have been adopted by the US embassy since the handover to the interim government at the end of June. My most recent endorsements of Bush policies have included supporting the Iraqi elections and the Administration's broad strategy toward Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. I have repeatedly cautioned against reproducing a domestic Vietnam-style polarization. To my way of thinking, an America polarized by foreign policy debates is a dangerous America for the rest of the world. But I have also vigorously opposed the disinformation campaigns that the Bush Administration waged as part of the presidential campaign or the gamesplaying with military budgets and force planning. So I want it understood that these comments are not an attack on prak's overall intentions which I share.

Two things have me seriously out of sorts. First -- and more on a personal level than anything I suppose -- I am quite resentful of the notion that somehow, as a vocal critic of the Bush policies regarding the invasion and occupation of Iraq, I have something to explain or apologize for. I don't think I'm misreading the subtext, even coming from those who aren't engaging in the recent rounds of "traitors on the left" triumphantalist hyperbole. The suggestion seems to be that if as critics we "can't admit we were wrong," we're being partisan or we're somehow not for democracy and freedom. That it's our lot to accept the "olive branch" offered by the David Adesniks of a bipartisan policy based on "democracy promotion." Gracious in defeat, don't you know.

Sorry, if there is an olive branch to be offered by the victorious, it should in point of fact be extending the other direction, from those of us who have long advocated policies that the Bush Admnistration is only now begining to adopt. I am eager to be magnanimous in victory, but it appears quite unlikely that my branch will even be acknowledged by the Administration's supporters, let alone accepted by a foreign policy team that's never made a mistake.

This brings me to my closely related second source of crankiness. The so-called "left" is being diverted by the unnecessary self-justifying squawks that have been coming out of the liberal hawks. Those who opposed the first Bush Administration shouldn't be wasting time squabbling on who was more right or more wrong about the war. They should be joining together now be saying to the new Bush team, "Glad you guys have finally come to your senses. Nice to have you back on board." We should be looking forward, trying to make sense of this post-Iraq world that's starting to emerge, to see what we think about the current Administration's priorities and policies as they are starting to take shape.

As I see it, the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq adventure have represented a severe dis-continuity in American foreign policy, and we're now returning to something approaching our normal balance. This is an idea that requires a much longer and more developed essay that's still rummaging around in my brain. For purposes of this discussion, let's simply focus on the issues of political change (not other elements of global politics like NATO or environment, trade etc).   more »

Am I the only one mystified as to how someone can write an entire treatise about how the Republican party has successfully used the culture war to advance its economic agenda, and then advocate that the culture war somehow does not actually trump the class war?

Sorry, Yuval (and Paul Krugman by extension), but I think that the Moose has the big picture right here, as does, sadly, Ramesh Ponnuru.

I'm not sure what to do about this--Hillary Clinton's reframing of the abortion issue as one of preventing unwanted pregnancies seems like a smart move--but I'm pretty damned sure that "more cultural liberalism" is not the answer.

... on the other hand, there is definitely something amiss in Kansas.

UPDATE: See also Ed Kilgore's reply to Armando of DailyKos, which in my view shows a more productive way of interacting with the "netroots" than the Moose approach (though I agree with his overall "culture trumps class" argument), which in addition to being problematic in some of its details, raises more hackles than awareness.

I was given an open-ended invitation by praktike to comment on Charles Krauthammer's unwise excursion into economic and fiscal policy via the Social Security debates. Given the effective take-downs of Krauthammer by Noam Scheiber and Matt Yglesias, I was going to pass. Their pieces present, however, that nagging "what should be done" problem that seems to bedevil the Democrats. As prak has sadly remarked, advice to the Democratic party has turned into a "sorry little cottage industry," and best to avoid getting sucked into the muddle. But it was a softball all teed-up, so how could I resist?

I both agree and disagree with Scheiber and Yglesias -- certainly agree that Krauthammer should stick to his knitting and not try to talk about something which is for him a foreign language. Disagree, on some of the grounds for their take-down.

More broadly, however, I think both are overlooking the opportunity that taking apart Krauthammer presents. It's child's play to dismiss his feeble "logic" in arguing the specifics of Social Security reform. But note that Krauthammer wasn't really making a technical argument, he was making a political argument, about the poor picture Bush chose to paint in the SOTU. And Krauthammer's "logic" opens up a much broader political argument that I think opponents of Bush-nomics would be wise to start to make.

First, on the specifics of the Social Security arguments, as I've indicated previously, I'm of the old-fashioned "cash-flow" persuasion when it comes to analyzing Social Security. It's a pay-as-you-go system of social insurance that provides benefits to a much larger portion of the population than would be necessary in a pure "safety-net" system. The broader coverage give the American people a sense that they are all participants in the same social contract. It's neither a retirement program nor a ponzi scheme. I repeat my mantra of the three things to keep in mind when looking at all the plans and arguments from all sides of the cacophony that passes for "debate": there is no crisis, there is no trust fund, there is no free lunch.

The Trust Fund is essentially a useful heuristic device. Yes, the federal government has an obligation to provide the trust fund with cash when the trust fund is called upon to pay out benefits, and failure to meet that cash call would be a default on government obligations. But since Congress can change the benefits and thereby change the calls on the trust fund, everybody's "property interest" in the trust fund can be eliminated with one set of votes and a stroke of the pen.

Over the past decades, as the Trust Fund built up a "surplus," and in future decades, when the "surplus" will be paid down, you can see what's really going on by looking at the federal government's overall receipts and outflows, as well as how the government finances its overall net negative cash flow -- including payroll taxes and Social Security benefits in the mix. The Trust Fund contains government obligations (please let's not get into central bank obligations vs government securities) that, in the absence of the net positive cash flow from Social Security (the excess of revenues from the payroll tax over the benefits being paid out), would have required the government to fund itself in some other fashion. It could have raised taxes, or it could have gone to the public markets to flog its paper. The net positive cash flow from the pay-as-you-go system financed current government expenditures without having to resort to either option.

All that happens as the revenues from the payroll tax cease to cover all the benefits -- as we start having a net negative cash flow -- is that the government has to go finance itself some other way. That's true, whether the government expenditure to be financed is the salary of a Marine, or payment to run the judiciary, or money for highways, or a welfare payment, or a grant to the states, or a disability payment under Social Security. As the net positive cash flow declines, and eventually reverses to a net negative cash flow, the amount of financing the government has to raise from other sources (taxes or selling paper in the markets) increases. We can find financing for those other amounts, or we can reduce our expenditures. If we decide to finance those amounts, one possibility among an almost mindboggling range of possible options is to increase payroll taxes. If we decide to reduce our expenditures, one possibility among an almost mindboggling range of options is to lower Social Security benefits. We can choose to do either, neither, or both. They have no necessary relation to each other.

For the Democrats, there are lots of ways of talking about financing and timing issues in what has been a fight against an amorphous set of suggestions that would (1) reduce taxes received by the government (diverting a portion of payroll taxes into retirement savings plans), (2) reduce benefits paid by the government, and (3) dramatically increase federal borrowings. Why have the Democrats remained focused on the Trust Fund? In part, because they had invested so much political capital in the whole notion in the first place in the late 90s and during Gore's presidential campaign.

The "lockbox" was a political gimmick that made a great deal of sense at the time. It was designed to deal with the politics of surplus budgets -- to protect hard won fiscal sanity from both the tax slashers and the spendthrifts. Clinton's political instinct has been proved to have been sound, since his successor has managed to be both. The problem the Democrats have is that they got caught in the "defense of the Trust Fund" rhetoric from the late 90s. And hence the meaningless debate about whether the Trust Fund will be in crisis in year 2042 or some later date or never.

That being said, Krauthammer doesn't do a very good job of explaining why you should ignore the Trust Fund, and, if so, what really should be the grounds for your analysis. By arguing that the Trust Fund isn't the problem -- that instead it's 2018 when the net positive cash flow reverses -- then he's adopting a cash-flow analysis that puts the Social Security issue into the broader framework of overall fiscal policy. And then he's got to stick with it for all purposes. You can't just sort of pick and choose when it suits you as Krauthammer has done.

He's so out of his depth that he doesn't even handle the sleight-of-hand well the way a pro like George Will might. The second half of Scheiber's piece is particularly good on the whiplash you get trying to follow Chuck's "logic." But if we were to pursue Chuck's initial logic, then we'd find that he's actually created a much bigger problem for himself. It takes us to the heart and soul of Bush-nomics: the gigantic, unsustainable fiscal deficits.

When you look at Social Security as part of the broader fiscal system, President Bush is indeed right -- there is, in fact, a crisis on the horizon, and a horizon that's far closer than 2042, or even 2018. Yet the Democrats haven't made hay with this logical response to the Social Security proposals, apart from occasionally remarking that the real crisis is in health care not Social Security. Why? Putting Social Security into the broader debate about fiscal policy puts Social Security on the same playing field as discretionary spending. And given the radical nature of the first Bush Administration when it comes to fiscal policy -- and a GOP-controlled Capitol Hill -- the Democrats quite understandably haven't been willing to risk that.

The interesting thing is, on the GOP side, President Bush seems to have come closest to acknowledging my three-part mantra: he's backing away from "crisis," he maintains that the Trust Fund is notional, and he's started to recognize that taxes might have to be increased and benefits reduced. That, of course, hasn't stopped him from peddling the ideological goal of privatization, even though it's increasingly been proved by the Democrats to be a total nonsequiteur to the "problem" as posed by Bush.

Since the crisis gimmick is blowing up in the GOP's collective faces, and they're starting to have to make tacit admissions about the costs of the changes in terms of taxes, benefits and transitional borrowings, they're now looking for diversionary tactics. This means, for the Democrats, that the New Deal is safe if all the Bush Administration can do is divert the "debate" to such worthy arguments as that AARP is just a bunch of godless, pinko, homo-loving, traitorous Islamo-fascists. Maybe there's an audience for that approach that isn't already in the President's camp on this one, but it's not a very big one.

The GOP will, of course, continue the obfuscation, prevarication and out-and-out lies about no tax increases -- even as their plans begin to show some tax increases -- and no benefits cuts -- even as the benefits are cut. But those tactics can, in fact, be countered by the Democrats, as the Republicans showed in the old health care debacle of the 90s. Bush certainly has all the powers of the presidency at his disposal, and the shameful ignorance of reporters spitting back GOP talking points certainly gives him a free ride. Nonetheless, it may simply be sufficient to raise serious questions -- enough of a "he-said she-said" that puts the GOP claims in a questionable light -- to make a lot of GOP Senators & Congressmen uncomfortable in their home districts.

I take much more seriously Matt Yglesias' intuition that the Big Lie that's coming is that libruhls are just defending their narrow little partisan interests and don't have any alternative -- that the Democrats are the party of the past with no vision for a brighter tomorrow for the generations to come, yadayada.

Remember when all this started, the Gingrich strategy was -- hey, even if we don't win in the sense of passing legislation, we win by beating up on the Democrats as the party of the past without a program, without a vision, etc. The thing that's shifted that strategy was Bush's decision to showcase Social Security and make it where he intends to "spend" his "mandate" capital. But watch it turn from a test of Bush's presidency to a beat-up-on-the-Democrats the moment that it really looks like the whole thing is DOA.

This is the hard one for Democrats to handle, because it's a lot easier to keep united in opposition to a dreadful proposal. Unity's a lot harder to maintain once discussions open about what would make sense. And we know that, when the final "negotiations" are conducted and the devilish details are defined, there won't be any Democrats (and very few moderate Republicans) in the room.

I think the GOP is indeed correct that we're not getting a clear vision of the future from the Democrats that's relevant to the changing structure of our economy and population. That's not solely the fault of the Democrats. The "new vision" being offered by the hard-right ideologues is no more in touch with today's and tomorrow's economy and society than FDR's version of the New Deal. Given the enthusiasm with which the Bushites are trying to dismantle the New Deal as it has evolved over the decades, a good deal of core defense by the Democrats is in order. But it is certainly time to start looking at the specifics of how the New Deal social contract may need broad adjustments, rather than constant tinkering at the margins.

That's why I've thought for some time that the Democrats should shift to offense with a combined package -- oriented around the new global economy and the coming fiscal crisis. Among the features, we need to redefine Social Security more transparently than it is now (it should probably become a narrowly focused social insurance combined with a modest mandatory defined-benefit retirement savings arrangement); to avoid making the same mistake we did with the S&Ls -- creating a big crisis by decades of temporizing -- we need a more orderly phase-out of the rapidly-eroding defined-benefits pension system (especially the collapsing PBGC which can't be addressed in isolation from the broader problem of defined-benefit schemes); and we need to sever the employer-connection to the heath care financing system.

A "package" approach would also allow Democrats to reposition themselves on the entire fiscal policy debate. For purposes of discussion here, let's not tackle the tax side of the equation, just the spending side. Isn't it time the Democrats outlined an overall shape of what our fiscal position, on the spending side, should look like? Isn't it time we revisited what constitutes discretionary and non-discretionary spending?

We know Medicare/Medicaid can't go on for ever as is. We know that some adjustments to Social Security are going to be appropriate for higher-income wage earners in the coming decades. We know we can't keep spending on a "new" military at the planned rate and still keep indefinitely all those boots on the ground in foreign climes. We know we can't keep subsidizing agriculture or providing corporate welfare (yes, I now that's usually through tax "relief", but let's recognize it should be put on the same basis as other spending programs). We know we can't keep up with the absurdly growing and pathetically ineffective spending patterns of DHS.

We need priorities, we are going to have to make trade-offs -- those should be based on principles that are consistent with the sort of economy and society we're going to have in the coming years, not just defensive maneuvers to beat back the worst of what the GOP keeps coming up with.

Back to focusing only on the "entitlements" part of the federal fiscal structure (not just social security put also retirement more broadly, health care etc.). Fundamentally, we need a clear rethink of (1) what's going to be the safety net -- for the vissicitudes of life when people get really trapped with no place to go; (2) what's going to be socially insured and not subject to market fluctuations so the government isn't going to get left holding the bag (by socially insured I mean it can be in either a government system a la Social Security or a private system, but people will be forced to save/insure for this stuff and the main terms and the population-wide pooling will be dicated by the government); and (3) what stuff will be left more to personal responsibilities and the marketplace but that it makes sense for the government to play an intermediation/regulatory role in order to overcome major information asymmetries.

There's lots of good technical stuff in specific proposals floating around from a whole variety of thinktanks and policy wonks. But all those nice details, the parsing of which make the hearts of wonks beat faster, must be translated into an easy-to-grasp intuitive picture of what the new New Deal would look like. I'm suggesting an opposite direction -- sketch the broad outlines of a new New Deal, and then play with the policies to fit the outlines.

This rethink should be congenial for international business, which needs a safe, secure, large middle class at home but that desparately wants to shed the pension and health care costs that are distorting competitive position internationally. Isn't there anyone in the union movement who can talk with the guys who run GM, Ford et al? As I've said before, we need someone to write the "What's the Matter with Kansas?" for corporate America, because their alliance with the GOP is otherwise mystifying. Getting changes in tort law and bankruptcy rules, with some further dilution of union rights, just isn't a big enough return for what the Bushites are doing to our position in the global economy.

The insane irony is that the radical Republicans think they're going to get a brighter future by finally winning an anachronistic sixty-year-old battle, and the Democrats are defending the present. Neither party is offering a realistic picture of why we need to change and where we actually need to go.

Just a suggestion: there's a reason why lame ducks are good things for the opposition. The opportunity is now, not three years from now. And there ends my contribution to the cottage industry.

Praktike has cut to the heart of Peter Beinart and his occasional advice column to lovelorn Democrats on recasting a winning foreign policy. Seems Beinart is of the Dear Abby school in which the right atmospherics can solve a host of problems -- greet hubby at the door in a provocative nightdress, and if necessary try a few trips to Beinart's counseling services -- rather than head straight to divorce court.

I think prak's probably right. He's s already taken Beinart apart several times for an excessively narrow casting of the scope of foreign policy debate -- effectively making Iraq and the war on terror the touchstone. One might well ask where China and India fit within his scheme. And prak and others have also noted Beinart's unfortunate habit of appropriating historical figures of Democratic Party history is a somewhat disingenous fashion. But let's try one more time to take Beinart's recipe for success seriously.

First -- and most important for an advice columnist who wants to be successful -- from a tactical vantage, Beinart is still fighting the last war (and trying to justify his part in it I might add, which makes him a singularly suspect spokesman for the views he's pushing). Beinart overlooks a simple fact of life: Democrats (as well as the anti-neocons in the Republican party) are going to lose as long as the focus is whether/how the invasion of Iraq was a first major step in an idealistic refashioning of the world, and whether it was a well-chosen or well-executed example. That ground has been claimed by Bush and the neocons. Any attempt to point out that Iraq should not be taken as a model of success for future foreign adventures becomes an assault on Iraqis and freedom writ large (and increasingly providing aid and comfort for tyrants and terrorists). Any discussion that tries to make intelligible and principled distinctions within that framework is a mug's game.

Now for the substance of Beinart's argument.

Here's the dilemma as presented by Beinart, and as presented there's clearly only one answer:

Democratic politicians, who have to answer to their liberal base, have only two choices: a realist-isolationist language that does not depict the United States as a global democracy-promoter, or an idealism without illusions that recognizes America's flawed history on questions of global freedom.

Sorry, but I don't recognize me and mine in those two choices. Beinart frames everything in democracy-promotion or not-democracy-promotion -- which is a pretty queer way to think about foreign policy if you're anything other than an American who has little familiarity with the residents and actual political and economic systems of other countries.

In the process of framing a policy choice that would be acceptable to "the liberal base" (whoever they may be) he's lost a whole lot of other parts of a potential anti-Bush anti-neocon electorate. As a traditional liberal internationalist, I don't see why I should buy the call to arms that Beinart is peddling. Furthermore, an opposition to the Bush Doctrine (v 1.0 or 2.0) is quite possible from "realist internationalists." As Steve Clemons has noted, the fault lines in US foreign policy are shifting, and some of the old adversarial schools are finding themselves on the same side of the fence when it comes to opposing the Bush Doctrine and its corollaries.

But, Beinart says, you've got to appeal to your liberal base, who will only accept one of the two alternatives. Yet he doesn't explore other ways to slice the much broader potential non-Bush electorate on foreign policy issues and still satisfy some of the moral imperatives of Democratic activists.

If he's going to make a convincing argument, first he's got to define who these liberals are who have to be satisfied. I'm not including in "liberals" those who are "anti-globalization" per se or anti-war absolutists, or the issue-driven activists who define foreign relations exclusively through the prism of their favorite theory (structural imperialism, world systems, etc) or cause (environment, human rights, poverty, etc). Those groups won't be satisfied with anything that would be acceptable to either the US electorate or most of our international partners, so they've already taken themselves out of the foreign policy conversation. If they're a core part of the party's base, they're just going to have to be satisfied with domestic policy and making sure that their favorite issues aren't totally ignored.

Within the bounds of a real world discussion about a foreign policy for Democrats (that would resonate with non-Bushites and non-neocons who are not Democrats), what are the real options?

How about a foreign policy that doesn't use the words "democracy" or "liberty" or "freedom." If there is one thing evident from the presidential campaign, it is that each of those terms has by now been drained of all content. The meaning of each is totally in the mind of the perceiver of the symbol as is the case with other potent symbols, like flags and fireworks and coffins. The policies for pursuit of each know no limits.

Each of these connotation-laden terms, when uttered by the US, carries historical baggage outside our borders about the selectivity with which we apply these notions to others. This is not simply a fastidiousness about American "hypocrisy." The Monroe Doctrine and its twentieth century manifestations continue to be a source of conflict that structures relations adversely with otherwise-friendly democratic regimes in this hemisphere. "Democracy" is often greeted as a code word for regime change a l'Americaine.

Why do we think that a global Monroe Doctrine is going to be greeted with hosannas? Placing "democracy" front and center in our attempts to communicate our policies to the rest of the world is, in practice, likely to be inimical to our interests. There appears to be a broad consensus within the US that "hearts and minds" must be won in a longer-term "battle of ideas" with radical Islam. Do we think the display of "humility" somehow will eradicate the taint of association with American policies that is currently the kiss of death for reformers in the Middle East? How much "humility" will be required in Latin America to neutralize the deeply-ingrained suspicions when we call for "democracy" to get rid of the leader of a government voted into office in a vigorously contested election? Think what one might about the nature of the Chavez regime, we should be able to admit that labelling him an anti-democratic tyrant probably isn't the best move in a "hearts and minds" campaign in the region.

Why do we think a "forward strategy of freedom" -- one which aggressively places unfriendly regimes under the threat of instantaneous transfiguration into US-defined democracies -- will encourage a process of regime change that will produce viable, stable, prosperous societies? Where has such a policy produced positive results, even where our power would appear most overwhelming, ninety miles off our own shores? Why should we abandon the approach that has served us well -- the long, patient slog of cooperating with our partners within a Helsinki-type framework that presses for internal reforms while making meaningful adjustments in external relations?

How about a foreign policy that's based on "respect," not on "humility" or mea culpas for past sins? As Matthew Yglesias has pointed out, the American public isn't going to be big on the mea culpa business, so that's probably not a marketing angle that will have legs. In Democratic focus groups pre-election, it was pretty clear that "respected abroad" was something that resonated strongly with large parts of the American public. They can handle -- and even welcome -- a change of style from cowboy arrogance. And in fact, that is precisely what the White House is currently trying to stage manage with the Condi-charm-offensive currently in swing. It's a change of style that's popular with the American electorate, even with the hardcore right.

How about a foreign policy that's based on a strategic assessment of the opportunities and threats that are not those of America alone but are shared by the US and large portions of the globe? How about a foreign policy that paints the US as a leader among a partnership of wealthier nations that are already cooperating through a whole host of international mechanisms to make the world a more open, prosperous and secure place?

How about a bit of "modesty" of ambitions rather than "humility" -- modesty both in ends and means? How about a foreign policy that doesn't call for a world-wide revolution -- especially when the ultimate stated motive is to make the world safer for Americans? How about a foreign policy framed in language that resonated with the American public on the domestic front -- that insists that "we can do better" rather than "we can remake the world"?

How about a foreign policy that returns to the foundations of what the American empire has offered -- and even in relative decline can continue to offer -- to the world to make it and America itself a better place?

American elites should have both more confidence in and more concern for the example their country sets to the world, through their institutions, their values and the visible well-being of ordinary Americans.... These institutions and values constitute America's civilizational empire, heir to that of Rome. Like the values of Rome, they will endure long after the American empire, and even the United States itself, has disappeared. The image of America as an economically successful pluralist democracy, open to all races and basically peaceful and nonaggressive, has been so powerful in the past because it has largely been true. Americans must make sure that it continues to be true. Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism, quoted by Brian Urquart in Feb 24 issue of NYRB.

How about a foreign policy that recognizes that what we are at home is vital to how we influence the world outside our borders -- that adhering within our own borders to democratic principles and our cherished values of liberty and freedom is inextricably intertwined with our ability to manage foreign relations in our interest.

Once Beinart has articulated a policy that is "democracy" and "liberty" free -- once we eliminate "freedom on the march" from the vocabulary -- then if he needs some "democratic" gloss to sell it, come back to me.

In the meantime, he's just BushLite: an international revisionist who thinks not only that the US still has the imperial suasion to impose its will on swaths of the world but that the world needs the hegemon to exercise its will. That is a profoundly radical agenda for a foreign policy, which goes well beyond Beinart's deceptively simple choice of realistic isolationism or idealistic engagement.

Beinart's is an engagement that is not satisfied to engage. Rather, it elevates to the prime strategic goal -- the primary organizing principle of policy -- the remaking of not just the international system but the internal systems of all participants in the international community. It is the height of hubris and the antithesis of the sort of basic respect that America's partners have called for -- even with his nice bit of filigreed "humility."

Perhaps his response is that this is all rhetoric, to sell the American public, and not how we'll actually behave. But when there is a major disconnect between words and actions, words are used to justify the actions one desires and are readily ignored when it's a matter of convenience.

So if Beinart recognizes from the outset that democracy and liberty aren't actually going to be very good guides to policy, what are the guiding principles he would offer as to when rhetoric applies and when it's to be ignored? Other than, of course, his personal tastes and gut instincts with a bit of political and moral correctness as window-dressing.

Honestly, why should I prefer Peter Beinart's gut instincts -- as refined and superior as they may be -- over George W Bush's?

Last year I spent a lot of time pouring over pdfs and budget tables, and in addition to being instructional and vaguely entertaining (keep in mind that I'm a nerd) it was a character-building exercise. I think that a lot of folks would benefit from doing the same.

Still, like Kevin Drum, I'm not inclined to do much budget-blogging this year. I've become too cynical. Reading stuff like this all over the place doesn't help. I do find it interesting to watch some Democrats embrace federalism and contemplate a state-oriented strategy (here's the latest example, but there have been many others). It surely makes one wonder what the point of belonging to a political party is: is it to win, to advocate for certain programs, to push for certain principles, or to protect your own? Perhaps it can be said that the parties have neither permanent constituencies nor permanent methods, but merely permanent interests. In any case, I'm coming to despise them both (OK, mostly the GOP). Aside from the social security fight, domestic politics is becoming less and less interesting to me. Is it outrage fatigue? Resignation?

Maybe these guys can solve the problem, but I doubt it until this other issue gets solved.

UPDATE: Hilzoy, Brad and Max, however, can at least muster the will to condemn the clown show. Good for them.

... the other major blogosphere Brads are doing yeoman's work, too.

I'll echo Matthew Yglesias' tepid enthusiasm for the apparent new DNC Chair, Howard Dean. I thought Simon Rosenberg was the guy, but he lost fair and square as far as I can tell, and he has now endorsed Dean. Here's hoping Rosenberg can be brought on board as the COO and chief strategist, and that Dean will restrain his penchant for igniting and exacerbating intra-party squabbles. I also hope that the Dean movement can channel its diffuse energy more effectively towards one or two clear reforms such as nationwide non-partisan redistricting.

I keep trying to keep from being hauled into the Great Social Security Debate because it's the great black hole of energy and attention. My opinions usually have very little to do with anything that's being discussed because usually what's being discussed has more to do with fantasyland and doesn't have much to do with Social Security, investment portfolios, fiscal policy, the financial services industry, or the ownership society.

And now here I go and break my own abstention rule. But this was too good to pass up. Evan Bayh with George Stephanoplous finally says, crisply [ed., well it reads crisp on the transcript, can't vouch the delivery wasn't soggy], what the Democrats' unifying theme should be on "privatization" [ed., or whatever obfuscatory label the BushAdmin has come up this week].

It's understandable, it's good politics, and what's more, it's true!

Q. Stephanopolus: Number one, would you support diverting the payroll tax into individual accounts?

A, Bayh: Look, you may own your home; a lot of Americans do. I bet you have insurance. Ownership and insurance have to go hand in hand.

Social Security is the insurance. Senior citizens in our country can always rely on it to make sure they're not desperately poor in their old age. [ed., and that goes even more for disability insurance]

Should we have ownership and choice in addition to that? Yes, we should. But we should never do anything to undermine that insurance. That is one of the bedrock principles of our country.

A three-fer is a rare bird, and one not anticipated to have been sighted in the company of Evan Bayh. Normally, Josh Marshall's quip, when commenting about a Meet the Press performance by Bill Thomas, is more apt: "[Thomas] was so incoherent and off-message that it was hard for me to believe he wasn't a Democrat."

And now, back to the real world.

transcript quote courtesy J Marshall, TPM