... of open, accountable government and our system of checks and balances -- including the press -- doing its job, there's this side-splitting piece of work from the normally rather staid Independent Institute, courtesy MaxSpeaks.

But then again, as Eric Martin asks, "Why bother to revise history when you can bury it?"

Here I was, feeling all mellow about how we should be able to rally around some commonsense principles in response to the complex prospects of political changes in the Middle East, and The New Republic strikes again. Their editors sure know how to put me seriously out of sorts. These guys give "idealism" a bad name, and I'm beginning to contemplate embracing "realism" with fervor.

The message from our grand political strategists at TNR is not that we should pull together behind sensible policies to promote better governance and open societies. Oh, that's all well and good, and Teddy Kennedy gets a nice little pat on the head for being a good boy and saying democracy in the Middle East is a good thing. But that's missing the Big Idea -- it's time to get into the democracy bidding wars. Who can be more "pro-democracy." And to give us just the incentive we need, they point to the silent regrets we all must share that Bill Clinton didn't make Middle East democracy the obsession of his administration. If we miss the bandwagon this time, we're really, really, really going to regret it.

The editors certainly make a valid point regarding the track record of the Bush Administration. It's important to force this Administration to pay attention to the long, hard, patient, frustrating slog at the level of institutions. Democracy can indeed be a devil once the details are examined -- both getting there and keeping it functioning to produce stable, effective governments. Fareed Zakaria wrote a best-seller about that in 2003 I seem to recall.

It's also true that one would be hard pressed to find many members of the Bush Administration who have demonstrated they have sound democracy-nurturing or institution-building instincts. They seem to fall either in the "we don't do institutions" school of Donald Rumsfeld or the "Dr Pangloss" school of Paul Wolfowitz. But the evolution of their policies in Iraq over the past year has shown they've done some learning, albeit the hard way, and they should be encouraged -- loud and often -- to keep up the good work, as I hope my most recent comments indicated.

I'm not sure which gets me more steamed -- the suggestion by the editors that Bill Clinton's efforts were misplaced to focus on strengthening the international economic architecture, halting destabilizing ethnic turmoil in the Balkans and bringing Yasser Arafat to a deal he should have taken, or the notion that the touchstone of US foreign policy for the foreseeable future is taking "democracy" -- whatever that may be -- to the dark reaches of the globe. They just can't get off their hobby-horse of remaking the world.

I do know that their rationale -- that the Bush Administration won't let liberals in on the action in places like Russia if we don't raise the ante -- is proof once again they don't understand how the Bush Administration plays politics. The proper role of liberals in the Bush universe is as punching-bag foils -- regardless of what any liberals actually do or say -- or as members of the anonymous cheering section well hidden behind the pom-poms on the sidelines.

But more important, the issues our policymakers have to deal with can't be addressed by sticking ideological labels on them. As I've noted before, the concept of "democracy" is content-free as a guide for policymaking. The choices facing the US are far more multifaceted and interdependent that some artificial choice between promoting "democracy" or acquiescing in "stability." And a single-minded "obsession" with remaking the world is as likely to erode American strategic strengths on a wide range of fronts as enhance its security from terrorists.

The problems US policymakers have today with Russia are not that Russia isn't democratic. There are certainly aspects of the Russian political system that are part and parcel of the irritations and tensions that are emerging in how Russia interacts with the rest of the world, and recent domestic political trends have exacerbated those external problems. But those problems would remain -- and might be substantially worse -- if Russia were overnight suddenly "democratic" or if "democracy" came to dominate the complex agenda the US and Russia share. Talking in terms of "democracy" is increasingly self-defeating in Latin America, where politicians of all stripes are working their way toward second-generation economic and political changes after the liberalizations of the 90s; and in doing so, they are often defining their visions in terms of how different they are from Washington. Does "democracy" help the US manage the lions' share of issues in its inter-hemispheric relations, which are principally in the economic and social spheres? Does "democracy" help the US find its way forward in defining evolving relations with China, or India, or Japan? Will it help Americans sort out when and where they should support interventions in horrific civil wars in Africa?

I have my own opinions on what US policies should and should not be doing on many of these issues, though I don't believe any are capable of clear-cut answers. What I do believe is clear, however, is that any group of self-proclaimed liberals who would criticize the Clinton Administration for failing to be sufficiently obsessed with democracy needs their collective heads examined. I certainly wouldn't look to them for guidance or trust them with either the fate of the US or of the global system. The French have an expression that I find apt for this sort of self-important nonsense: Ils ne sont pas serieux.

Warning, this is not a thoughtful post. This is a cranky post.

In "Time for a Rethink?" praktike offers a review of positive comments and views from the liberal or "left" part of the American political universe on the encouraging signs of political change in the Middle East. Though he points out some of the continued weaknesses of the Bush Administration's policies, he calls on opponents of the neocon approach to Iraq to get behind those Bush policies we can support. Time to be constructive.

This is not a new theme for prak, and it's an approach I've consistently endorsed. I've advocated elsewhere that opponents of Bush's foreign policy nonetheless give vocal support to specific policies that are consistent with what we ourselves would be promoting if the Bush team weren't still running the show.

With those principles in mind, I have been supportive of the shifts being made gradually over the past six months by the military field commanders in both strategy and tactics. I have been supportive of the shift in approach which appears to have been adopted by the US embassy since the handover to the interim government at the end of June. My most recent endorsements of Bush policies have included supporting the Iraqi elections and the Administration's broad strategy toward Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. I have repeatedly cautioned against reproducing a domestic Vietnam-style polarization. To my way of thinking, an America polarized by foreign policy debates is a dangerous America for the rest of the world. But I have also vigorously opposed the disinformation campaigns that the Bush Administration waged as part of the presidential campaign or the gamesplaying with military budgets and force planning. So I want it understood that these comments are not an attack on prak's overall intentions which I share.

Two things have me seriously out of sorts. First -- and more on a personal level than anything I suppose -- I am quite resentful of the notion that somehow, as a vocal critic of the Bush policies regarding the invasion and occupation of Iraq, I have something to explain or apologize for. I don't think I'm misreading the subtext, even coming from those who aren't engaging in the recent rounds of "traitors on the left" triumphantalist hyperbole. The suggestion seems to be that if as critics we "can't admit we were wrong," we're being partisan or we're somehow not for democracy and freedom. That it's our lot to accept the "olive branch" offered by the David Adesniks of a bipartisan policy based on "democracy promotion." Gracious in defeat, don't you know.

Sorry, if there is an olive branch to be offered by the victorious, it should in point of fact be extending the other direction, from those of us who have long advocated policies that the Bush Admnistration is only now begining to adopt. I am eager to be magnanimous in victory, but it appears quite unlikely that my branch will even be acknowledged by the Administration's supporters, let alone accepted by a foreign policy team that's never made a mistake.

This brings me to my closely related second source of crankiness. The so-called "left" is being diverted by the unnecessary self-justifying squawks that have been coming out of the liberal hawks. Those who opposed the first Bush Administration shouldn't be wasting time squabbling on who was more right or more wrong about the war. They should be joining together now be saying to the new Bush team, "Glad you guys have finally come to your senses. Nice to have you back on board." We should be looking forward, trying to make sense of this post-Iraq world that's starting to emerge, to see what we think about the current Administration's priorities and policies as they are starting to take shape.

As I see it, the Bush Doctrine and the Iraq adventure have represented a severe dis-continuity in American foreign policy, and we're now returning to something approaching our normal balance. This is an idea that requires a much longer and more developed essay that's still rummaging around in my brain. For purposes of this discussion, let's simply focus on the issues of political change (not other elements of global politics like NATO or environment, trade etc).   more »