There are certainly substantial differences in the motives and means of intervention by leading nations today in failed states and regions of conflict when compared to those of the imperial nations of the colonial era. But many of the issues confronting both groups are similar, and there may be some broad lessons to be learned from the experiences of the colonial powers.

So argues a new book by an associate professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, Kimberly Zisk Marten. Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past compares the colonial activities of the United States, Britain and France at the turn of the 20th century with the post-conflict peace-keeping/peace-building operations of the 1990s (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor). Her study does not extend to the conflicts of this decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Reviewing the book in AsiaTimesOnline, David Isenberg sets out Marten's central observation and its broad implications for adjusting the policies and approaches of the intervening states. The intervenors have, typically, multiple objectives which may often be somewhat in tension, if not out-and-out mutually inconsistent. And of course the intervenors are operating under constraints, both internal to their own domestic politics and capacitites to act abroad and to the international arena. Isenberg, with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq summarizes the argument as follows:

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Marten's view, represent an oxymoron, or as she more politely phrases it, an "intertwined set of problems". It is the desire by the international community to avoid being tarred with the imperial label while attempting to exert what amounts to political control over foreign societies, and the need to encourage multilateral participation to achieve legitimacy while avoiding inconsistency.

Looking at past experience, both colonial and the most recent decade:

Among Marten's findings are the following:

• Powerful states in both eras have lacked the political will that would be necessary to gain control over political development in foreign societies;
• military organizations are one of the factors contributing to the lack of clear direction we find on the ground; and
• when properly directed to do so, disciplined soldiers can do a good job of providing public order.

The meaning of all this is that peacekeepers should try to limit their goals but expand their expectations of what military forces can reasonably do. Specifically, rather than trying to transform foreign societies, peacekeepers should be directed toward providing security and preventing anarchy in unstable regions of the world. [emph supplied ed.]

Shares some important observations with what Gen. Zinni has been talking about. Though I think both he and Thomas Barnett would say that, given the hyper-kinetic nature of today's combat, the US soldier or Marine who's at the tip of the spear or engaged in days of intense urban combat probably shouldn't be called upon to switch to a policing function within 24 hours of major combat operations.

Perhaps a fit with a somewhat less ambitious version of Barnett's SysAdmin? Martens' caution of not trying to use the force which "enforces the peace" to also transform the local political society is one that should be taken seriously.

I see that Daniel Drezner really, really likes Sebastian Mallaby's book about the World Bank and its head, James Wolfensohn. I just started it last night, and so far it's as good as Drezner says. As is my wont, I'd like to share a brief passage from it that relates to the current Colemanian brouhaha over Kofi Annan and the UN (btw, I'm willing to admit that I could well be wrong on the politics and/or the merits, especially given McCain's position).

Here's Mallaby:

We veer between contempts for international bodies--the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and likewise the World Bank--and unrealistic pronouncements on what they ought to do: forge peace, banish financial instability, lift every person out of poverty. It has become commonplace to say that our global institutions are not up to the challenge of our unprecedented global interdependence. But the reason for this mismatch lies partly in our shizophrenia. Sometimes we pour scorn on the Bank and other international bodies, and starve them of resources. Sometimes we talk as though they must have superhuman strengthm and we lumber them with impossible objectives.

That graf could have been written by our own inimitable Ms. Nadezhda, no? More concretely:

When President George W. Bush took office, it was the contempt that seemed most threatening. In 2001 and 2002, the Bush Treasury assailed the Bank with a mixture of aggression and plain ignorance, as this book will describe later [Note: I haven't gotten there yet. -p]. In early 2003, the Bank was left out of the planning for Iraqi reconstruction by the Pentagon, even though it had valuable experience from other nation-building exercises. The Pentagon's attitude did not prevent the Treasury from attacking the Bank for doing too little in Iraq; days after Jim Wolfensohn visited Baghdad in the summer of 2003, and days before a World Bank expert was killed by Iraqi insurgents, The Wall Street Journal published an editorial broadside about the Bank's lack of involvement in the country. Throughout this period, the very idea of the international system was called into question; some parts of the administration believed we lived in a unipolar world--that the United States was the international system. The unipolar fantasy is a trap, for it is only in military matters that American power is overwhelming. In the economic realm, the United States is the leading power, but it is not the only power; it depends on foreigners to open up trade, to prime the pump of global growth, and to provide savings that pay for the federal government's spending habits.

Idiots. Thomas Barnett would probably agree that you can't, er, connect "the Gap" to "the Core" unless you, um, actually try to connect them to the Core. Argh.

I'll likely never take the time to offer a comprehensive review once I finish the book, so treasure this brief snippet accordingly.

And now a question for our knowledgeable readers: do the regional combatant commands (e.g. CENTCOM) have liaisons to major international bodies like the World Bank, does the State Department handle those things on the ambassadorial level, are there interagency coordination groups back in Washington, do they employ their own development specialists, etc.? To make this more concrete, how (if at all) would someone in charge of World Bank development projects for Nigeria coordinate with United States European Command, who runs training projects for the Nigerian military (but doesn't talk about it on its website)? I bring this up in light of my growing concern about the militarization of American foreign policy. I thought this passage from Dana Priest's The Mission was particulary illuminating:

Operation Focus Relief said a lot about the times. For decades, the federal government and Washington's inside-the-Beltway brain trust had poured money into studying the Third World and Africa. Even so, no one had gotten very good at mapping out, and then executing, long-term strategies to solve Africa's massive problems. Funds and programs came and went with each new administration and each new majority in Congress. As a result, sixty U.S. soldiers might walk through hip-deep bushy fields with a battalion of underfed Nigerian soldiers, showing them how to conduct an ambush, but no cadre of U.S. economists flew there to train officials in the country's economic ministry. No legion of agronomists camped out in the middle of nowhere to help improve farming techniques. Battalions of teachers did not deploy to repair the educational system. The Peace Corps was marginalized and outdated.

Using the American military to address global problems had become almost a reflex in Washington. But even the best U.S. troops could deal only with the symptoms, not the causes, of incipient problems. Military programs did little to help political systems move from dictatorship to democracy, or economies from government control to the free market.

I echoed my concern in comments to Steve Clemmons, and a smart commenter responded:

Praktike, don't blame the CinCs (sorry, I mean "combatant commanders"); as Congress gutted our foreign service, the task of diplomacy didn't go away, it just devolved to the military. The CinCs are very cognizant of the importance of diplomacy, and they'd like a heck of a lot more civilian support in what they're doing. Our elected officials, Republican and Democrat, have basically abdicated much of their responsibility and forced unwanted responsibilities upon military leaders. (Shades of "The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012.")

To be clear: I don't blame the CinCs (most of whom "get it" and are trapped by the system). I blame Congress. Development alone won't solve the terrorism problem (and as Mallaby says, the World Bank can't exactly wave a magic wand), but boosting failed or failing states is part of a long-term solution. States that work and can find hope for their people are states that will fight terrorism. But we're eating soup with a knife on a global scale here, or using hammers on what look like nails but are actually screws, or whatever. I'm sure there's some cliche that sums it all up.

In any case, this has to change, because we're trying to solve problems too late, with too few resources, and sometimes with the wrong resources. Maybe we have to get more creative about boosting the non-military capabilites of the regional commands, or at a minimum, improve our coordination with, say, the World Bank, which employs thousands of brilliant technocrats. It benefits from having a board that, unlike the United Nations Security Council, isn't set up in such a way that politics routinely interfere with doing good; unlike the UN, it's well-funded and highly driven. Still thinking out loud here ... maybe the State Department should be reorganized to match the regional commands. Why, for instance, do State's geographic divisions not match the Pentagon's? Why doesn't "jointness" extend beyond the military?

Now ... tell me why none of these inchoate thoughts are realistic. Imagine that George Bush is not the current president if that helps my case.

Note: good thinkin', Matt, but the U.S. is not about to give up its veto.