Levine explains how attachment to the content-free but high-sounding moral sentiments of the neocons -- whether engaged by right or left -- impedes clear analysis, judgment and policymaking with respect to US policy toward Syria in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination. Though he doesn't frame his remarks in BushLite's terms of "democracy" and "freedom," he argues that such an approach -- of privileging moral sentiment over principles and analysis -- will often get in the way of "doing the right thing." [BTW -- I'd argue that the same sort of blindness is produced by the moral sentiments of those who see the Israelis as "the enemy" of liberty.]
Since Levine's remarks can't be understood out of context, and in any event the Syrian situation is certainly topic du jour, here's the background. Emphasis is mine.
Discussing Israel and Syria, Levine stated that "whatever is called the left" should support the Lebanese people, together with the diplomatic isolation of Syria by the US and France, until Syria is pushed out of Lebanon.
This "anti-Syrian" view (which is also consistent with the Bush Administration's stated policy to ratchet up diplomatic pressure for Syria's immediate withdrawal) was greeted by some surprise by Morgan Feis, a co-blogger. Levine explains:
The reason: because I questioned whether an alliance between the US and Israel to secure Israeli dominance of the region is a good idea. Basically, I questioned whether the strategy enunciated in the infamous ‘Clean Break’ policy paper is the right one. Morgan responded to this by asking whether I would rather see Syrian dominance of the region instead of Israeli dominance.
Levine continues:
I think this response captures something important about the way policy in the Middle East is discussed by neo-cons and certain liberal hawks. For these thinkers, political calculation is one that concerns, above all, the content and quality of one’s political opponents. One does not look at what is the right thing for us to do, one just looks at who is a friend or an enemy. (For certain delusional liberal hawks, the friend enemy distinction maps onto a distinction between morally good regimes and morally bad one’s. This allows them to moralize that which in essence is political).
By this logic, of course one supports Israel and not Syria. But this logic of analysis is totally bankrupt because it has no substance: the question is not whether to support Israel over Syria but a question of how to support Israel. Perhaps supporting Israel means helping Israel recognize that a policy of regional dominance is foolhardy. Perhaps it means trying to achieve a regional piece [sic] even if this means breaking bread with some less then savory characters. Of course, the adjudication of friend and enemy is an important part of the equation that goes into political judgment. However, when it becomes the almost single source of judgment, it clouds clear thinking.
This, of course, is fine for the political forces that take advantage of intellectuals whose critical faculties are paralyzed by the polarizing effect that this logic introduces into political discourse. Indeed, this is the secret of success for extreme nationalist or populist movements. Hopefully, our liberal intellectuals will in the future be better able to resist this demented political logic.
Good guys-bad guys; democrats and tyrants; freedom on the march: this is the language of non-thinking and non-policy. Of relegating the "how" -- the important stuff that makes or breaks policy -- to the realm of "my way or the highway." Of self-justification wrapped in language that deflects, dismisses and denigrates open and serious discussion. Of mass mobilization.
Levine's arguments reinforce my quarrel with Beinart and TNR's constant calls to put "liberal values" of democracy and freedom at the centerpiece of foreign policy.
The road they propose is simply illiberal -- based not only on elites calling the shots, but insulating their real strategies in ersatz moral trappings. And if the trappings aren't ersatz -- if they really will dictate policy -- then they'll lead to very bad policymaking. As Levine points out, they interfere with any clarity of assessment of reality and analysis of options.
I would add to that list -- the more successful you are in mass mobilization through defining enemies and stirring high moral passion, the less latitude you will enjoy in decision-making. You become prisoner of the political dynamics you have unleashed.